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i 
Abstract 
This thesis makes contributions towards understanding the relationships between 
energy, economic growth, and macroeconomics by focussing on the linkages 
between oil prices and output growth as well as oil sector profits and the real 
exchange rate. Following an introductory chapter, Chapters 2 and 3 investigate how 
the oil price–macroeconomy relationship in the United States and the United 
Kingdom has evolved over time and draw comparisons between the two countries. 
As a part of this, I estimate time-varying vector autoregression models using a rolling-
window approach. I then used impulse response functions to estimate the size of an 
oil price shock of a standard magnitude. The findings in these chapters identify 
differences and similarities between the two countries in question, and suggest that 
the oil price–macroeconomy relationship is sensitive to variable choice, model 
specification, and sample period. Chapter 4 studies the existence of resource curse 
and the Dutch disease on a global scale in oil-exporting countries. Using a unique, 
large-N, large-T dataset, I find evidence of a long-run relationship between rents in 
the oil sector and the real exchange rate of oil exporters as well as short-run 
adjustment towards an equilibrium. Although non-OPEC members exhibit 
behaviour in line with theory, the impact on OPEC countries’ real exchange rates is 
the largest.   
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The problem now is that uncertainty hangs over the economy like a black cloud, 
emitting a steady, dampening drizzle. Oil prices remain high even though world oil 
production has returned to pre-crisis levels. Interest rates are slow to fall. Businesses 
are postponing investment decisions. And consumer confidence is plunging. Until all 
the uncertainty ends, an economic recovery is highly unlikely. 
 
Wall Street Journal, 3 December 1990 
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 General Introduction 
1.1 Energy and Economic Growth 
An economy’s long-run growth and development critically depend on its resilience 
and susceptibility to shocks (Balassa, 1986; Martin, 2012; Romer & Romer, 2004). 
Energy shocks have been placed in the centre of this observation, since growth-
inducing activities are highly dependent on access to energy. It has widely been 
observed that inexpensive access to energy could relate to economic growth. Given 
that oil has been the single most important source of energy in the global fuel mix 
since World War II, it has enjoyed the limelight for decades. The striking link 
between oil prices and US business cycles did not escape economists: almost every 
recession was preceded by a rise in energy prices (see Figure 2.1). Following oil crises 
of the 1970s, economists have sought to understand the implications of oil price 
shocks on the macroeconomy and confirm this casual observation. Among these are 
Hamilton (1983, 1996b, 2003, 2005), Hamilton & Herrera (2004), Rotemberg & 
Woodford (1996), and Kilian (2008). Although oil has lost market share to other fuels 
recently, it maintains its significance as the fuel with the largest share. As Figure 1.1 
shows, oil accounted for a third of global primary energy consumption in 2016 (BP, 
2017). Nordhaus (1980) and Nordhaus, Houthakker, & Sachs (1980) made early 
contributions to this theme by discussing channels through which oil prices may 
hinder economic activity and growth. Among others, Kümmel, Henn, & 
Lindenberger (2002), Ayres & Warr (2005), Allan (2009), and Stern & Kander (2012) 
have investigated the role energy plays in inducing or preventing growth. In basic 
terms, a rise in the price of oil raises the cost of energy which, with a price-inelastic 
demand, increases expenditure on energy. Oil products enter households’ 
consumption functions as well. Jointly, the impact is often reduced production and 
consumption of goods and services, which reduces GDP. In oil-importing countries, 
this also hurts the balance of payments and puts an upward pressure on prices.  
 
Using post-World War II data through the early 1980s, Hamilton (1983) found a 
statistically significant relationship between oil price increases and recessions in the 
US. Since then, researchers have observed shifts in the relationship—in terms of its 
statistical significance, the magnitude of the impact, and the characteristics of shocks. 
One major avenue of further investigation has been what makes economies more 
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capable of absorbing shocks and returning to the original growth path. Along this 
vein, there is some evidence that economic development itself enables countries to 
adjust to new economic conditions and bounce back more quickly. For example, 
Blanchard & Galí (2007) have argued that declining reliance on energy in production 
processes, more flexible labour markets, and better monetary policies can help 
ameliorate the detrimental effects of oil price hikes. In this line of work, Dhawan & 
Kesje (2006) found that developed economies have become more resilient to oil 
shocks since 1986, and Kilian (2009) argued that the nature of shocks matters. 
Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis add to this literature by introducing an alternative 
approach. Based on the findings, I argue that the observed relationship has links to 
underlying oil price volatility, and that modelling this explicitly helps understand the 
true nature of the oil price-macroeconomy relationship. 
 
The rich literature on the topic, inspired by Hamilton (1983), consistently identified 
negative impacts of oil price hikes on GDP in industrialised, industrialising, oil 
importing, and oil exporting economies (Ferderer, 1997; Jiménez-Rodríguez & 
Sanchez, 2005; Lee, Ni, & Ratti, 1995; Mork, 1989, 1994; Papapetrou, 2001). 
Numerous studies found that the impact of oil prices on GDP declined over time. As 
an example, Hamilton (1983, 1996b) estimated a larger impact coefficient for pre-
1973 than post-1973. Similarly, Baumeister & Peersman (2013a, 2013b), Blanchard 
& Galí (2007), and Kilian (2008) found a smaller and declining effect in the early 
1980s. More recently, oil price dynamics appear to be getting more complex: 
Hamilton (2009) and Kilian & Murphy (2013) concluded that price speculation 
played a role in the 2007-08 oil price fluctuations. For the US economy, most studies 
found a negative impact on GDP growth of an oil price increase too large to explain 
given the share of oil expenditures in GDP. Economic theory has struggled to 
describe this empirical finding (Atkeson & Kehoe, 1999; Rotemberg & Woodford, 
1996). In an effort to disentangle the underlying mechanisms, Kilian (2008) broke 
down the transmission mechanisms into roughly two categories. The first category is 
concerned with energy as an input into economic activity. Operating costs of durables 
that rely on oil as an input rises due to an oil price hike, which restricts their use. In 
addition, because demand for energy is expected to be price inelastic, rising costs 
decrease overall disposable income and reduce the consumption of other goods. On 
this basis, Finn (2000) argued that energy price shocks could act like technology 
shocks and hypothetically cause GDP fluctuations more than twice the magnitude 
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that would be expected given the share of energy in GDP. The second category 
relates to behaviour and expectations. Capturing these effects in traditional economic 
models is complicated and an asymmetric response of GDP to energy price variation 
is likely, as these effects tend to be stronger when energy prices rise than when they 
fall. An uncertainty effect underlies this. Changing energy prices often create 
uncertainty about the future path of energy prices and cause consumers and 
producers to delay irreversible investments (Bernanke, 1983; Pindyck, 1990). 
Additionally, rises in energy prices could induce precautionary savings for 
consumption smoothing, whereas a fall in prices would not provide as strong an 
incentive to spend existing savings. Evidence of an asymmetric response of GDP to 
oil prices as documented by Hamilton (1996b, 2003), Lee et al. (1995), Mork (1989, 
1994), and Mory (1993) suggests that this mechanism may play a substantial role in 
determining the GDP response to an oil price shock. This is another focal point of 
Chapters 2 and 3, where I provide a detailed overview of the relevant literature and 
discuss empirical findings based on the implemented methodology. 
Brief Remarks on the Global Oil Market and Prices 
There have been major changes in the global oil market over the sample period 
considered. The establishment of OPEC in 1960 and the 1970s price shocks signalled 
a fundamental change in the way the global oil market operated. Although there is 
an ongoing debate about the true underlying nature of these shocks, researchers agree 
that the events marked the emergence of a new regime in the market for crude oil. 
The balance of power had shifted from the Seven Sisters (multinational oil companies 
of the Consortium for Iran oligopoly, which dominated the global petroleum industry 
from 1940s to 1970s) to OPEC, and OPEC were not afraid to use their influence. 
Price controls used during this period in response to the sharp rise in oil prices 
exacerbated the impact and disrupted the day-to-day running of the economy. Figure 
1.2 plots global crude oil production by region in an effort to demonstrate the overall 
increasing trend in production—hence the size of the global oil market—and the role 
Middle Eastern producers play relative to the rest of the world. The dip in Middle 
Eastern production in 1974-75 corresponds to the OPEC oil embargo, and the 
shrinking contribution by the region’s producers observed in mid-1980s was short-
lived given the trend that followed. These are examples of large dynamics in the 
global oil market that could have profound economic impact across the globe. This 
is partly the motivation for the emphasis on sample period in Chapters 2 and 3.  
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Figure 1.1. World primary energy consumption in million tonnes of oil equivalent (MTOE) by fuel. Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2017. 
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Although informative, Figure 1.2 masks some OPEC versus non-OPEC dynamics, 
which are shown explicitly in Figure 1.3 along with an oil price series. The figure 
shows that the OPEC contribution was at its maximum in 1973 with 52% of global 
oil production. As noted previously, this corresponds to one of the fundamental shifts 
in the oil market not only in terms of price dynamics but also global perception of the 
commodity. Arguably, the events of 1970s have influenced perception so much that 
the economic impact of oil price changes is no longer only due to the fluctuations 
themselves but expectations around each shock as well. Thus, perhaps oil price 
changes should not be considered or modelled in isolation but within the context they 
occur. This is yet another motivation for Chapters 2 and 3, where oil price volatility 
before a price shock is captured. Observing OPEC countries’ contributions to global 
oil production in Figure 1.3 and slow economic growth figures for these countries 
prompted my interest in the resource curse and Dutch disease themes, which are the 
focal points of Chapter 4. 
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Figure 1.2. Global crude oil production by region in million tonnes (MT). Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2017. 
 
 
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
4500
5000
1
9
6
5
1
9
6
6
1
9
6
7
1
9
6
8
1
9
6
9
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
1
1
9
7
2
1
9
7
3
1
9
7
4
1
9
7
5
1
9
7
6
1
9
7
7
1
9
7
8
1
9
7
9
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
1
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
3
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
5
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
7
1
9
8
8
1
9
8
9
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
3
2
0
1
4
2
0
1
5
2
0
1
6
C
ru
d
e 
O
il
 P
ro
d
u
ct
io
n
 (
m
il
li
o
n
 t
o
n
n
es
)
World Crude Oil Production by Region
Asia Pacific Africa Middle East Europe & Eurasia South & Central America North America
  
7
 
 
Figure 1.3. OPEC and non-OPEC crude oil production in million tonnes. Oil price series is expressed in nominal (money of the day) terms with Arabian Light posted at Ras 
Tanura for 1965-1983 and dated Brent for 1984-2016. Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2017. 
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1.2 Resource Curse, Dutch Disease, and the Balassa-Samuelson Effect 
The relationship between oil price changes and economic growth is certainly not the 
only critical link in the wider energy-economic growth context. Another observation 
that has received ample attention is resource curse, where abundance of natural 
resources becomes an obstacle to development. Inexpensive access to abundant 
natural resources should, in theory, encourage growth and not hinder it. Therefore, 
observing the opposite effect in practice worldwide has become a paradox that is 
widely thought to have deep causes related to macroeconomic fundamentals. The 
resource curse, or the paradox of plenty, has a wide-reaching definition and is often 
used as an umbrella term for underlying fundamental mechanisms. It was originally 
coined by Auty (1993) and includes effects relating to exchange rate fluctuations, 
worse institutions in countries with abundant natural resources, less democracy, and 
so on. Together, these effects have made transforming subsurface assets, such as 
hydrocarbons, into surface assets, such as capital that generates employment and 
economic growth, challenging (Venables, 2016). With the exception of a few cases, 
such as Norway and Australia, most resource-rich countries have experienced 
lacklustre growth. Examples include Bolivia, Nigeria, Venezuela. Crucially, Ross 
(2012) noted about growth performance of resource-rich economies that “[…] the 
real problem is not that growth […] has been slow when it should have been normal, 
but that it has been normal when it should have been faster than normal.” 
 
The overview of the multi-stage process for economic implications of natural 
resource exploitation could be summarised as follows. Once resources are 
discovered, up-front investment is often required to develop them. The resulting 
revenues are then shared between the government, investors, and other parties. Each 
participant tends to have different incentives for seeking the resources, and revenues 
are used accordingly. To encourage growth, spending needs to be directed towards 
growth-inducing activities and those with particularly high social return. 
Unfortunately, these can be difficult to identify and in developing nations, there are 
considerable incentives to increase current spending instead of making investments 
for future social pay-off. Poor resource management could undermine economic 
growth, if investments are not made in sectors that can sustain jobs and stimulate the 
economy (Venables, 2016).  
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However, effective use of resource earnings does not eliminate all potential harm to 
growth. The Dutch disease effect suggests that even with job-creating investments, 
increased resource exports can appreciate the exchange rate and hurt other tradable 
sectors. If not addressed, this appreciation could crowd out other sectors, leaving the 
nation exposed to global fluctuations in a single sector. In this context, capability of 
governments as well as their far-sightedness and intentions play a pivotal role. 
However, most resource-abundant nations have poor institutional quality and often 
succumb to political corruption exacerbated by the nature of resource wealth. A 
mechanism closely related to Dutch disease, the Balassa-Samuelson (B-S) effect, also 
affects what implications natural resource abundance may have on economic 
performance. In the context of Dutch disease, capital inflows may appreciate a 
currency through a demand effect and the exchange rate appreciation leads to a loss 
of competitiveness in the tradable sector. Although there have been no changes in 
productivities in these sectors, they are less competitive on the global market. The B-
S effect is concerned with an aspect of this: positive wealth shocks due to high 
productivity in the tradable natural resource sector, such as oil production, result in 
higher demand for non-traded goods and services and create excess demand for them. 
This raises their prices, which includes input costs and wages, and squeezes profit 
margins in traded activities whose end products are influenced by the law of one price 
on the global market. In turn, these changes can have an economy-wide impact and 
slow down the growth process. 
 
Venables (2016) summarises observations about resource-rich economies and their 
potential growth-impeding characteristics in four patterns. First, many resource-rich 
countries are heavily dependent on these natural resources for income and fiscal 
revenues, and “fiscal dependency is particularly acute for oil producers” (Venables, 
2016). Second, savings have been low in resource-rich low-income countries. Third, 
resource-rich economies have had limited economic growth except just a few 
countries, which itself received plenty of attention. For example, Sachs & Warner's  
(1995, 1997) seminal work found GDP per capita growth to be negatively affected by 
natural resource dependence. The authors estimated that if natural resource exports 
as a percentage of GDP increased by 10 percentage points, annual GDP growth 
would be expected to fall by 0.77-1.1 percentage points. Fourth, revenues from 
natural resources—particularly from oil—are highly volatile. Most fluctuations are 
unpredictable and due to commodity price volatility. In this context, Venables (2016) 
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noted that resource rents, measured by the World Bank as gross revenues from oil, 
natural gas, coal, minerals, and forests minus their estimated extraction costs, have 
fluctuated between 1.5% and 7% of world GDP in the past two decades. Further, 
coefficients of variation of export revenues in resource-rich nations often exceed 
those in others by 100% for oil-rich countries—and to a lesser extent for mineral-rich 
countries (Venables, 2016).  
 
The complex and multi-channel nature of the link between natural resource 
production and consumption on the economy has made it challenging to identify 
why exploitation of these valuable resources has been so difficult to transform into 
wealth and development. Although there are some success stories, others have been 
cursed in an idiosyncratic way that is difficult to generalise. Despite this, conclusions 
can be drawn from a comparison of resource-rich nations that have achieved 
sustained growth and those that have not. In particular, as more and better data 
become available, determining the existence of Dutch disease and B-S-type effects 
has become feasible and robust. The section below provides an overview of each 
chapter’s structure, overview, and contributions.  
1.3 Chapter Structure, Overview, and Contributions 
Chapter 2 investigates the impact of oil price fluctuations on US GDP growth using 
a series of VAR models and quarterly data from 1950 through 2015. Impulse response 
analysis provides estimates of the size of the impact. Parameter estimates are 
analysed across model specification and sample period. As a part of the former, I 
focus not only on variable choice in each system but also on proxy choice for oil 
prices. Oil prices are modelled with and without asymmetry to assess empirical 
implications of each alternative. Further, oil price volatility is modelled using a 
GARCH (1,1) specification, which provides deeper insights into the characteristics 
of the oil price-GDP growth relationship. The importance of sample period for 
parameter estimates is investigated using both a static and a time-varying approach. 
The rolling-window time-varying parameter methodology provides richer insights 
and sheds light on some puzzles in the literature. In Chapter 2, I find evidence that 
oil price rises constrain US GDP growth. I also find strong evidence for asymmetry: 
increases in the price of oil affect GDP to a larger extent than price falls. The 
magnitude and statistical significance of the impact are time-dependent: although 
there is slightly weaker evidence for Granger-causality between oil price changes and 
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GDP growth in more recent years, the estimated impact is greater. I also discuss 
whether the seemingly-weaker relationship is due to a weaker underlying economic 
relationship or a weaker statistical relationship and worse model fit.  
 
Chapter 3 follows a similar structure to the previous one. The time-varying VAR and 
IRF techniques are implemented to analyse the oil price-macroeconomy relationship 
in the UK based on quarterly data from 1955 through 2015. This chapter highlights 
the differences and similarities between the US and UK, which leads to an interesting 
discussion around the two countries’ oil dependence, historical imports and exports, 
and how oil prices affect macroeconomic fundamentals besides GDP. Asymmetry of 
oil prices and modelling of price volatility are implemented here as a first for the UK 
and provide insightful conclusions about the economy. As a part of this, I investigate 
additional dynamics that apply to the UK as a small open economy, such as the role 
real exchange rates play and how this can be captured in model specifications through 
. Overall, I find a weakening link between oil prices and UK economy across time. 
Particularly after the UK became a net exporter of oil in the early 1980s, the nature 
of the relationship seems to have changed. The rolling-window implementation of 
IRFs provides details of this shift and its implications for econometric modelling.  
 
Chapter 4 turns to rents from the oil sector and what implications they may have on 
the real exchange rate. In this chapter, I make contributions to the Balassa-Samuelson 
literature by introducing a new and unique measure of oil rents into the analysis. This 
variable is based on upstream costs from Wood Mackenzie’s Global Economic 
Model and captures profits from the oil sector in a large number of countries. Two 
competing measures of oil rents were used in the analysis as a robustness check and 
to discern whether oil rents are expected to have a greater impact on the real exchange 
rate in countries where the oil sector constitutes a larger share of GDP. There is some 
evidence towards this, but both measures indicated an ambiguous relationship in 
OPEC countries with some coefficient estimates having an unexpected sign. Upon 
investigation, the unexpected results pointed towards failure of some B-S 
assumptions, including those stemming from labour market dynamics in OPEC 
countries. I exploit the large-N, large-T panel structure of the dataset and implement 
mean group and pooled mean group estimators as well as dynamic OLS. I find that 
the B-S mechanism holds in some oil-exporting countries but not all. For most 
countries, the relationship is non-negligible in size and statistically significant. 
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Surprisingly, non-OPEC members showed a particularly significant link between 
their real exchange rates and oil rents. The largest observed effect was for OPEC 
countries. Oil prices were identified as another covariate with coefficients of a similar 
size and sign to oil rents.   
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 Estimating the Oil Price – Macroeconomy Relationship: The 
Role of Model Specification and Sample Period  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This chapter analyses the oil price-macroeconomy relationship using vector 
autoregression models on quarterly US data from 1950 to 2015. As a part of the 
analysis, model performance is investigated across two broad aspects: model 
specification and sample period. First, I examine model performance with and 
without control variables and determine the role of price volatility at the time of oil 
price shocks. Then, I evaluate the impact of proxy choice for oil prices and the effect 
on parameter estimates of allowing for asymmetry in a VAR system. I also implement 
a time-varying approach using a rolling window in VARs and rolling IRFs. I find no 
clear evidence of the oil price-macroeconomy relationship weakening over time in a 
Granger causality sense, and the coefficient estimates do not fall substantially in post-
1986 data. Parameter estimates are sensitive to model specification and choice of 
proxy. Controlling for asymmetry is shown to be a favourable trait for VAR models 
in this context, as I find strong evidence for an asymmetric effect of oil prices on 
output growth across specifications, proxy, and sample period. Through impulse 
response analysis, a one-time, 10 percent rise in oil prices is estimated to cause a 0.14-
0.16 percent decline in output growth rate over 5 years in my pre-1986 sample, and 
a 0.30-0.34 percent over 5 years in post-1986 data. 
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2.1 Introduction 
For the past few decades, heavy global dependence on non-renewable energy sources 
has been considered a significant threat to sustainable economic growth. Hamilton 
(1983) observed in post-World War II data that about 90% of U.S. recessions were 
preceded by drastic increases in oil prices. As a result, the oil price-macroeconomy 
relationship became a central focus of research throughout the 1980s and 1990s, and 
it continues to remain that way. As has historically been the case, recent political 
turmoil in the Middle East has increased attention to the topic. Recently, the desire 
to control carbon emissions and to incorporate more renewables into the energy mix 
have raised interest in the subject. 
 
For net importers of oil, the nature of the relationship between oil prices and 
macroeconomic activity seems obvious: an oil price hike should, ceteris paribus, slow 
down economic growth through more expensive imports and other channels. 
However, despite numerous theoretical predictions and empirical studies, debates 
continue, and many researchers believe that the negative correlation between oil price 
rises and output growth dissipated after the 1980s. This chapter uses vector 
autoregression models to determine the impact of oil price changes on US output. 
The sample period in question starts from the first quarter of 1950 and runs through 
to the second quarter of 2015. Not all variables are available for the whole sample 
period and these are outlined in Section 2.4. 
 
The next section provides an overview of theoretical approaches, the literature, 
transmission mechanisms through which oil prices propagate, and observed 
characteristics of the oil price-macroeconomy relationship. Section 2.3 outlines the 
models used for empirical analysis in the paper, and Section 2.5 presents the results 
obtained from their implementation. As a part of the analysis, model performance is 
investigated across three dimensions in Section 2.5.3. Empirical analysis is finalised 
with a discussion of impulse response functions in Section 2.6, and Section 2.7 
concludes the analysis. 
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2.2 Theoretical Analysis and Literature Review 
2.2.1 Oil Price-Macroeconomy Relationship 
Cyclical behaviour of macroeconomic variables, the cause of such fluctuations, and 
their implications for welfare has attracted much interest and research among 
economists. In this context, two main strands of scholarly work have emerged within 
econometrics: predicting the paths of real macroeconomic variables in the presence 
of random shocks and forecasting when a recession is likely. Achieving the latter 
objective hinges crucially on identifying the underlying cause of recessions. In turn, 
this would facilitate timely policy interventions aimed at limiting the detrimental 
effects of exogenous shocks on economic activity.  
 
The link between oil price fluctuations and macroeconomic fundamentals—
particularly economic growth—became a central focus for research because post-
World War II data tell an interesting story as demonstrated in Figure 2.1: almost all 
US recessions were preceded by drastic oil price increases. 
 
Visually inspecting the data certainly seems to point in an obvious direction: 
increases in the price of oil lead to a fall in GDP growth. One of the objectives of the 
literature as well as this chapter has been to investigate whether this is merely a case 
of post hoc ergo propter hoc. If true, a rise in oil price would, ceteris paribus, be expected 
to cause a decline in real GDP growth. Although the a priori expectation is a negative 
correlation between oil price increases and GDP growth, some researchers have 
found that empirical results do not match what may theoretically be expected and 
what the data appear to reveal. Therefore, the rich literature has arguments for both 
sides.  
 
Hamilton (2005) pointed out that an OLS regression of GDP growth on its lags and 
the lags of logarithmic changes in nominal oil prices would be a simple but effective 
approach to determine the correlation, if any, between oil price fluctuations and GDP 
growth. This is shown in equation 2.1 below. 
 
  
1
6
 
 
Figure 2.1 Recessions and oil prices in the United States 
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𝑦𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑦𝑡−2 + 𝛽3𝑦𝑡−3 + 𝛽4𝑦𝑡−4 + 𝛽5𝑜𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝑜𝑡−2 + 𝛽7𝑜𝑡−3
+ 𝛽8𝑜𝑡−4 + 𝜀𝑡 
(2.1) 
 
where, 𝑦𝑡 denotes changes in real GDP in period t, 𝑜𝑡 changes in nominal oil prices in 
period t, and 𝜀𝑡 is the error term such that 𝜀𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜀
2). 
 
Hamilton's (2005) analysis found a statistically significant negative relationship between 
real GDP growth rate and lagged logarithmic changes in nominal oil prices using a 
dataset spanning 1949:21 through 1980:4. An F-test on the joint significance of the 
coefficients on oil prices confirmed the rejection of the null hypothesis that all 
coefficients on the lags of oil price changes are zero. Having observed this, Hamilton 
(2005) discussed two further findings: the impact of period considered and the 
transmission mechanism of oil price shocks. For the former, the model in equation 2.1 
was re-estimated using data through 2005. This led to a fall in not only the size of the 
coefficients of interest but also the statistical significance. As for the latter, through an 
output elasticity analysis, Hamilton (2005) deduced that “if these oil shocks did 
contribute to economic downturns, it would have to be attributed to the movements they 
induced in other factors of production rather than the value of the lost energy per se.” 
This chapter investigates both points, among others, by implementing a time-varying 
approach to observe the evolution of the relationship over time. Doing so within a VAR 
system allows controlling for indirect effects as well.  
 
Acknowledging the above observation, many researchers have opted for VAR and 
structural VAR models capable of capturing more complex relationships than OLS to 
reach a more robust conclusion (Abeysinghe, 2001; Dalsgaard, Andre, & Richardson, 
2002; Hamilton, 1983, 1996, 2003, 2005; Hooker, 1996a, 1996b; Jiménez-Rodríguez & 
Sanchez, 2005). Further analyses extended to macroeconomic variables other than GDP 
growth and concluded that oil prices have a statistically significant impact on the 
macroeconomy in general (Carruth, Hooker, & Oswald, 1998; Hamilton, 1983, 1996, 
2003, 2005; Raymond & Rich, 1997). In their estimations, many researchers use nominal 
                                                 
 
1 Dates are denoted as Year:Quarter. 
 18 
prices and argue that real prices can bias empirical results: by definition, real prices 
incorporate inflation, which is endogenous to the economy at any given time.  
 
A number of researchers further argue that the transmission mechanism between oil 
prices and macroeconomic variables is indirect and that the observed relationship 
between, for instance, GDP growth and oil price fluctuations is mostly due to the two 
variables’ correlation with a third one (Barsky & Kilian, 2001, 2004; Hooker, 1996b, 
1999). Implemented and popularised by Hamilton (1983), one approach to ruling this 
possibility out is to confirm that oil price fluctuations cannot be predicted by other 
variables in the model and their lags.  
 
Another key point of debate is the exogeneity of oil price shocks. Within this discussion, 
I differentiate between two types of exogeneity: macroeconomic and econometric. In a 
macroeconomic modelling sense, it would be difficult to argue for the strict exogeneity 
of oil price fluctuations since oil is an input to many production processes and has been 
the dominant source of energy for decades. However, this does not automatically imply 
econometric endogeneity of oil price fluctuations in a GDP growth equation of a VAR 
system. In fact, most oil price changes in history have been driven by exogenous factors, 
such as military conflicts, which provides evidence for the price shocks being exogenous 
(Hamilton, 1983, 2005). Further, the period considered in this chapter does not cover 
the increased oil production in the US through the so-called shale revolution. This is 
done intentionally to minimise endogeneity and avoid the risk of US production directly 
affecting the global oil price and, therefore, becoming endogenous. For much of 1950 
through 2015, US production and consumption were small enough relative to their 
global counterparts that exogeneity assumptions are plausible. Nevertheless, Hamilton’s 
exogeneity claims have been criticised in the literature. For instance, Hooker (1999) 
argued that oil price shocks acted through unemployment and that much of the impact 
of price hikes on output is indirect. More specifically, the author concluded that oil price 
increases lead to a heightened natural level of unemployment and impede output growth 
as a by-product. Another perspective was offered by Barsky and Kilian (2001, 2004), 
who argued that monetary policy—sometimes in response to oil price changes 
themselves—is the cause of some large drops in GDP growth. Since tests have 
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corroborated both claims under certain circumstances, such as model specification and 
sample period, I have included several control variables in my analysis. These include 
unemployment, 3-month TB rate, real wage inflation, and import price inflation, and 
they help isolate the true impact of oil prices. 
 
Another theoretical view with its origin dating back to late 1980s is the asymmetric 
impact of oil price shocks on output: an oil price increase may have a greater absolute 
effect on output than a fall in price. Several researchers found strong evidence for this. 
See Lee, Ni, & Ratti (1995), and Mork (1989) for early examples. This issue is discussed 
theoretically in Section 2.2.3, formally introduced in Section 2.3.2, and tested 
empirically in Sections 2.5.2 and 2.5.3. 
2.2.2 The Transmission Mechanisms 
The main channels through which changes in oil prices affect macroeconomic variables 
are largely agreed upon: supply side, demand side, and terms of trade. Even though the 
contribution of each channel can be case-specific, all three matter in most cases. To see 
how an oil price shock may propagate through the economy, suppose there is a rise in 
the price of oil. The immediate supply-side impact is increased production costs. 
Although firms can adopt streamlined and energy-efficient processes in the long run, 
frictions prevent these efficiency gains in the short run. This translates into a negative 
impact on supply in the short term, and the long-run impact is expected to be less 
pronounced. Even so, implementing changes in production processes comes at a cost. 
Firms need to pay fixed costs for training and infrastructure (Schneider, 2004). Given 
these additional costs, which may be affected by oil prices themselves, firms need to 
solve a new profit maximisation problem: is it optimal to continue an energy-intensive 
production process in the new price environment or is investment to improve energy 
efficiency warranted? Depending on which side of the threshold firms find themselves, 
this decision may lead to a bias in what we observe. If most firms opt to continue 
production as is, the effect of an oil price increase on GDP growth may appear negligible. 
 
On the demand side, the impact of the price increase is two-fold. First, since consumers 
demand oil products directly, the shock feeds into inflation and drives the general price 
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level up. Considering US transport sector has accounted for over two-thirds of oil 
demand in the past few decades, the price increase also affects individual goods. This 
decreases real disposable incomes across the economy and reduces aggregate demand 
(Schneider, 2004). Second, falling real wages put pressure on downward rigid nominal 
wages, lower the level of employment2, and lead to a fall in output. 
 
Since oil is a globally traded commodity, fluctuations in its price can affect nations 
through channels outside of their domestic economies. For an oil importing country, a 
rise in price are equivalent to an increase in import prices. This deteriorates terms of 
trade and, in many cases, welfare in importers’ domestic markets. Unsurprisingly, the 
magnitude of this impact depends on what fraction of import value oil accounts for: the 
greater the share of oil in total expenditure, the larger the impact of the shock 
(Rasmussen & Roitman, 2011).  
 
In addition to the supply, demand, and trade channels, oil price shocks can have a 
substantial impact on the financial sector and, by extension, on macroeconomic 
fundamentals. One main message from this rich and developing part of the literature is 
that investor and consumer confidence play a key role in their respective behaviours in 
the economy and the stock market. If such loss of confidence due to fluctuations in oil 
prices is reflected in stock markets, the overall impact could be amplified (Schneider, 
2004).  
 
Besides these transmission channels in the context of a laissez faire economy, researchers 
unanimously acknowledge that policy responses to oil price fluctuations can influence 
the final impact of the shock. For instance, in response to an oil price increase, an oil-
importing country’s central bank could attempt to mitigate the negative implications by 
manipulating the policy tools available. The extent to which policy affects the outcome 
can vary and is a point of debate. On one extreme, Bernanke, Gertler, & Watson (1997) 
argued that most of the impact of price shocks were caused by tighter monetary policy 
responses as opposed to the price fluctuations themselves. On the other end of the 
                                                 
 
2 I assume wages are rigid downwards and that the level of employment is determined by labour demand. 
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spectrum, Hamilton & Herrera (2004) claimed that restrictive monetary policy could not 
explain all of the impact of the shocks and that the direct effects were greater than those 
caused by policy responses. Since there are often many moving parts, it is difficult to 
disentangle the impact into its components. For instance, the monetary authority faces 
a trade-off between inflation dampening and output stabilisation and objectives can vary 
across countries. Similarly, each shock occurs under different circumstances and policy 
may be implemented differently for what appears to be the same type of shock. Although 
policy-making is beyond the scope of this chapter, the results can inform policy-makers 
and facilitate effective interventions. 
 
Oil price volatility is key as well. Frequent large oil price fluctuations increase 
uncertainty in the general economic environment and can affect consumer behaviour. 
Durable goods purchases, including real estate and cars, subside and can have economy-
wide trickle-down implications (Hamilton, 2005). Stock markets respond to volatility 
the same way. Periods of volatile oil prices are generally associated with lower investor 
confidence, which can lead to cautious trading. This effect has been demonstrated 
through a number of country-specific studies on the link between oil price volatility and 
stock market returns (e.g. Arekar & Jain, 2017; Sathyanarayana, Harish, & Gargesha, 
2018). From an modelling perspective, this chapter incorporates volatility into the 
analysis through the use of a GARCH model as outlined in Section 2.2.3, while Section 
2.2.4 provides an overview of the related literature. GARCH models are effective in this 
context, as they allow explicit modelling of unexpected shocks that surprise economic 
agents whose expectations are determined by historical trends. More generally, 
increased uncertainty often leads to precautionary savings, slowing down economic 
activity and, if sustained over a longer period, dampen economic growth. Pindyck 
(2004b) pointed out that persistent volatility has wide-reaching implications. Within the 
oil and gas sector, it can expose producers and industrial consumers to risk and influence 
their investment decisions. In turn, these have an impact on oil inventories and 
production and transportation facilities (Pindyck, 2004b). Outwith the oil and gas 
industry, volatility has an impact on commodity-based contingent claims and, therefore, 
derivative valuation and hedging decisions. Furthermore, firm may revise their 
investment decisions in physical capital linked to production and consumption of oil and 
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natural gas (Pindyck, 2004b). According to Pindyck (2004a), there are even wider 
implications. The author argued that volatility can affect the total marginal cost of 
production, which is reflected in firms’ operating options and the opportunity cost of 
current production. Generally, the higher the oil price volatility, the more uncertainty it 
creates and the more likely economic instability becomes in both oil-exporting and oil-
importing countries. If the volatility is linked to increasing oil prices, rising inflation 
following threatening a recession in oil-dependent countries. 
2.2.3 The Asymmetric Effect of Oil Prices 
Section 2.2.1 touched on the idea that the negative impact on GDP growth of a positive 
price shock may not have the same absolute size as the positive impact an equivalent 
negative price shock would have. Given the theoretical potential for this, a number of 
empirical studies have investigated and found evidence for a non-linear relationship 
between oil price fluctuations and output growth (Gronwald, 2012; Hamilton, 1996; Lee 
et al., 1995; Mork, 1989; Mory, 1993). The leading explanation for this phenomenon is 
the dispersion hypothesis, which states that frictions in reallocating factors of production 
across sectors exacerbate the detrimental effect of price fluctuations. In the context of oil 
price analysis, consumer behaviour in fuel-inefficient automobile industry is a good 
example of this. One of the immediate effects of an oil price hike is a fall in demand for 
fuel-inefficient vehicles. Since labour and capital are immobile in the short-run, factors 
of production cannot move freely from fuel-inefficient automobile industry to other 
sectors (Hamilton, 2005). This may lead to extended idle periods for labour and capital 
in this part of the economy following the sudden fall in demand, causing a potentially 
sizeable fall in output.  
 
Following a decrease in oil prices of the same size, however, demand for fuel-inefficient 
cars does not increase substantially. According to Atkeson & Kehoe's (1999) and 
Hamilton's (1988) theoretical models, technological costs of adjusting capital and labour 
to be adopted by other sectors could magnify the effects of oil price fluctuations on 
macroeconomic variables. In some cases, oil price decreases could reduce output growth 
in the short-run as capital and labour are reallocated to other industries (Hamilton, 
2005). Further, these models found that demand side output responses to oil price shocks 
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are not log-linear. Returning to the example above, consumers may postpone purchasing 
(fuel-inefficient) vehicles when oil prices increase but do not buy a second car when they 
decrease (Hamilton, 2005). 
 
Downward nominal wage rigidities also play a role in this asymmetric relationship 
between GDP growth and changes in the oil price. An increase in price reduces workers’ 
purchasing power and puts an upward pressure on wages as workers press for higher 
pay. Increased wages can, in turn, have implications for the level of employment, 
inflation, and more generally, aggregate demand and supply. On the contrary, nominal 
wages are largely unaffected (i.e., not adjusted downwards) if the oil price shock is a 
negative one and real wages rise.  
 
Empirically, the nature of the hypothesised effect of oil price fluctuations on 
macroeconomic variables appears to depend on a number of factors. For instance, 
sample period has been a key point of discussion in this context. Lee et al. (1995) found 
that statistical significance of the asymmetry hypothesis depends on sample period. 
Through pairwise equality tests of oil price increases and decreases, the authors 
concluded that the null hypothesis of equal positive and negative effects could not be 
rejected for the sample from 1949:1 through 1986:1. However, the same hypothesis was 
rejected for 1949:1-1988:2 and 1949:1-1992:3 samples, leading to the final conclusion 
that output growth appears to respond asymmetrically to oil price disturbances in recent 
samples and not in earlier ones. In their original analysis, Kilian & Vigfusson (2011a) 
used a Monte Carlo integration method to argue that GDP, consumption, and 
unemployment respond symmetrically to positive and negative oil price innovations. 
However, with a dataset updated to the fourth quarter of 2009, the authors rejected the 
null hypothesis of symmetry in response to a 2-standard deviation price shock (Kilian & 
Vigfusson, 2011b). Recently, Karaki (2017) repeated Kilian & Vigfusson's (2011a) 
analysis with data through 2016 and found that asymmetry could not be rejected for a 2-
standard deviation innovations and could only be rejected for small price shocks. This 
provided further motivation for the analysis in this chapter as normalised oil price shocks 
introduced in Section 2.3.3 can help shed light on the definition of a “large” price shock. 
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On a sectoral and firm level, the extent to which an oil price shock affects industry and 
firm output depends critically on the production processes: firms with capital intensive 
production processes, those with a high capital to labour ratio, and those that produce 
durable goods are affected most due to their energy requirements and hence 
susceptibility to price fluctuations in the energy sector (Davis & Haltiwanger, 2001).  
2.2.4 Literature Review 
Building on the previous subsections, this one aims to provide a general overview of the 
oil price–macroeconomy literature with a focus on how methodology, econometric 
models, and variable choice have evolved over time by discussing competing hypotheses.  
 
Theoretical and empirical papers examining the macroeconomic consequences of oil 
price shocks date back to early 1980s. A number of seminal papers have come out of this 
literature, which mainly focussed on the US economy. An early example of this is 
Hamilton's (1983) paper that spurred interest in the topic and made the observation that 
“all but one of the U.S. recessions since World War II have been preceded […] by a 
dramatic increase in the price of crude petroleum.” Estimating the relationship in 
question appeared an ordinary one at first: OLS was used to estimate the coefficient of 
interest. However, researchers noted that this type of analysis was missing a critical 
component: system dynamics. VAR models, popularised by Sims (1980), were adopted 
to account for this and remain the most widely used empirical approach to model the oil 
price – macroeconomy relationship.  
 
As with most empirical work, model specification and variable choice have been key 
points of discussion for the estimation of the theoretical relationship at hand. An issue 
that received particular attention is the choice of oil price variable. Bernanke et al. (1997) 
noted that “it is surprisingly difficult to find an indicator of oil price shocks that produces 
the expected responses of macroeconomic and policy variables in a VAR setting.” 
Various attempts have been made to capture the true nature of oil price shocks using 
different oil price measures and introduction of non-linear oil price specifications. Along 
this vein, Hamilton (2003) provided evidence for the non-linear nature of the oil price-
macro relationship, Hooker (1996b) investigated the stability of the relationship, and 
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Kilian (2009) argued that the underlying causes of oil price shocks change over time and 
that this matters for the relationship in question.  
 
Further, other scholarly work, including but not limited to Blanchard & Galí (2007), 
observed that the relationship between oil price shocks and macroeconomic 
fundamentals has evolved over the years. This observation provides part of the 
motivation for this chapter because it aims to observe, analyse, and ultimately address 
the econometric difficulties experienced by the literature through the use of time-varying 
parameters in a rolling-window impulse response approach. This is akin to Blanchard & 
Galí's (2007) bivariate rolling VARs but with larger VAR systems and, therefore, more 
complicated system dynamics. Large number of observations in my dataset has allowed 
a rolling impulse response analysis using high-dimensional VARs. Besides providing 
better system dynamics, this approach eliminates the need to conduct sophisticated 
structural break testing. The rest of this section provides an overview of how the 
literature has developed over the years and different specifications implemented to 
address obstacles along the way.  
Model Specification and Choice of Oil Price 
Using Sims' (1980) 6-variable quarterly VAR model for GDP equation as a basis, 
Hamilton (1983) found a strong causal relationship between oil price fluctuations and 
output growth based on U.S. data from 1948 to 1980. Mork (1989) repeated the analysis 
with data through the second quarter of 1988 and observed only a marginally significant 
relationship between oil price changes and real GDP growth. Hooker (1996b) further 
extended the dataset and claimed that the relationship between oil price changes and 
output growth was no longer statistically significant by the early 1990s. 
 
In his work mentioned above, Mork (1989) illustrated that oil price fluctuations only 
marginally improve the goodness of fit of Sims’ GDP equation when the sample period 
is extended into the 1980s. The author suggested that the findings differed from those 
made by Hamilton (1983) due to three main reasons: how oil prices are modelled, what 
oil price measure is used, and how monetary policy is controlled for. These three factors 
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had an influence on the direction of the literature as econometricians attempted to model 
these accurately.  
 
The VAR implementations became larger as longer time series became available. As a 
part of this, Mork (1989) proposed extending the 7-variable system into an 8-variable 
one in order to allow for an asymmetric oil price impact. He did this by splitting oil price 
fluctuations into their positive and negative counterparts. In addition, Mork proposed 
two further fundamental changes to Hamilton's (1983) approach. First, he argued that 
refiner’s acquisition cost of crude oil is a better proxy for oil price than the traditionally-
used producer price index in crude petroleum. The biggest justification for this was the 
bias in what PPI measured in the 1970s, as it reflected only the controlled prices of 
domestically produced oil (Mork, 1989). Second, he suggested replacing M1 with 3-
month TB rate to capture the behaviour of monetary policy makers. Through these 
changes, Mork improved the accuracy of the test and observed an asymmetric 
relationship between oil price fluctuations and GDP growth. Like Mork, I opted for 3-
month TB rate as the measure of monetary policy. This variable is key to the analysis, 
since policy implementations in response to an oil price shock could distort the observed 
impact on macroeconomic performance. As an example, looser monetary policy in 
response to an oil price rise could potentially outweigh the effects of the original shock. 
Given the established relationship between interest rates and GDP growth, the a priori 
expectation is a negative coefficient on the 3-month TB rate. I find some evidence 
towards the importance of modelling interest rates appropriately in later sections, 
although the effect appears to be time- and specification-dependent. The motivation for 
choosing TB rate instead of an alternative measure, such as the federal funds rate, is 
twofold. First, what matters for agents’ decisions most is the interest rate and yield 
available to households and firms through the bill rates as opposed to the official rate set 
by the Fed. Second, 3-month bills are shortest-term assets and are likely to reflect the 
changes in the federal funds rate and adjust more rapidly. In this sense, it would be less 
justifiable to use TB rates with much longer maturities, as factors other than the 
underlying rate set by the central bank are more likely to bring in noise into the observed 
series.  
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Lee et al. (1995) proposed building upon Mork's (1989) analysis by modelling the 
volatility of oil prices. The authors argued that, ceteris paribus, unexpected oil shocks have 
a larger impact on GDP growth than expected ones. Further, the authors observed that 
surprise shocks tend to have a higher statistical significance. To observe this, the authors 
re-estimated Mork's (1989) 7-variable VAR model. The variables involved were real 
GDP growth, GDP deflator inflation, 3-month TB rate, unemployment rate, wage 
inflation measured as the average hourly earnings for production workers in 
manufacturing, import price inflation, and oil price changes. The extended model added 
a new oil price variable that captured the “unanticipated component of real oil price 
movement and the time-varying conditional variance of oil price change forecasts” (Lee 
et al., 1995). This variable evaluates how different the current shock is from the prior 
distribution of oil prices in an attempt to capture the effect of unexpected price shocks. 
Although the sets of results from the two studies could not be compared directly due to 
data source and format differences,3 Lee et al. (1995) found this variable to be highly 
correlated with GDP growth in various sample periods. Section 2.5.3 investigates 
whether this is still the case with an updated dataset. 
 
Lee et al. (1995) has been a stepping stone for introducing normalised oil price shock 
variables into VAR systems to account for the surprise element of a shock. This has been 
a critical step forward in understanding the impact of unexpected shocks on 
macroeconomic fundamentals as well as how, if at all, they differ from their expected 
counterparts. Unsurprisingly, this approach requires us to categorise oil price 
fluctuations and define which ones are unexpected. In practice, this could be modelled 
in various forms. A robust and relatively uncomplicated approach implemented by Lee 
et al. (1995) used a univariate generalised autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity 
error process to compute the unexpected part and conditional variance of the oil price 
shock. In this chapter, I adopt this process and give further details of the GARCH model 
implementation in Section 2.2.3.  
 
                                                 
 
3 Lee et al. (1995) used quarterly data from a different source, whereas Mork (1989) had monthly series. 
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Lee et al. (1995) found empirical evidence that an unexpected oil price shock has a 
greater effect on output than an anticipated one. Given the implementation of 
unanticipated oil price shocks, this translates into a shock having greater impact on GDP 
growth if it immediately follows a long period of stable prices. Similarly, an oil price 
fluctuation of the same magnitude is expected to have a smaller impact on output growth 
if it is preceded by a period of volatile prices. The authors observed that although parts 
of the literature found oil price shocks to have lost their statistical significance in recent 
decades, the normalised price shocks remained important. The conclusion was, 
therefore, that oil price fluctuations remain relevant in explaining macroeconomic 
activity when price variability is captured.  
 
In contrast, others have argued that the robust relationship between oil prices and 
macroeconomic variables broke down after the highly volatile oil price movements of 
the 1980s. From the middle of 1990s onwards, a number of analyses emerged empirically 
testing this claim. As an example, Hooker (1996b, 1999, 2002) observed that mainstream 
model specifications led to considerably different outcomes when differing sample 
periods were considered. The author argued, therefore, that oil price fluctuations affect 
macroeconomic fundamentals indirectly; they propagate through interest rates, 
unemployment, and inflation such that an oil price shock may induce a departure from 
Okun’s law. Building on the existing literature, this chapter revisits and reassesses the 
relationship between oil price and macroeconomic activity. As a part of this, I compare 
model performance across specifications and sample periods as well as investigate the 
effects of variable choice. Sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3 outline the implementation of these 
models, and their output is presented in Sections 2.5.2 and 2.5.3. 
2.2.5 Structural Interpretation of the Model 
The VAR models adopted as part of the analysis here have an implicit structural 
assumption via variable ordering. As is the norm with VARs, explanatory variables have 
been used in order of exogeneity. However, sensitivity analysis using different variable 
ordering has shown that the main results are not sensitive to this choice. In an effort to 
identify different transmission mechanisms and differentiate between the US (discussed 
in this chapter) and the UK (discussed in the next chapter), I adopt a simple 
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macroeconomic model. This model is in line with Blanchard & Galí's (2007) work and 
has a similar focus: explaining the different response of the economy to oil price shocks 
across time.  
 
Like Blanchard & Galí (2007), I start with a standard new-Keynesian model. Oil is then 
introduced as an input to firms’ production function as well as direct consumption. For 
an oil importer whose demand is not large enough to influence the global oil price, 
fluctuations in the price of oil are exogenous. This is a key difference between this 
chapter and the next, as the UK has had a more complex history with oil trade. This 
aspect of the underlying model forms the basis of the different interpretation and results 
observed in the two chapters. This is discussed further in the next chapter. Lastly, in the 
labour market, wages are rigid downwards. This section provides a brief overview of the 
log-linearised model implemented in this chapter as adopted from Blanchard & Galí 
(2007).  
Oil as an input to consumption and production 
Oil features in the model in two ways: as in input for firms’ production and as a direct 
input into consumption. Production and consumption are given by the following two 
equations. 
𝑞𝑡 = 𝑎𝑡 + 𝛼𝑛𝑛𝑡 + 𝛼𝑚𝑚𝑡 (2.2) 
𝑐𝑡 = (1 − 𝜒)𝑐𝑞,𝑡 + 𝜒𝑐𝑚,𝑡 (2.3) 
where  
𝑞𝑡 Domestic output 
𝑎𝑡 Exogenous technology parameter 
𝑛𝑡 Labour 
𝑚𝑡 Imported oil used in production 
𝑐𝑡 Consumption 
𝑐𝑞,𝑡 Consumption of domestic production 
𝑐(𝑚,𝑡) Consumption of imported oil 
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There are two points of note here. First, 𝛼𝑛 + 𝛼𝑚 ≤ 1. Second, there are two prices at 
play – the price of domestic production (𝑝𝑞,𝑡) and the price of consumption (𝑝𝑐,𝑡). If 𝑝𝑚,𝑡 
is the price of oil and the real price of oil is given by 𝑠𝑡 = 𝑝𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑝𝑞,𝑡, the consumption 
equation implies 𝑝𝑐,𝑡 = 𝑝𝑞,𝑡 + 𝜒𝑠𝑡 such that an increase in the real price of oil raises the 
consumption price relative to the price of domestic output.  
Households 
Two equations determine the behaviour of households: 
𝑐𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡{𝑐𝑡+1} − (𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸{𝜋𝑐,(𝑡+1)}) (2.4) 
𝑤𝑡 − 𝑝(𝑐,𝑡) = 𝑐𝑡 + 𝜙𝑛𝑡 (2.5) 
where  
𝑖𝑡 Nominal interest rate 
𝜋𝑐,𝑡 ≡ 𝑝𝑐,𝑡 − 𝑝(𝑐,(𝑡−1)) Inflation 
𝑤𝑡 Nominal wage 
𝑛𝑡 Employment 
𝜙 Frisch elasticity of labour supply 
 
Equation 2.5 implies that wages equal the marginal rate of substitution between 
consumption and leisure. To introduce real wage rigidities, equation 2.5 can be modified 
to include a parameter, 𝛾 ∈ [0, 1], that aims to capture the idea that real wages may not 
respond to labour market conditions as implied by a model with perfectly competitive 
markets. This modified version is given in equation 2.6.  
𝑤𝑡 − 𝑝(𝑐,𝑡) = (1 − 𝛾)(𝑐𝑡 + 𝜙𝑛𝑡) (2.6) 
 
Firms 
Firms’ cost minimisation problem, together with the production function, implies that 
their demand for oil is 𝑚𝑡 = −𝜇𝑡
𝑝 − 𝑠𝑡 + 𝑞𝑡, where 𝜇𝑡
𝑝
 denotes the price mark-up. 
Substituting for 𝑚𝑡 in equation 2.2 yields the following reduced-form production 
function: 
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𝑞𝑡 =
1
1 − 𝛼𝑚
(𝑎𝑡 + 𝛼𝑛𝑛𝑡 − 𝛼𝑚𝑠𝑡 − 𝛼𝑚𝜇𝑡
𝑝) (2.7) 
 
Hence, output is inversely related to the real price of oil, 𝑠𝑡, for a given level of 
employment and technology. Further, for a given level of productivity, a rise in the real 
oil price could have one or more of the following effects: (1) lower wages, (2) lower 
employment, and (3) lower mark-up.4 In a world with perfectly competitive labour 
markets and flexible prices and wages, a rise in the price of oil would be reflected entirely 
on wages. However, as noted and demonstrated by Blanchard & Galí (2007), sticky 
prices mean that wages respond less and that mark-ups vary as a result. This is a critical 
dynamic for the asymmetric impact of oil price changes on macroeconomic 
fundamentals. For instance, this structural setup implies an increase in the price of oil 
may lead to lower wages, higher unemployment, or lower mark-up. A decrease, 
however, does not necessarily lead to the opposite outcome in each of these. More 
specifically, a fall in oil price may not lead to higher wages or lower unemployment. 
Because mark-ups are flexible, lower cost of production may – at least in the short run – 
lead to a higher mark-up with little change in wages and unemployment level.  
The Effect of Oil Prices on Inflation 
At the equilibrium, the relationship between inflation and the real oil price can be shown 
to be  
𝜋𝑞,𝑡 = 𝛽𝐸𝑡{𝜋𝑞,𝑡+1} + 𝜆𝑝Γ𝑛𝑛𝑡 + 𝜆𝑝Γ𝑠𝑠𝑡 − 𝜆𝑝Γa𝑎𝑡 (2.8) 
where 
Γ𝑛 ≡
(1 − 𝛼𝑛 − 𝛼𝑚)𝛾 + (1 − 𝛼𝑚)(1 − 𝛾)(1 + 𝜙)
(1 − (1 − 𝛾)(𝛼𝑚 − (1 − 𝛼𝑚)𝜂))
≥ 0 
Γ𝑎 ≡
𝛾
(1 − (1 − 𝛾)(𝛼𝑚 − (1 − 𝛼𝑚)𝜂))
≥ 0 
Γ𝑠 ≡
𝛾(𝛼𝑚 + (1 − 𝛼𝑚)𝜒)
(1 − (1 − 𝛾)(𝛼𝑚 − (1 − 𝛼𝑚)𝜂))
≥ 0 
                                                 
 
4 Further details of the model as well as the derivation of the relationships are given in Blanchard & Galí 
(2007). 
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𝜂 ≡
𝛼𝑚
Μp − 𝛼𝑚
 
such that Μp denotes the levels of steady 
state gross mark-up 
 
Therefore, in simple terms, an increase in the real price of oil is expected to raise 
domestic inflation directly through equation 2.8. 
2.3 Models and Methodology 
My analysis of model performance and the estimation procedure begins with a base 
model similar to that used by Hamilton (1983). This model is then progressively 
extended to incorporate the ideas put forth by Mork (1989) and Lee et al. (1995). At that 
stage, time-varying parameters are estimated using a rolling-window technique to 
provide further insights as to the nature of the oil price – macroeconomy relationship 
and how it may have evolved over time. Variables used in the estimation are listed in 
Section 2.4 and have been selected based on the debate and criticisms in the relevant 
literature. As in most recent studies, GDP is used as the measure of output as opposed 
to GNP, although Sims’ original VAR model used the latter. All estimations presented 
in Section 2.5 using GDP have been repeated with GNP, but the results did not change 
substantially.5 In addition, whether nominal or real GDP should be used in the system 
has been a point of controversy. Hamilton used nominal log differences in output growth 
because the implicit deflator itself is included in the model and this gives identical results 
to using real log differences (Mork, 1989). Lastly, some researchers, including Hamilton 
(1996b), have deflated their measure of output using PPI in all commodities. I find this 
to be problematic, because it introduces an artificial correlation between oil prices and 
deflated GDP, since some commodities that enter the PPI measure are oil-related 
products. As a result, my analysis uses PPI in finished goods to deflate GDP.6 Lastly, it 
is important to note that oil price changes are captured using two proxies: PPI in crude 
petroleum and RAC. Hamilton has been criticised for using PPI as a measure of oil 
                                                 
 
5 The difference between GDP and GNP is not substantial for the US, but if the analysis were to be 
repeated for a country like Mexico, GDP should be preferred, since income earned by Mexican residents 
abroad constitutes a considerable fraction of the country’s GDP. 
6 The estimation was repeated using GDP deflated using PPI in finished goods and CPI with a base year, 
but the sign and significance of the resulting parameter estimates remained unchanged. 
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prices, and the use of RAC has been proposed as a robust alternative. In my analysis, 
the entire estimation procedure is repeated using each of these variables in order to 
evaluate relative performance and the robustness of the VAR systems. 
2.3.1 The Base Model 
The base model is an extension of Sims' (1980) VAR specification. The 6-variable VAR 
system proposed by Sims is expanded to include an oil price variable. This 7-variable 
system consists of GDP growth, oil price changes, GDP implicit deflator inflation, 3-
month TB rate, real wage inflation, unemployment, and import price inflation.7 
Estimation results and empirical analysis using this model are given in Section 2.5.1. 
2.3.2 Asymmetric Effects Model 
The first extension to the base model incorporates the asymmetric response idea 
popularised by Mork (1989) and later adopted by Lee et al. (1995) and Hamilton (1996). 
To evaluate the effects of oil price increases and decreases separately, oil price changes 
are split into two distinct parts. The resulting variables are added to the VAR resulting 
in an 8-variable system. Denoting oil price changes as 𝑜𝑡, the new variables are generated 
as follows: 
𝑜+ = {
𝑥, 𝑥 > 0
0, 𝑥 ≤ 0
 
𝑜− = {
0, 𝑥 ≥ 0
𝑥, 𝑥 < 0
 
(2.9) 
 
The regression results using this specification are analysed in depth in Section 2.5.2. It 
is worth noting here that although this chapter has opted for this method to capture 
asymmetry, other methods, such as threshold autoregressive (TAR) models, could also 
be implemented. The reason was this choice two-fold. First, this asymmetry 
implementation is an intermediate step in the build-up to a normalised oil price variable. 
Second, the threshold approach limits the distribution of the least squares estimator and, 
                                                 
 
7 Due to data availability, the estimated base model specification is limited for some sample periods. Please 
see the section 2.4 for details. 
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despite being consistent under some regularity assumptions, has some shortcomings. 
Three key issues raised in the TAR literature relate to 1) the unverifiable nature of strong 
assumptions, 2) the testing for linearity and, therefore, the validity of using TAR as an 
alternative, and 3) the difficulty in the inference of the threshold parameter. Tong (2011) 
discussed the latter two points and, as noted in Hansen (2011), highlighted that the 
threshold parameter is required to construct confidence intervals. Although Hansen 
(2000) proposed a nuisance parameter-free asymptotic approximation, some modelling 
difficulties remain.  
2.3.3 Normalised and Net Oil Price Model 
Lee et al. (1995) proposed a further extension to capture the nature of oil price 
fluctuations more accurately. Using a univariate GARCH (1,1) process, the authors 
calculated the conditional variance of oil price changes and used it to normalise 
unanticipated real oil price fluctuations (Lee et al., 1995). These normalised oil price 
changes aim to capture the idea that small price increases within volatile periods are 
predicted to have little effect on economic agents’ behaviour “if they do not push agents 
across time-varying S,s bands or generate enough uncertainty to delay irreversible 
investments” (Hooker, 1999). Lee et al. (1995) proposed using positive and negative 
normalised price shocks in addition to non-normalised ones in order to introduce an 
additional degree of asymmetry into the model. In the literature, these variables are 
referred to as scaled oil price increases (SOPI) and scaled oil price decreases (SOPD). By 
construction, SOPI incorporate the surprise factor through changes in variance and not 
in the level of oil price. That is, the mean of real oil price changes may rise over time 
without agents being surprised as long as the new distribution of oil price changes 
remains the same. These variables are constructed as follows: 
𝑧𝑡 =  𝛼0 +  ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝑧𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜀𝑡
4
𝑖=1
 (2.10) 
ℎ𝑡 =  𝛾0 +  𝛾1𝜀𝑡−1
2 + 𝛾2ℎ𝑡−1 (2.11) 
Here, 𝜀𝑡|𝐼𝑡−1~𝑁(0, ℎ𝑡), and 𝑧𝑡 are oil prices measured as the change in RAC. The 
unexpected part of the oil price shock is simply the residual term of equation 2.10, 𝜀?̂? =
𝑧𝑡 − 𝑧?̂?. Normalised oil price shocks are then calculated as, 
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𝜀𝑡
∗ = 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑂𝑖𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘 =
𝜀?̂?
√ℎ𝑡
 (2.12) 
 
This variable is then split into two parts as, 
𝑆𝑂𝑃𝐼𝑡 = 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑂𝑖𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘 (𝜀𝑡
∗+) = max(0, 𝜀𝑡
∗) (2.13) 
𝑆𝑂𝑃𝐷𝑡 = 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑂𝑖𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘 (𝜀𝑡
∗−) = min(0, 𝜀𝑡
∗ )  (2.14) 
 
Assuming unexpected variation in real oil prices has an impact on how the price shocks 
affect real output, the normalised variable, 𝜀𝑡
∗, is predicted to have a “more systematic 
causal relation to real GDP than either 𝑧𝑡 or 𝜀?̂?” (Lee et al., 1995). 
 
Hamilton (1996) proposed an alternative to scaled oil price changes: net oil price 
increases (NOPI). This variable is defined as the amount by which log oil prices in 
quarter 𝑡 exceed the maximum value over the past four quarters. If log oil price in the 
current quarter does not surpass any of the previous 4 values, NOPI takes on the value 
of 0. Therefore,  
𝑁𝑂𝑃𝐼𝑡 =  max(0, 100 × {ln(𝑜𝑡) − ln [max(𝑜𝑡−1, 𝑜𝑡−2, 𝑜𝑡−3, 𝑜𝑡−4)]}) (2.15) 
 
Here, 𝑜𝑡 denotes the same oil price series used by Mork (1989), but in quarterly 
frequency. Having observed asymmetric effects in their empirical models, some 
researchers, including Hamilton (1996), have used only oil price increases (NOPI or 
SOPI) in their estimations. This introduces an extreme level of asymmetry into the 
model by entirely ignoring the effect of oil price decreases. Such changes in price can, of 
course, be captured using SOPD. This chapter focuses on overall model performance 
and robustness and, therefore, uses all three variables in the analysis. This is discussed 
further in the Empirical Results section (2.5) below. Finally, a summary of model 
specifications used in the analysis is given in Table 2.1 below. 
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Model 
Specification 
GDP 
Growth 
Oil 
Price 
Change 
Oil 
Price 
Increase 
Oil Price 
Decrease 
Normalised 
Oil Shock 
Normalised 
Positive Oil 
Shock 
Normalised 
Negative 
Oil Shock 
Net Oil 
Price 
Increase 
GDP 
Deflator 
Inflation 
3m 
TB 
rate 
Unemp. 
Rate 
Real 
Wage 
Inflation 
Import 
Price 
Inflation 
Base Model             
Asym. Eff. 
Model             
6-variable 
System 1             
6-variable 
System 2             
6-variable 
System 3             
7-variable 
System 1             
7-variable 
System 2             
7-variable 
System 3             
8-variable 
System 1             
8-variable 
System 2             
8-variable 
System 3             
NOPI 
System 1             
NOPI 
System 2             
NOPI 
System 3             
 
Table 2.1. Model specifications. 
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2.3.4 Impulse Response Analysis 
Impulse response analysis used in this chapter and the next is a standard approach. 
This section provides an overview of the implementation, interpretation, and details 
of the technique. Since the impulse response functions (IRFs) are implemented 
following a VAR model, I started with a 𝑝th order VAR with exogenous variables 
given by 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝑣 + 𝐴1𝑦𝑡−1 + ⋯ + 𝐴𝑝𝑦𝑡−𝑝 + 𝐵𝑥𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡 (2.16) 
where 𝑦𝑡 is a 𝐾 × 1 vector, 𝐴𝑖 are 𝐾 × 𝐾 matrices of parameters, 𝑥𝑡 is an 𝐿 × 1 vector 
of exogenous variables, 𝐵 is a 𝐾 × 𝐿 matrix of coefficients, and 𝑢𝑡 is a white noise 
error term with 𝐸(𝑢𝑡) = 0, 𝐸(𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑡
′) = Σ, and 𝐸(𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑠
′ ) = 0 for 𝑡 ≠ 𝑠.  
 
The VAR has a moving-average representation if it is stable (Lütkepohl, 2005). 
Therefore, assuming the variables are covariance-stationary and there is no high-
order autocorrelation, it can be rewritten as 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝜇 + ∑ Φ𝑖𝑢𝑡−𝑖
∞
𝑖=0
 (2.17) 
where 𝜇 is the 𝐾 × 1 mean of 𝑦𝑡.  
 
IRFs describe how the innovations to one variable affect another one after a certain 
number of periods. In this notation, Φ𝑖 are IRFs and the 𝑗, 𝑘 element of Φ𝑖 represents 
the impact of a one-time unit increase in the 𝑘𝑡ℎ element of 𝑢𝑡 on the 𝑗𝑡ℎ element of 
𝑦𝑡 after 𝑖 periods. Φ𝑖 have the following representation 
Φ𝑖 = {
𝐼𝐾
∑ Φ𝑖−𝑗𝐴𝑗
𝑖
𝑗=1
 
if 𝑖 = 0 
if 𝑖 = 1, 2, … 
(2.18) 
 
In a time-series context, 𝑢𝑡 are contemporaneously correlated, however, which 
implies equation 2.17 cannot provide a causal inference. In other words, a shock to 
one variable in the system would imply shocks to others making it impossible to hold 
everything other than the intended shock constant. A workaround to this is the 
Cholesky decomposition, which helps rewrite equation 2.17 in terms of mutually 
uncorrelated innovations. This leads to the so-called orthogonalised IRFs that do 
allow a causal interpretation.  
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2.4 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The data are from various sources but were downloaded from Thomson Reuters 
Datastream in quarterly frequency. All variables in the VAR system, with the 
exception of real wage inflation, are expressed in natural logarithm. Since the 
variables exhibit non-stationarity and are determined to be integrated of order 1, their 
first differences are used. Time trend is also removed from the variables where 
appropriate. In this analysis, de-trending was applied to GDP deflator, import price 
inflation, unemployment rate, and 3-month TB rate. Table 2.2 summarises the 
variables, data treatment, period of availability, and sources.  
 
Variable Description Period Data Treatment Source 
GDP 
Gross Domestic 
Product ($2009) 
1950:1 - 
2015:2 
Natural log, first 
difference, deflated 
using PPI in finished 
goods 
Bureau of 
Economic 
Analysis 
GDP deflator 
Chain-type price 
index of GDP 
1950:1 - 
2015:2 
Natural log, de-
trend, first difference 
Bureau of 
Economic 
Analysis 
PPI in crude 
petroleum 
Index, 2009=100 
1950:1 - 
2015:2 
Natural log, first 
difference 
Bureau of 
Labor 
Statistics 
Refiners' 
acquisition cost 
Refiners' 
acquisition cost of 
domestic & 
imported crude oil 
1974:1 - 
2015:2 
Natural log, first 
difference 
Department 
of Energy 
Import price 
index 
Import Prices, All 
commodities, 
Index, 2000=100 
1982:3 - 
2015:2 
Natural log, de-
trend, first difference 
Bureau of 
Labor 
Statistics 
Real wage 
growth 
Real hourly 
compensation, 
manufacturing, % 
change 
1950:1 - 
2015:2 
First difference 
Bureau of 
Labor 
Statistics 
3-month TB 
rate 
3-month Treasury 
Bill rate 
1972:1 - 
2015:2 
Natural log, de-
trend, first difference 
Federal 
Reserve 
Unemployment 
rate 
Total 
unemployment 
rate 
1950:1 - 
2015:2 
Natural log, de-
trend, first difference 
Bureau of 
Labor 
Statistics 
Table 2.2. Variable descriptions, availability, and sources. 
 
GDP is used as a measure of output and the variable enters the VAR system as 
ln(𝑦𝑡/𝑦𝑡−1), where 𝑦𝑡 denotes GDP deflated using PPI in finished goods. Two 
proxies for oil price are used: PPI in crude petroleum and refiners’ acquisition cost 
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(RAC). As described above, these variables also undergo a logged differencing 
transformation. Therefore, changes in the resulting variables can be interpreted as 
percentage point fluctuations. Since not all variables were available from 1950:1, 
some of the analysis was conducted with a shorter time series. These are shown in 
Table 2.3 and also noted in the results section where appropriate. 
 
Variable Statistic 
1950:1 - 
1986:1 
1974:1 - 
2015:2 
1986:1 - 
2015:2 
1950:1 - 
2015:2 
Δln(GDP) 
Mean -0.0002 -0.0016 0.0009 0.0003 
Std dev 0.0179 0.0151 0.0118 0.0155 
Δln(PPI in crude 
petroleum) 
Mean 0.0123 0.0108 0.0074 0.0101 
Std dev 0.0509 0.1511 0.1738 0.1221 
Δln(RAC) 
Mean 0.0185 0.0118 0.0090 0.0118 
Std dev 0.0764 0.1412 0.1607 0.1412 
Δln(GDP deflator) 
Mean 0.0010 -0.0008 -0.0037 -0.0011 
Std dev 0.0070 0.0061 0.0024 0.0059 
ΔReal wage growth 
Mean -0.0597 -0.0121 -0.0410 -0.0513 
Std dev 3.8090 7.0859 8.1793 6.1505 
Δln(Unemployment 
rate) 
Mean -0.0009 -0.0012 -0.0037 -0.0022 
Std dev 0.0824 0.0513 0.0447 0.0680 
Δln(3-month TB 
rate) 
Mean 0.0358 -0.0147 -0.0297 -0.0085 
Std dev 0.1635 0.3428 0.3922 0.3365 
Δln(Import price) 
Mean -0.0093 -0.0010 0.0000 -0.0010 
Std dev 0.0164 0.0260 0.0267 0.0260 
Table 2.3 Descriptive statistics. 
 
Some model specifications discussed in Section 2.5 require data to be processed and 
transformed further. To this end, oil price fluctuations are split into positive and 
negative changes. Further, normalised oil price shocks are estimated through a series 
of GARCH models. Under larger model specifications, normalised shocks are also 
broken down into their positive and negative counterparts to capture any 
asymmetrical patterns. Figure 2.2 demonstrates the impact of normalising oil price 
fluctuations using RAC from 1974:1 through 2015:2. As illustrated by the diagram, 
normalisation process rescales the oil price fluctuations based on price behaviour in 
the preceding four quarters. More specifically, if a price increase is preceded by a 
period of relatively stable prices, it is exaggerated. Similarly, a price change following 
a particularly volatile period is scaled down. An example of the former is observed 
in the fourth quarter of 2008 where the -74% fall in price is represented as a much 
larger decline in estar (𝜀𝑡
∗). The end of 2008 saw a rapid decline in oil prices, although 
the previous four quarters had been relatively stable. After normalisation, therefore, 
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the fourth quarter’s price fall is scaled up substantially. Having observed a volatile 
quarter at the end of 2008, however, the further decline in prices in the first quarter 
of 2009 is scaled down and the normalised oil price shock is less, in absolute value, 
than the true price change.  
 
Figure 2.2 Oil price changes and normalised oil price fluctuations. 
 
2.5 Empirical Results 
This chapter examines the oil price–macroeconomy relationship using four models 
each of which is implemented with different specifications and over different 
subsample periods to evaluate relative performance as well as sensitivity of each 
model to additional control variables. Estimations over a few subsamples also allow 
an analysis of whether the relationship is losing significance over time. Results from 
each of the models are discussed in detail below. In these results, statistical 
significance refers to Granger causality with a null hypothesis that has a binary 
outcome. Throughout the discussion in this section, the rejection of the null 
hypothesis suggests the coefficient estimates in question are statistically significantly 
different from zero and, thus, provide evidence for Granger causality. Similarly, if 
the null hypothesis is not rejected, there is no evidence for Granger causality. In other 
words, the null hypothesis is equivalent to no Granger causality, whereas the 
alternative suggests Granger causality.   
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2.5.1 The Base Model 
The analysis begins with a base model over different subsamples. The sample periods 
analysed separately are 1950:1 through 1986:1, 1974:1 through 2015:2, 1986:1 
through 2015:2, and finally the entire sample period. The first sample period is used 
to compare the results with those obtained by Lee et al. (1995). RAC series is 
available from 1974:1 onwards so the second sample period begins then and allows 
for a direct comparison between RAC and PPI in crude petroleum as proxies for oil 
price. Furthermore, this subsample avoids the bias introduced by Nixon price 
controls that ended in April 1974. Lastly, this sample period avoids, and allows the 
testing of, the criticism that oil price–macroeconomy relationship vanished after 1973 
but appears significant in recent sample periods only because pre-1973 observations 
drive the relationship. The third period is used largely because data on import price 
index are available beginning 1986:1, and finally, the entire sample period is included 
for comparison.  
  
Table 2.4 shows a summary of exclusion tests, which are joint F-tests for the 
significance of all four lags of the oil price change variable in the GDP growth 
equation of the corresponding model. The null hypothesis is that none of the four 
coefficients are statistically different from zero. Therefore, these tests can also be 
considered Granger causality tests. 
 
Base Model Variable 
1950:1-
1985:4 † 
1974:1-
2015:2 †† 
1986:1-
2015:2 ††† 
1950:1-
2015:2 † 
PPI 
Oil Price 
Change 
27.959*** 18.326*** 9.598** 21.632*** 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.048) (0.000) 
RAC 
Oil Price 
Change 
— 
22.807*** 11.190** 
— 
(0.000) (0.025) 
Table 2.4. Exclusion tests for the base model. The values in parentheses are p-values. Statistical 
significance is shown at the 10% level (*), 5% level (**) and 1% level (***). 
 
Note that the model specification used in each of the subsamples is different due to 
data availability, and the most comprehensive specification is used over the period 
1986:1-2015:2.8 The 7-variable VAR system consists of real GDP growth, oil price 
                                                 
 
8 Table 2.4 shows results for different model specifications corresponding to each sample period: 5-
variable VAR (base model, denoted as †), 6-variable VAR (base model + 3-month TB rate, denoted 
as ††) and 7-variable VAR (base model + 3-month TB rate + import price inflation, denoted as †††) 
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changes, implicit GDP deflator inflation, real wage inflation, unemployment rate, 3-
month TB rate and import price inflation. Because import price index series are only 
available from the third quarter of 1982, the specification used in the 1974:1 through 
2015:2 subsample omits this variable and instead uses a 6-variable system. Finally, 
the remaining two sample periods are analysed using a 5-variable VAR where the 3-
month TB rate is omitted due to limitations on data availability. Based on the 
resulting test statistics, I reject the null hypothesis in all model specifications across 
all subsamples at the 5% level and conclude that oil price changes do Granger-cause 
fluctuations in real GDP growth in every specification. Note, however, that these 
specifications do not allow for any degree of asymmetry as oil price increases and 
decreases are pooled into one variable.  
 
For comparison with the 7-variable system shown in Table 2.4, the 5-variable system 
was estimated over the sample period 1986:1-2015:2. The F-statistic for the joint test 
of coefficients on all four lags of oil price changes was 18.296 with a p-value of 0.001 
when PPI in crude oil was used as the proxy for oil prices, and 20.891 with a p-value 
of 0 when RAC was used. After a preliminary analysis of the difference in test 
statistics across model specification and information criteria, 3-month TB rate and 
import price inflation appear to be valuable control variables: they increase the 
explanatory power of the model and in their absence, oil price variables have higher 
statistical significance pointing to a potential omitted variable bias. Although oil price 
fluctuations are of particular interest here, I conduct a formal test of the joint 
significance of all four lags of the two control variables using exclusion tests as 
discussed above. The results are surprising: using RAC as the proxy over 1986:1-
2015:2 sample period yielded an F-statistic for the joint significance of four lags of 
3.90 for TB rate and 0.64 for import price inflation. The corresponding p-values were 
0.420 and 0.959, respectively, suggesting that the null hypothesis could not be 
rejected for either variable. It is worth mentioning, however, that this sample period 
consists of 118 observations and a small sample bias might be affecting the results 
when using a 7-variable VAR system with four lags, despite a small sample 
correction. 
 
                                                 
 
 
 43 
To summarise, the results obtained from the 5-variable base model are unreliable due 
to two main problems. First, omission of 3-month TB rate and import price inflation 
is likely to bias parameter estimates. Second, the model does not allow for the 
asymmetric effect of oil price shocks on GDP growth, which is found to be 
statistically significant in later sections. 
2.5.2 Asymmetric Effects Model 
Building on Hamilton's (1983) work, Mork (1989) was first to point out the 
asymmetric effect of oil price fluctuations on GDP growth rate. Table 2.5 summarises 
the F-statistics of exclusion tests obtained by separating oil price changes into their 
positive and negative counterparts.9 The test results indicate that oil price increases 
Granger-cause changes in GDP growth. In subsamples 1974:1 through 2015:2 and 
1986:1 through 2015:2, RAC-based oil price increases have a higher statistical 
significance than the PPI-based ones. This is due to the degree to which PPI for crude 
petroleum and RAC are correlated with the included control variables. For example, 
since oil imports constitute a considerable portion of all US imports, oil and import 
prices are expected to be correlated. Further investigation indicates that PPI for crude 
petroleum is significantly more correlated with import price inflation than RAC. 
Therefore, including import price inflation in the system renders PPI-measured oil 
price increases less statistically significant, while it only diminishes the significance 
of RAC-based oil price increases leaving the variable statistically significant at the 1% 
or 5% levels. Part of this investigation revealed that the root-mean-square error 
(RMSE) did not change substantially across models and sample periods, suggesting 
that the observed variation in results is not due to worse model fit in general.   
                                                 
 
9 Table 2.5 shows results for different model specifications corresponding to each sample period: 5-
variable VAR (base model, denoted as †), 6-variable VAR (base model + 3-month TB rate, denoted 
as ††) and 7-variable VAR (base model + 3-month TB rate + import price inflation, denoted as †††) 
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Proxy Variable 
1950:1-
1985:4 † 
1974:1-
2015:2 †† 
1986:1-
2015:2 ††† 
1950:1-
2015:2 † 
PPI 
Oil Price 
Increase 
32.186*** 19.140*** 10.211** 25.313*** 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.037) (0.000) 
Oil Price 
Decrease 
1.583 12.629** 8.425* 8.632* 
(0.812) (0.013) (0.077) (0.071) 
Inflation, GDP 
Deflator 
2.676 8.131* 3.349 16.023*** 
(0.613) (0.087) (0.501) (0.003) 
3-month TB 
Rate 
— 
1.952 5.616 
— 
(0.745) (0.230) 
Unemployment 
Rate 
9.932* 14.392*** 12.374** 13.917*** 
(0.080) (0.006) (0.015) (0.008) 
Real Wage 
Inflation 
7.779 2.356 2.269 5.519 
(0.100) (0.671) (0.686) (0.238) 
Import Price 
Inflation 
— — 
1.049 
— 
(0.902) 
RAC 
Oil Price 
Increase 
— 
26.356*** 15.754*** 
— 
(0.000) (0.003) 
Oil Price 
Decrease 
— 
8.758* 8.116* 
— 
(0.067) (0.087) 
Inflation, GDP 
Deflator 
— 
6.941 3.134 
— 
(0.139) (0.536) 
3-month TB 
Rate 
— 
2.301 6.494 
— 
(0.681) (0.165) 
Unemployment 
Rate 
— 
11.835** 11.471** 
— 
(0.019) (0.022) 
Real Wage 
Inflation 
— 
2.111 2.123 
— 
(0.715) (0.713) 
Import Price 
Inflation 
— — 
0.759 
— 
(0.944) 
Table 2.5. Exclusion tests of asymmetric effects model with GDP growth as the dependent variable. 
The values in parentheses are p-values. Statistical significance is shown at the 10% level (*), 5% level 
(**) and 1% level (***). 
 
In order to isolate the effect of including import price inflation in the VAR system, a 
7-variable model (which excludes import price inflation) with PPI for crude 
petroleum was estimated in the sample period 1986:1 through 2015:2. The test 
statistics for positive and negative oil price changes were 14.69 (0.005) and 10.88 
(0.028), respectively, where the values in parentheses are p-values. Further, a 6-
variable model (which excludes 3-month TB rate and import price inflation) was 
estimated for the same sample period. The results suggest that, unsurprisingly, 
control variables play a role in the diminished significance of oil price increases in 
this subsample. Hence, significance of positive oil price changes themselves do not 
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decrease in this period and the fall in test statistics is mostly due to the additional 
variables included in the system. 10 This provides some evidence against the validity 
of Hooker's (1996a, 1996b) claim that the statistical significance of oil prices in 
explaining output fluctuations has declined in recent datasets. Throughout this 
analysis, RAC was more isolated from import price inflation than PPI for crude 
petroleum and should be favoured in estimation procedures, as it increases the 
robustness of the model and parameter estimates. Most exclusion tests on oil price 
decreases returned a p-value greater than 0.05. Thus, the results confirmed that the 
asymmetric impact of oil price shocks on output growth continues to hold in most 
recent data. This asymmetry effect is robust to the specification of the model, since 
larger specifications displayed the same pattern.  
2.5.3 Normalised and Net Oil Price Models 
Table 2.3 above shows the summary statistics for oil price variables being used in 
estimation for all sample periods. From the table, oil prices appear more volatile in 
more recent samples. Hence, oil price volatility could provide further identifying 
variation unexploited in traditional models, and implementing a volatility-scaled 
measure for price fluctuations could lead to more accurate results. Table 2.6 lists the 
estimated coefficients from the GARCH (1,1) model expressed by equations 2.3 and 
2.4 above.  
  
                                                 
 
10 This pattern was not observed universally. For example, the subsample 1986:1-2011:1 shows a fall 
in the significance of oil price increases even when the control variables are omitted. This suggests a 
weaker link between oil price changes and GDP growth in more recent years. Time-varying parameter 
estimation discussed later in this chapter sheds more light on this. 
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Proxy Parameter 
1950:1-
1985:4 
1974:1-2015:2 1986:1-2015:2 1950:1-2015:2 
PPI 
α0 
0.011** 0.017 0.013 0.003 
(0.028) (0.222) (0.379) (0.377) 
α1 
0.770*** 0.258 0.264** 0.394** 
(0.000) (0.121) (0.014) (0.026) 
α2 
0.007 -0.300** -0.336** -0.393** 
(0.959) (0.017) (0.011) (0.010) 
α3 
0.064 0.110 0.141* 0.250 
(0.244) (0.419) (0.097) (0.274) 
α4 
0.035 -0.067 -0.161* -0.056 
(0.378) (0.505) (0.064) (0.792) 
γ0 
0.000 0.004 0.012*** 0.000 
(0.333) (0.617) (0.008) (0.325) 
γ1 
5.951** 0.433 0.217 1.220* 
(0.017) (0.154) (0.222) (0.055) 
γ2 
0.014 0.497 0.328 0.493*** 
(0.483) (0.110) (0.135) (0.000) 
RAC 
α0 — 
0.016 0.015 
— 
(0.117) (0.310) 
α1 — 
0.411*** 0.309** 
— 
(0.003) (0.013) 
α2 — 
-0.371*** -0.318*** 
— 
(0.004) (0.005) 
α3 — 
0.230** 0.318 
— 
(0.023) (0.213) 
α4 — 
0.085 0.375*** 
— 
(0.145) (0.009) 
γ0 — 
0.004 0.009*** 
— 
(0.332) (0.003) 
γ1 — 
0.384* 0.008** 
— 
(0.054) (0.020) 
γ2 — 
0.421 0.311** 
— 
(0.128) (0.039) 
Table 2.6. Parameter estimates for GARCH (1,1). The values in parentheses are p-values. Statistical 
significance is shown at the 10% level (*), 5% level (**) and 1% level (***). 
 
From these results, GARCH (1,1) representation of oil prices to compute conditional 
variance of oil price shocks appears to be appropriate. The main observation is that 
ARCH and GARCH terms, 𝛾1 and 𝛾2, are statistically significant in several sample 
periods. Most notably, recent time periods exhibit GARCH behaviour in errors. 
Estimated parameters are qualitatively identical to those obtained by Lee et al. (1995) 
and have the expected signs. As a side observation, in early sample periods, 𝛼𝑖 have 
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loosely alternating signs such that 𝛼1 is positive, 𝛼2 is negative, 𝛼3 is positive, and 𝛼4 
is negative. This is shown in columns four and six of Table 2.5. The marginally-
significant GARCH coefficient in Lee et al. (1995) is not statistically significant in 
my dataset—see column three of Table 2.5.  
 
An analysis of autocorrelation in residuals of the GARCH model in each sample 
period showed that there is no unexploited information in residuals for sample 
periods 1974:1 and later. Although there is some autocorrelation in residuals for 
earlier samples, increasing the number of AR lags or ARCH and GARCH terms did 
not improve the behaviour of the residuals. For the 1974:1-2015:2 subsample, PPI 
and RAC GARCH (1,1) residuals resulted in a Ljung-Box Q statistic of 19.23 
(p=0.739) and 12.92 (p=0.968), respectively. Furthermore, Bollerslev, Chou, & 
Kroner (1992) argue that low-order GARCH models outperform alternative methods 
the authors investigate. In light of these, GARCH (1,1) specification is adopted as a 
parsimonious representation of the conditional variance of 𝜀𝑡 in equation 2.17 above. 
Therefore, this specification is used to calculate 𝜀𝑡
∗. 
  
Analysis of different sample periods showed that the characteristics of the conditional 
variance process of 𝜀𝑡 changed over time. More specifically, in earlier sample periods, 
the sum of 𝛾1 and 𝛾2 is greater than one suggesting that the conditional variance 
process is highly persistent. In Engle & Bollerslev's (1986) terminology, this 
corresponds to an integrated GARCH model with integration order higher than one. 
In samples from 1974 onwards, however, this sum is much lower and less than one. 
This provides further evidence that the GARCH (1,1) specification is appropriate for 
recent subsamples, as persistence in the conditional variance process could be 
indicative of the variance equation being misspecified. An example of this is 
Lamoureux & Lastrapes (1990), who provide empirical evidence that persistence in 
stock return variance is sensitive to model specification and decreases when control 
variables are included. To ensure consistency and comparability in this analysis, the 
same GARCH specification is adopted for all sample periods. Lastly, the model 
employed in this analysis was assumed to exhibit the asymptotic properties of 
GARCH processes outlined in Bougerol & Picard (1992), Lumsdaine (1991, 1996), 
and Nelson (1990). 
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Table 2.7 provides exclusion test results for each specification and sample period 
having introduced normalised oil price shocks into each system. From this output, 
there is little evidence that the normalised oil price shocks are more highly correlated 
with changes in real GDP than oil price changes. Test statistics for normalised price 
shock variables are not statistically significant except in early sample periods (see 
columns four and seven of the table). Interestingly, although normalised price shocks 
are not statistically significant individually, when considered with oil price changes, 
they are jointly significant. This is likely caused by the strong correlation between oil 
price changes and normalised oil price shocks; including normalised oil price shocks 
in the VAR system seems to decrease the individual impact of oil prices substantially 
but conserve the joint significance of the two variables taken together. Note here that 
early parts of the sample period where normalised oil price shocks are highly 
statistically significant match the periods in which Lee et al. (1995) found a 
statistically significant relationship between normalised oil price shocks and real 
GDP fluctuations. Their result is reflected here but appears to dissipate in later 
sections of my sample.  
Specification Proxy Variable 
1950:1-
1985:4 
1974:1-
2015:2 
1986:1-
2015:2 
1950:1-
2015:2 
6-variable 
System 1 
PPI 
Oil Price Change 
5.353 7.932* 11.293** 12.568** 
(0.253) (0.094) (0.023) (0.014) 
Normalised Oil 
Price Shock (ε*) 
25.408*** 4.159 5.388 28.266*** 
(0.000) (0.385) (0.250) (0.000) 
RAC 
Oil Price Change — 
5.220 2.939 
— 
(0.265) (0.568) 
Normalised Oil 
Price Shock (ε*) 
— 
1.612 3.780 
— 
(0.807) (0.437) 
7-variable 
System 1 
PPI 
Oil Price Change — 
8.713* 11.648** 
— 
(0.069) (0.020) 
Normalised Oil 
Price Shock (ε*) 
— 
4.533 5.723 
— 
(0.339) (0.221) 
RAC 
Oil Price Change — 
6.004 3.065 
— 
(0.199) (0.547) 
Normalised Oil 
Price Shock (ε*) 
— 
2.085 4.567 
— 
(0.720) (0.335) 
8-variable 
System 1 
PPI 
Oil Price Change — — 
11.934** 
— 
(0.018) 
Normalised Oil 
Price Shock (ε*) 
— — 
7.295 
— 
(0.121) 
RAC 
Oil Price Change — — 
3.283 
— 
(0.512) 
Normalised Oil 
Price Shock (ε*) 
— — 
4.634 
— 
(0.327) 
Table 2.7. Exclusion tests for normalised oil price shocks. The values in parentheses are p-values. 
Statistical significance is shown at the 10% level (*), 5% level (**) and 1% level (***). 
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In addition, 3-month TB rate is highly correlated with output growth. When included 
in the system, this variable weakens the observed relationship between oil prices and 
GDP growth. Therefore, monetary policy plays an important role in determining the 
path of output growth rate, and fluctuations in interest rate can potentially have large 
effects on the macroeconomy. This introduces the challenge of disentangling two 
distinct effects on GDP growth when the monetary authority reacts to an oil price 
shock with an interest rate adjustment. From an econometric perspective, 3-month 
TB rate is a key control variable in the VAR systems, as in its absence, oil price 
fluctuations are wrongly credited with having had a large impact on GDP growth. 
 
As discussed earlier, a key aim is to test for the existence of an asymmetric 
relationship between oil price fluctuations and changes in GDP under normalised 
price shocks as well. To do so, extensions to each specification from Section 2.5.2 are 
required such that positive and negative price changes are modelled separately. The 
objective here is to investigate whether positive normalised oil price changes have a 
statistically significant impact on GDP growth (Granger-cause changes in GDP 
growth) while negative changes do not. The results are striking, especially in 
comparison to those shown in Table 2.7 above: positive normalised oil price shocks 
are statistically significant across all sample periods and model specifications whereas 
negative ones are not. This outcome is in sharp contrast with the earlier evidence that 
normalised oil price shocks are not strongly linked to output growth rate. One 
underlying implication of this is that when price changes are taken as a whole, their 
statistical significance weakens due to an averaging out effect of positive and negative 
price shocks. When modelled explicitly, normalised positive oil price shocks are 
highly statistically significant even in larger specifications with key control variables 
identified in earlier sections. The results in this table facilitate deeper analysis of the 
oil price – GDP growth relationship across four key dimensions. First, the exclusion 
tests show each specification’s performance across different sample periods. Second, 
robustness checks for each specification and proxy pair can be conducted by adding 
control variables to the system. Third, the sensitivity of each specification to proxy 
choice for oil prices can be observed, and lastly, the impact of allowing for asymmetry 
in the specifications on model performance can be investigated in this new context. 
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Specification Proxy Variable 
1950:1-
1985:4 
1974:1-
2015:2 
1986:1-
2015:2 
1950:1-
2015:2 
6-variable 
System 2 
PPI 
Normalised 
Positive Oil Price 
Shock (ε*+) 
62.376*** 11.238** 13.112** 67.683*** 
(0.000) (0.024) (0.011) (0.000) 
Normalised 
Negative Oil Price 
Shock (ε*-) 
0.816 2.614 3.648 1.859 
(0.936) (0.624) (0.456) (0.762) 
RAC 
Normalised 
Positive Oil Price 
Shock (ε*+) 
— 
18.513*** 19.877*** 
— 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Normalised 
Negative Oil Price 
Shock (ε*-) 
— 
0.539 4.222 
— 
(0.970) (0.377) 
7-variable 
System 2 
PPI 
Normalised 
Positive Oil Price 
Shock (ε*+) 
— 
11.487** 14.855*** 
— 
(0.022) (0.005) 
Normalised 
Negative Oil Price 
Shock (ε*-) 
— 
2.898 6.042 
— 
(0.575) (0.196) 
RAC 
Normalised 
Positive Oil Price 
Shock (ε*+) 
— 
18.896*** 21.980*** 
— 
(0.001) (0.000) 
Normalised 
Negative Oil Price 
Shock (ε*-) 
— 
0.725 6.158 
— 
(0.948) (0.188) 
8-variable 
System 2 
PPI 
Normalised 
Positive Oil Price 
Shock (ε*+) 
— — 
9.421* 
— 
(0.051) 
Normalised 
Negative Oil Price 
Shock (ε*-) 
— — 
6.604 
— 
(0.158) 
RAC 
Normalised 
Positive Oil Price 
Shock (ε*+) 
— — 
16.900*** 
— 
(0.002) 
Normalised 
Negative Oil Price 
Shock (ε*-) 
— — 
6.110 
— 
(0.191) 
NOPI  
System 1 
PPI 
Net Oil Price 
Increase 
31.141*** 5.881 3.549 14.062*** 
(0.000) (0.208) (0.470) (0.007) 
RAC 
Net Oil Price 
Increase 
— 
14.457*** 8.861* 
— 
(0.006) (0.065) 
NOPI  
System 2 
PPI 
Net Oil Price 
Increase 
— 
5.951 4.286 
— 
(0.203) (0.369) 
RAC 
Net Oil Price 
Increase 
— 
14.896*** 9.627** 
— 
(0.005) (0.047) 
NOPI  
System 3 
PPI 
Net Oil Price 
Increase 
— — 
1.010 
— 
(0.908) 
RAC 
Net Oil Price 
Increase 
— — 
4.767 
— 
(0.312) 
Table 2.8. Exclusion tests for specifications with normalised and net oil price changes with asymmetry. 
The values in parentheses are p-values. Statistical significance is shown at the 10% level (*), 5% level 
(**) and 1% level (***).  
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The Effect of Proxies for Oil Price 
Table 2.7 corroborates the claim that choice of oil price proxy has an impact on the 
statistical significance of the shocks in the output growth equation as well as the 
robustness of the whole VAR system. Although the statistical significance of 
normalised positive oil price shocks appears reasonably stable across specifications 
and sample periods, the variable loses statistical significance in some cases when PPI 
is used as the proxy. When RAC is used as the proxy instead, the relationship appears 
more robust. This is particularly clear in the test results for 8-variable system 2 and 
NOPI systems 1 and 2. With RAC as the proxy, normalised positive oil price shocks 
are highly statistically significant in all sample periods, whereas the PPI-based 
variable is significant only at a 10% level. In the context of NOPI specifications, a 
more prominent pattern emerged: observing only PPI-based results, one would argue 
that the impact of oil price increases on output growth has vanished in more recent 
years—specifically, from 1974 onwards. This was indeed what many researchers 
observed around that time. Turning to RAC results show, however, that the 
underlying relationship remains significant. NOPI systems 1 and 2 show statistically 
significant oil price increase variables in large specifications with unemployment rate, 
3-month TB rate, and real wage inflation as control variables.  
 
A pattern of note here is that the statistical significance of the relationship, even with 
RAC as the oil price proxy, displays a downward trend. This is further evidenced by 
NOPI system 3 where neither oil price increase variable is statistically significant. As 
touched on previously, the weakening relationship observed here could be due to a 
weaker underlying economic link between oil prices and GDP growth or a 
deterioration in model performance across time. Most previous research reached 
conclusions about the underlying economic relationship without explicitly 
addressing the possibility of a break-down from an empirical modelling perspective. 
In an effort to address this, I analysed how the RMSE behaved based on specification, 
proxy choice, and sample period. Upon further investigation of the weakening 
relationship, two root causes for this pattern emerged: first, when large model 
specifications are used in the most recent sample period, small sample bias is a 
concern. NOPI system 3 comprises 8 variables with 4 lags each with a sample size of 
118. Second, and more importantly, net imports of crude oil in the US started an 
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increasing trend from February 1985. This increased the share of crude oil in the 
country’s imports and how much crude oil imports contributed to overall import 
price inflation. This is reflected in the dataset as an increase in the correlation 
coefficients between RAC11 (and PPI in crude petroleum) and import price inflation 
from 1986 onwards. As a result, including import price inflation as a control variable 
for this period reduces the statistical significance of net oil price increases as they 
share much of the identifying variation. Unsurprisingly, the reverse of this is true as 
well: removing 3-month TB rate and import price inflation from the VAR system 
inflates the test statistics for oil price variables. 8-variable system 2, particularly when 
RAC is used as the oil price proxy, is robust to this. Positive normalised oil price 
shocks in this large VAR system remain highly statistically significant in the most 
recent sample period. RAC-based oil price changes are, therefore, more robust to 
model specification and sample period. 
 
Returning to the observation that RAC is preferable to PPI in crude petroleum as the 
oil price measure, 8-variable system 2 indicated that the lack of strong evidence for 
Granger causality between PPI-based oil price changes and GDP growth in the most 
recent sample is not due higher RMSE. 8-variable system 2 with PPI and RAC as 
proxies yielded virtually identical RMSE values. Furthermore, the same holds for 
same model specifications across time. For example, 7-variable system 2 using RAC 
showed that RMSE did not change substantially when the model was estimated in 
the 1974:1-2015:2 sample period versus 1986:1-2015:2. Jointly, these suggest that 
when a weaker relationship is observed, it tends to be due to changing parameter 
estimates as opposed to the point estimates being less precisely estimated. Having 
established this, later sections focus on the magnitude of the impact as opposed to the 
statistical significance of parameter estimates.  
The Oil Price-GDP Relationship Across Time 
A heavily-debated claim in the oil price-macroeconomy literature is whether oil price 
fluctuations are still as relevant today as they used to be. Some researchers argue that 
the relationship has been weakening over time and that this is reflected in empirical 
results (Hooker, 1996b, 1996a). However, results in Table 2.8 show little evidence 
                                                 
 
11 Recall that the RAC variable is constructed using the prices of both domestically-produced and 
imported crude.  
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that oil price shocks no longer Granger-cause changes in output growth in recent 
sample periods. In fact, statistical significance of positive oil price shocks increases 
under most model specifications when a later sample used. An example of this is 7-
variable system 2 with PPI as the oil price proxy. Under this specification, positive 
normalised oil price variable is statistically significant at the 5% level in the 1974:1-
2015:2 sample period and at the 1% level with the later sample beginning in 1986:1. 
This occurs with other specifications in Table 2.8 regardless of proxy choice.  
 
The exceptions to this observation are NOPI models 1 and 2. When normalised oil 
price shocks are substituted by net oil price increases, statistical significance decreases 
in recent samples. As an example, the exclusion test for RAC-based NOPI returns a 
p-value of 0.005 in the 1974:1-2015:2 column and a p-value of 0.047 in the 1986:1-
2015:2 column. Having observed these contradictory results, it is difficult to make 
definitive statements. It appears, however, that robust oil price measures, such as the 
normalised variables, retain their statistical significance in recent samples whereas 
those currently more prevalent in the literature do not. Note that these statements are 
strictly in a Granger causality sense and not about the size of the effect. Later sections 
find that coefficient estimates on oil price shocks and overall impact on output growth 
estimated through impulse response analysis increase in recent samples. This will be 
discussed in greater detail in those sections.  
 
To address this issue more rigorously, this chapter implements a time-varying 
parameter approach using a rolling window. More specifically, a rolling window of 
132 quarters is estimated sequentially from 1974:1 onwards. Exclusion tests are 
conducted after each iteration to observe changes in statistical significance of oil price 
shocks over time. 12 The resulting p-values on normalised positive PPI-based oil price 
shocks in 7-variable system 2 are shown in Figure 2.3 below. 13 
 
                                                 
 
12 Note that although this section focuses on a discussion of statistical significance, other sections put 
an emphasis on interval estimates and how wide they are. The purpose of focussing on point estimates 
and p-values here is to address the ongoing debate in the literature.  
13 P-values shown in the figures are not identical to those presented in Table 2.8, since the former use 
a 132-quarter rolling window sample period whereas the latter uses as much of the sample period as 
available. 
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Figure 2.3. Exclusion test p-values for PPI-based normalised positive oil price shocks in 7-variable 
system 2 using a rolling window against starting quarter. 
 
Only the first three p-values—those where estimations start in 1974:1 through 
1974:3—are greater than 0.01. A clear conclusion is that the normalised positive 
shocks used in his system remain statistically significant in recent periods. P-values 
calculated for RAC-based normalised positive price shocks follow a virtually 
identical pattern (see Figure 2.4).  
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Figure 2.4. Exclusion test p-values for RAC-based normalised positive oil price shocks in 7-variable 
system 2 using a rolling window against starting quarter. 
 
With RAC as the proxy, only the first and third starting quarters result in a p-value 
greater than 0.01. Unlike the PPI case in Figure 2.3, all p-values are below 0.05 in 
this case. These observations on the statistical significance of normalised positive oil 
price shock variables are in sharp contrast with their negative counterparts. Figure 
2.5 and Figure 2.6 summarise the p-values observed for PPI- and RAC-based, 
normalised negative oil price shocks.  
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Figure 2.5. Exclusion test p-values for PPI-based normalised negative oil price shocks in 7-variable 
system 2 using a rolling window against starting quarter. 
 
 
Figure 2.6. Exclusion test p-values for RAC-based normalised negative oil price shocks in 7-variable 
system 2 using a rolling window against starting quarter. 
 
These two figures corroborate the earlier observation of an asymmetric relationship 
between oil price fluctuations and output growth: within this dataset, across time 
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periods, oil price increases have a statistically significant impact on GDP growth 
whereas oil price drops do not. The next sub-section elaborates on how this 
observation holds across different model specifications and focusses on the 
asymmetry discussion observed earlier but revisits it in the normalised oil price 
context. Before moving on to a discussion concerning asymmetry and model 
specification, however, I return to ordinary (non-normalised) shocks in a rolling-
window context to finalise the temporal investigation. Similar to earlier observations, 
this exercise revealed a weaker relationship between oil price changes and GDP 
growth than only positive price changes. This is due to an averaging out effect of 
positive and negative price shocks, where statistically significant positive shocks 
appear to matter much less due to negative shocks being included in the same 
variable. In Figure 2.7, p-values from exclusion tests on PPI-based oil price changes 
in 7-variable system 1 are greater than 0.05 from 1974:1 through 1976:2 inclusive. P-
values fall sharply when the sample period starts after 1976:2 providing evidence 
against a weakening relationship between oil price fluctuations and output growth in 
the US from a statistical significance perspective. This pattern repeats for RAC-based 
oil price fluctuations as shown in Figure 2.8. These findings relate to the next sub-
section and are a good segue to that discussion where asymmetry is discussed in the 
presence of normalised price shocks.  
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Figure 2.7. Exclusion test p-values for PPI-based oil price shocks in 7-variable system 1 using a rolling 
window against starting quarter. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.8. Exclusion test p-values for RAC-based oil price shocks in 7-variable system 1 using a rolling 
window against starting quarter. 
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A key interpretation of these time-varying estimations is that an analysis focussing 
on the sample period 1980:1 onwards (due to data availability at the time of writing, 
for instance) would have concluded that oil price changes do not have a statistically 
significant impact on GDP growth. This is what has been observed in the literature 
for part of this sample period which, in light of the findings from this section, is an 
incomplete analysis and misrepresents the true nature of the oil price-macroeconomy 
relationship. In a Granger-causality sense, there is little evidence here that the link 
between oil prices and output growth has vanished over the past few decades. Later 
sections investigate whether the size of the impact has changed considerably over the 
years.  
Model Performance across Specifications 
This sub-section is split into two main parts: testing for asymmetry in the presence of 
normalised price shocks and conducting robustness checks using larger model 
specifications with more control variables. The latter part focuses on the inclusion of 
import price inflation in particular. For the former discussion, especially to draw final 
conclusions on asymmetry effectively in the presence of normalised price shocks, 6-
variable system 3 and 7-variable system 3 have been set up. These specifications differ 
only in how much asymmetry they allow for. Namely, the 6-variable system uses 
normalised oil shocks whereas the 7-variable specification splits it into its positive 
and negative components. Looking at Figures 2.9 and 2.10, a pattern emerges. A 
handful of tests return p-values greater than 0.05 and several greater than 0.01 when 
6-variable system 3 is used. Only a few p-values are greater than 0.01 when positive 
shocks are tested under 7-variable system 3.  
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Figure 2.9. Exclusion test p-values for PPI-based normalised oil price shocks in 6-variable system 3 
using a rolling window against starting quarter. 
 
 
Figure 2.10. Exclusion test p-values for PPI-based normalised positive oil price shocks in 7-variable 
system 3 using a rolling window against starting quarter. 
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positive and negative fluctuations amounts to stripping the original component of 
variation unrelated to GDP growth leaving just the part that matters.  
 
 
Figure 2.11. Exclusion test p-values for PPI-based normalised negative oil price shocks in 7-variable 
system 3 using a rolling window against starting quarter. 
 
Findings beginning from Section 2.5.2 and continuing throughout 2.5.3 provide 
evidence for an asymmetric relationship between oil price changes and real GDP 
growth. Independently of proxy choice for oil price, sample period, and model 
specification, oil price increases have a statistically significant impact on output 
growth and oil price decreases do not. This section has investigated this hypothesis 
in the context of normalised oil price shocks and reached the same conclusion. 
Therefore, there is strong empirical evidence for an asymmetric relationship 
predicted by economic theory in Section 2.2.3. 
 
Model specification offers an avenue for interesting discussion here. Table 2.8 has a 
structure to facilitate this: 6-variable system 2 plus 3-month TB is 7-variable system 
2, and 7-variable system 2 plus import price inflation is 8-variable system 2. The same 
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little change as well. Statistical significance of 3-month TB rate in the real GDP 
equation greatly depends on sample period. Having controlled for other variables, 
this variable has limited contribution on its own. This, coupled with its limited 
correlation with oil price shocks in this sample, translate into minimal impact on 
coefficients of interest.14 
 
Both specifications discussed in this section so far ignore import price inflation. 
Adding this additional control variable uncovers an interesting dynamic. Although 
import price inflation itself is not statistically significant in the real GDP growth 
equation, it has implications for the estimated coefficient on positive oil price 
changes. More specifically, when controlling for import price inflation, coefficients 
on lags of oil price rises decrease in absolute value while their standard errors remain 
roughly unchanged. This leads to the smaller test statistics observed in the 8-variable 
system 2 row of Table 2.8. This is not an entirely surprising result, as import price 
inflation was previously observed to be correlated with producer price index in crude 
petroleum and refiners’ acquisition cost. It would, therefore, be expected that when 
import price inflation is omitted, the coefficient on a variable highly correlated with 
import price inflation (oil price fluctuations in this case) would capture its effect. 
Further investigation led to an important discovery, however: even though 
fluctuations in RAC are more highly correlated with import price inflation than those 
in PPI, RAC-based normalised positive oil price shocks are marginally less correlated 
than PPI-based ones. This is also reflected in Table 2.8. The test statistic on 𝜀∗+ drops 
from 14.855 to 9.421 when PPI is used but from 21.98 to 16.9 with RAC. Arguably, 
therefore, RAC is a more robust proxy than PPI as previously discussed in earlier 
parts of this section. There is further evidence for this in the NOPI system results in 
the same table, since RAC-based NOPI variables retain their statistical significance 
in recent samples and PPI-based ones do not. A previously-observed outcome from 
NOPI models relate to systems 2 and 3. Statistical significance of oil price increases 
falls when the specification is extended to include import price inflation. The fact that 
NOPI lose statistical significance with a narrow confidence interval around zero 
signals some level of multicollinearity. Hence, there is reason to believe the variables 
                                                 
 
14 A surprising outcome of this analysis was the increase in the test statistic on positive oil price shocks 
when switching from 6-variable system 2 to its 7-variable counterpart in the 1986:1-2015:2 sample 
period. Further investigation showed that there is no clear underlying fundamental reason for this 
change. 
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in the system are sufficient and that import price inflation does not contribute further 
identifying variation not already provided by existing variables. Much of the analysis 
in the rest of this chapter proceeds on this basis and focuses predominantly on 6- and 
7-variable systems with references to 8-variable systems where appropriate. 
 
A final dimension of model specification explored here was whether normalised oil 
price variables perform better than non-normalised ones both in terms of statistical 
significance and in the context of impulse response analysis. The latter is explored 
further in Section 2.6 below. An investigation into the former revealed a weaker 
relationship between non-normalised price variables and GDP growth than 
normalised ones. Revisiting tables and figures from previous sections can shed light 
onto this. Tables 2.7 and 2.8 have output from specifications that allow this, and 
Figures 2.3, 2.4, 2.7, 2.8, 2.9, and 2.10 put the results into a time-varying parameter 
context. Figure 2.12 below is a summary of exclusion test p-values (z-axis) across 
model specification (y-axis) with varying starting quarter (x-axis). The right-most 
specification, 6-variable system 1, has the least stable exclusion test p-values among 
those considered here. Particularly in the early parts of the sample, exclusion test p-
values on RAC-based oil price changes are considerably higher than those in other 
specifications. Even though PPI- and RAC-based oil price changes in 7-variable 
system 1 are much smaller, the specifications with normalised price fluctuations have 
much flatter p-value profiles within the [0, 0.05] range. The three-dimensional 
representation below also allows a snapshot across specifications at a given starting 
quarter. As an example, considering a slice across specifications on 1976:1 indicates 
p-values less than 0.05 for the first three specifications and greater than 0.05 for the 
rest.  
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Figure 2.12. Exclusion test p-values (z-axis) across model specification (y-axis) with varying starting quarter (x-axis). Excluded variables as follows. 6-variable system 1: 
RAC-based oil price changes; 6-variable system 2: normalised positive oil price changes; 7-variable system 1: PPI- and RAC-based oil price changes; 7-variable system 2: 
PPI- and RAC-based normalised positive oil price changes. Each colour contour on the z-axis represents an increment of 0.05. 
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2.5.4 Exogeneity of Oil Price Shocks 
Since the early years of the literature, the oil price-macroeconomy discussions have 
made references to exogeneity of oil price shocks. As the literature matured, this 
interest morphed into two opposing views and debates followed. At the heart of this 
discussion, researchers have asked whether oil price shocks could be considered 
exogenous even though the price hikes may have different underlying causes. As a 
result, numerous studies, starting with Kilian (2009) and Hamilton (2009), have tried 
to model oil prices differently based on their root cause. As a part of this, Hamilton 
(2009) has argued that oil price rises have traditionally been viewed as exogenous 
shocks caused by supply disruptions but that there is increasing consensus that the 
price hike of 2007-2008 was due to a combination of strong demand for oil and 
stagnating world oil production. Other studies since then have found contradicting 
results pointing out that other factors, such as sample period and reliance on oil 
versus other fuels, matter more than the nature of oil price fluctuations. No matter 
the true nature of the relationship, the original reason researchers turned to splitting 
oil price shocks into their structural components was to retain their statistical 
significance in the real GDP equation—a well-founded and desirable outcome based 
on theoretical models. In this respect, this chapter proposes the normalisation and 
asymmetric split of price changes as an alternative approach. As discussed above, 
normalised positive oil price shocks retain their explanatory power across all sample 
periods as well as in the rolling-window context. One advantage of this approach is 
that it does not require unreliable proxies. The normalisation process is self-contained 
within the model, whereas identifying different types of shocks requires local and 
global oil demand series as well as an indicator of global economic activity. 
Researchers have attempted to identify proxies for these, including global shipping 
traffic under the Baltic Dry Index as an indication of global economic activity, but 
this is hardly a reliable measure as there are many logistical reasons unrelated to 
global economic performance this variable can change behaviour. Blanchard & Galí 
(2007) mention that identifying a more exogenous proxy for oil prices is an option 
but that it is unnecessary. The authors state, in response to Kilian's (2008a) attempt 
to use global oil production as a proxy, that “what matters, however, to any given 
country is not the level of global oil production, but the price at which firms and 
households can purchase oil […].” Furthermore, popular models often adopt a two-
country approach with the country in question and rest of the world. This approach 
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is rather simplistic and groups together a very heterogeneous group of countries as a 
single entity all in an effort to identify whether an observed price shock is demand- 
or supply-side. In addition, splitting an oil price series into three or more components 
inflates VAR systems to be estimated, causing degrees of freedom obstacles. In the 
context of this chapter’s rolling-window approach, longer windows would be 
required to estimate each system reducing the overall observational window due to 
fewer number of estimations. Finally, as the price shock variable is split into more 
components, the identifying variation in each gets progressively smaller. This is a 
concern, especially in small samples with limited information. These have jointly 
motivated the search for a better, more robust, and more straight-forward approach 
to modelling oil price innovations.  
 
A distinction often ignored within the exogeneity discussion of oil price fluctuations 
is whether we can differentiate between econometric exogeneity and macroeconomic 
exogeneity. Focussing on the latter first, it is reasonable to argue that, albeit being 
large and influential, the US is still “small” within the global oil market. As such, it 
is unclear whether trends in the US alone would have global implications within the 
oil market. Studies have found and argued that endogeneity of oil prices is not stable 
over time. There is some basis for this, since the share of US oil consumption in global 
consumption has declined from 37.5% in 1965 to 20.3% in 2016 according to the BP 
Statistical Review of World Energy 2017. Over the years, this has also contributed to 
analyses focussing on structural breaks as the nature of the relationship appeared to 
change across time. From an empirical modelling perspective, and given the scope of 
this analysis, econometric exogeneity carries more importance than exogeneity in a 
macroeconomic modelling sense.15 The exclusion tests discussed throughout this 
chapter can shed light on this. Table 2.9 lists Granger causality exclusion test results 
in the corresponding oil price equation for real GDP growth. Based on the results, 
real output fluctuations do not appear to Granger-cause oil price changes in these 
specifications across most sample periods. Separating positive and negative shocks 
resulted in high test statistics for oil price increases in the most recent subsample 
shown in Table 2.9.  
 
                                                 
 
15 Requirements within a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model may differ depending 
on the modelling objective. 
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Proxy Variable 
1950:1-
1985:4 † 
1974:1-
2015:2 †† 
1986:1-
2015:2 ††† 
1950:1-
2015:2 † 
PPI Oil Price Change 
23.244*** 3.121 4.768 2.200 
(0.000) (0.538) (0.312) (0.699) 
RAC Oil Price Change — 
3.899 3.781 
— 
(0.420) (0.436) 
PPI 
Oil Price Increase 
20.631*** 5.294 12.398** 7.757 
(0.000) (0.258) (0.015) (0.101) 
Oil Price Decrease 
11.397** 2.697 1.373 11.233** 
(0.022) (0.610) (0.849) (0.024) 
RAC 
Oil Price Increase — 
7.281 10.396** 
— 
(0.122) (0.034) 
Oil Price Decrease — 
3.094 1.046 
— 
(0.542) (0.903) 
Table 2.9. Exclusion tests for real GDP growth in each corresponding oil price equation. The values 
in parentheses are p-values. Statistical significance is shown at the 10% level (*), 5% level (**) and 1% 
level (***). Recall that different model specifications are used in each sample period: 5-variable VAR 
(base model, denoted as †), 6-variable VAR (base model + 3-month TB rate, denoted as ††) and 7-
variable VAR (base model + 3-month TB rate + import price inflation, denoted as †††) 
 
However, a further investigation of this using a rolling window showed that the 
endogeneity does not persist more than one quarter. An exception to this is the early 
sample period covering 1950-60. There is some evidence in more recent years that 
demand-side influences originating from the US may have played a role in some price 
rises in line with Hamilton's (2009) discussion of 2007-2008 price shock. In the VAR 
implementation here, oil prices are endogenous within the system, and the relevant 
equations are estimated with the rest of the variables on the right-hand side.  
2.5.5 Interim Conclusion 
A key finding of this section is that normalised positive oil price changes are 
consistently more highly correlated with output fluctuations than any other oil price 
variable. In addition to being statistically significant across model specifications and 
sample period, normalised positive shocks have a narrow confidence band. In 
contrast, normalised negative oil price fluctuations do not Granger-cause GDP 
fluctuations (i.e. coefficients are not statistically significant), and their relationship 
with real GDP growth is less well-defined. Once again, this holds regardless of 
specification and sample period providing strong evidence of an asymmetric response 
in output growth to oil price changes. Choice of oil price proxy matters as well. RAC 
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is more robust than PPI in crude petroleum and although sample period alone does 
not have a clear impact on oil prices Granger-causing output growth rate, some 
traditional measures of oil prices lose their explanatory power in more recent 
samples. Model specification can also influence estimation results. In particular, 
omitting relevant variables, such as 3-month TB rate, can inflate test statistics on 
other variables and result in misleading estimates. In this dataset, this is especially 
true when PPI is used as the oil price proxy. Overall, there is little evidence that the 
oil price-macroeconomy relationship has entirely disappeared in recent decades. In 
fact, when appropriately captured, oil price increases retain their importance in the 
GDP equation even in large specifications with several control variables. The next 
section turns to impulse response analysis as it steps away from statistical significance 
and emphasises size of the impact. 
2.6 VAR Results and Impulse Response Analysis 
Previous sections focussed on a discussion of statistical significance in line with the 
current literature. This section focuses on parameter estimates, their interpretation, 
and impulse responses. Orthogonalised impulse response functions were 
implemented to interpret VAR results, as these parameter estimates are not easily 
interpretable on their own. IRFs in this chapter have undergone the appropriate 
Cholesky decomposition and consider a twenty-quarter time horizon. Throughout 
this section, independently of model specification and sample period, the estimated 
coefficients on positive oil shocks were negative, while those on negative oil shocks 
had alternating signs. In all estimated impulse response functions, only some quarters 
showed a statistically significant impact. With oil price increases as the impulse, this 
tended to be in the first and third quarters. Although there are some instances where 
other quarters had a 95% confidence interval that excluded zero, the interpretation is 
that the US economy adjusts to oil price increases quickly, making an impulse 
transient. The results that follow are interpreted with this understanding, although 
the main focus is on the overall trend and total impact as opposed to individual point 
estimates.  
 
IRF analysis starts with the 7-variable system 2 using both price proxies over the 
1974:1-2015:2 subsample. The response of output growth rate to a 10% shock to PPI-
based normalised oil price increase and decrease are shown in Figures 2.13 and 2.14, 
respectively.  
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Figure 2.13. IRF with a 10% PPI-based normalised positive oil price shock. 
 
 
Figure 2.14. IRF with a 10% PPI-based normalised negative oil price shock. 
 
 
The confidence bands indicate that the impulse responses are statistically significant 
in the first and third quarters in the top figure, and the estimated response becomes 
weaker over time. Point estimates from the eighth quarter onwards are positive 
-0.05
-0.04
-0.03
-0.02
-0.01
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.03
0 5 10 15 20
G
D
P
 G
ro
w
th
 R
a
te
Quarters
7-variable System 2 - PPI
(1974:1-2015:2)
Orthogonalised IRF
95% CI
-0.03
-0.02
-0.01
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0 5 10 15 20
G
D
P
 G
ro
w
th
 R
a
te
Quarters
7-variable System 2 - PPI
(1974:1-2015:2)
Orthogonalised IRF
95% CI
 70 
indicating a slight overshooting as the economy adjusts to the new oil price 
environment about two years after the initial shock. The total estimated impact of a 
10% increase in the price of oil on annualised real output growth over 20 quarters is 
-0.2% in this specification, proxy, and sample period combination. This figure 
implies that a 10% increase in oil price is expected to reduce real GDP growth by 
0.2% over a five-year horizon. RAC-based oil price impulse yielded a similar result 
shown in Figure 2.15. Referring to Section 2.2.5, the transmission mechanism for 
this effect is through inflation, unemployment, wages, and firms’ mark-ups. The 
increase in oil price has an immediate impact on inflation through equation 2.8. It 
also has an impact on firms’ behaviour based on equation 2.7, leading to one or more 
of the main transmission channels, which are higher unemployment, lower wages, 
and a lower mark-up. 
 
 
Figure 2.15. IRF with a 10% RAC-based normalised positive oil price shock. 
 
Interestingly, a fall in the price is estimated to have a negative impact on output 
growth rate as shown in Figure 2.14. The first-quarter impact is positive but negative 
ones follow immediately after leading to an overall decline. Potential underlying 
reasons for such behaviour were touched on in Section 2.2. In all these three figures, 
the graph shows that the estimated OIRF converges to zero, which indicates that an 
orthogonalised innovation to the corresponding oil price variable does not have a 
permanent effect on real GDP growth rate in the US. The overall annualised impact 
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estimated here is on par with those calculated by Lee et al. (1995) and Blanchard & 
Galí (2007). Further, much like Blanchard & Galí's (2007) findings, I observe a larger 
impact earlier in the sample than later.  
 
This is more apparent in Figure 2.16 and Figure 2.17 below, which were constructed 
using rolling IRFs and give a more detailed view of the results. Regardless of sample 
period and proxy, the first quarter following an oil price increase showed a negative 
GDP growth rate followed by an overshooting effect in the second quarter. Another 
common feature across the two figures is the dying out effect of the original shock 
roughly from the eighth quarter onwards—represented by the flattening out of the 
surfaces in the two figures. Further, as the starting quarter moves from mid- to late-
1970s, both the initial negative impact and the overshooting effect that follows it 
become more pronounced with the largest observed impact corresponding to 1977.  
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Figure 2.16. Rolling IRFs with a 10% PPI-based normalised positive oil price shock. 
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Figure 2.17. Rolling IRFs with a 10% RAC-based normalised positive oil price shock. 
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The authors write “in the [1970s], output is estimated to decline as much as 1 percent 
two years after the 10 percent change in the price of oil” (Blanchard & Galí, 2007). 
IRFs based on 7-variable system 2 yielded a similar total annualised figure as 
mentioned above but smaller quarterly effects. Similarly, Lee et al. (1995) estimated 
the response after 24 quarters to be -0.65—larger than the one observed here. Having 
said that, estimated IRFs behave similarly and demonstrate the same sign 
characteristics: an immediate negative impact on GDP growth followed by a period 
of overshooting and convergence towards the x-axis such that much of the effect 
dissipates eight quarters after the impulse.  
 
8-variable system 2 was also used to generate IRFs for sense- and robustness-checking 
purposes. Although this specification uses a more recent and shorter sample period, 
estimated IRFs behave similarly to the 7-variable system. Annualised impact on real 
GDP growth of a 10% increase in oil price is estimated as -0.3 over a 20-quarter 
horizon independently of proxy used. This figure is quite close to the sum of 
estimated responses from the 7-variable system within the same sample period and 
translates to an average of 0.06% fall in GDP growth rate per year for 5 years. Figure 
2.18 and Figure 2.19 show the functions where RAC is used.  
 
 
Figure 2.18. IRF with a 10% RAC-based normalised positive oil price shock. 
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Figure 2.19. IRF with a 10% RAC-based normalised positive oil price shock. 
 
The increase in overall impact in the most recent sample suggests that normalised 
positive oil price changes not only retain their statistical significance (Section 2.5.3) 
but also the magnitude of impact. This is a new finding in the oil price-
macroeconomy literature, as most studies have found evidence of a weakening 
relationship. This could be investigated further using the rolling IRF implementation 
on the 8-variable system in the recent sample, but it is, regrettably, infeasible to do so 
given the small number of observations remaining in the dataset. This would be 
worth revisiting in the future to observe how the models behave with the latest data 
available. For completeness, IRF impact estimates for both specifications and 
subsamples are given in Table 2.10.  
 
Specification Proxy 1974:1-2015:2 1986:1-2015:2 
7-variable System 2 
PPI 
-0.16 -0.34 
(-0.03) (-0.07) 
RAC 
-0.14 -0.32 
(-0.03) (-0.06) 
8-variable System 2 
PPI — 
-0.32 
(-0.06) 
RAC — 
-0.30 
(-0.06) 
Table 2.10. IRF results: Annualised percent changes in output growth rate as a response to a 10 percent 
increase in oil prices over a 20-quarter horizon. Values in parentheses are average per year responses 
of output growth rate to the impulse. 
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These estimates lie within the range of other studies in the literature. In addition to 
those mentioned above, Schneider (2004) outlines that estimated per-year response 
of US output growth ranges from -0.02 percent as estimated by Abeysinghe (2001) 
using an SVAR and -0.06 percent as estimated by Jiménez-Rodríguez & Sanchez 
(2005) using a VAR. More recently, Rasmussen & Roitman (2011) reported that a 
25% increase in oil prices is expected to cause a 1% decrease in GDP for countries 
whose oil imports account for 4% of total expenditure in a panel study. My findings 
suggest that a 10% increase in the price of oil is expected to cause an average of 0.03% 
per year fall in GDP growth for five years in the early sample and 0.06% per year fall 
in the later sample. 
2.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has investigated the oil price and macroeconomy relationship across a 
number of dimensions with the goal of determining the most robust specification and 
the magnitude of the effect of an oil price change on output. Based on the results and 
analysis, RAC was found to be a more robust measure of oil price level than PPI for 
crude oil. The study found limited evidence that the oil price shocks do not Granger-
cause fluctuations in output growth rate in recent samples and concluded that the 
impact of the shocks increased in post-1986 data. Model specification and not 
controlling for all relevant variables in the VAR system influence parameter estimates 
greatly and can result in misleading outcomes. Conditioning variables, such as 3-
month TB rate and import price inflation, were found to be important in avoiding 
this bias in estimates, although the latter appeared redundant in some specifications. 
Furthermore, the statistical significance of control variables, including but not limited 
to 3-month TB rate, highlight the complexity of oil price-macroeconomy relationship 
and that many variables and monetary policy play an important role in determining 
the ultimate impact of oil price shocks on economic activity.  
 
Section 2.5.2 found strong evidence for an asymmetric effect of oil prices on output 
across model specification and sample period. Moreover, normalised positive oil 
price shocks are more highly correlated with output growth rate than any other oil 
price variable considered. This provides evidence for the claim that volatility of oil 
prices before a shock occurs matters. Hence, unexpected positive oil price shocks are 
predicted to have a much larger impact on macroeconomic activity than anticipated 
ones. These findings contradict some researchers’ views and findings (e.g., Hooker, 
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1999) that oil price changes do not Granger-cause fluctuations in output in most 
recent subsamples. There is some evidence that the magnitude of the effect was larger 
in 1970s than 1980s, but that this reversed in post-1986 samples. Analysis throughout 
Sections 2.5.2 and 2.5.3 found that models that allow for asymmetry generally 
perform better. Without separating oil price variables into their positive and negative 
counterparts, the statistical significance of the former is reduced by the latter. 
Therefore, it is preferable to distinguish between positive and negative shocks in a 
VAR system.  
 
Section 2.6 introduced orthogonalised impulse response functions to determine the 
impact of oil price changes on the growth rate of output. Positive oil price shocks 
were found to have a significant negative impact on output growth rate, whereas the 
impact of oil price falls was not statistically significant. Post-1974 data indicate that 
the effect on annual output growth rate of a 10% increase in oil prices ranges between 
-0.014 and -0.034% over a horizon of 20 quarters, although most of the impact 
dissipates about eight quarters after the shock.  
 
Obtaining parameter estimates and impulse responses across sample periods and 
model specifications has allowed a unique perspective on a relationship with a long 
macroeconomic and econometric history. I observed results that match popular work 
in the literature, such as Blanchard & Galí's (2007) observation that the impact of oil 
price rises on GDP growth is larger in the 1970s than early 1980s. I also encountered 
output that contradicts other researchers’ findings, such as observing no loss of 
statistical significance in recent samples. I argue that these contradicting results are 
the outcome of the new way in which I modelled oil prices.  
 
As part of future research on the topic and as more data become available, 
implementing a rolling IRF using larger specifications to investigate changing trends 
is key. An interesting extension would be to add a measure of investor and consumer 
confidence in the VAR system, since these are often reflected in economic agents’ 
decisions, including stock market behaviour, which has become an important 
determinant of output growth path.  
 
In addition to econometric research potential, the topic offers opportunities for 
macroeconomics-oriented research as well. Since monetary authorities could, and 
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sometimes do, intervene in the face of an oil price shock, an optimal response could 
theoretically be identified based on this new way of modelling oil prices. Keeping in 
mind the strong linkages between 3-month TB rate and money supply and output 
growth rate, a reaction by the monetary policy authority could have a larger impact 
on growth than the oil price change would. Despite the amount of research devoted 
to the topic, there is no consensus on how central banks should respond to 
exogenously and endogenously rising oil prices. Identifying such policies can help 
prevent recessions and steep declines in output growth rates following oil price hikes.  
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 Evaluating the Relationship between the UK Economy and Oil 
Prices: The Differences and Similarities between the US and the 
UK 
 
 
Abstract 
This chapter implements VAR models on quarterly UK data to analyse the oil price–
macroeconomy relationship in the country. Data coverage is from 1955 through 
2015. A primary objective is to determine how the oil price-macroeconomy 
relationship has evolved over time with an emphasis on the importance of oil price 
volatility. The analysis extends beyond GDP and includes other key macroeconomic 
variables, including inflation and unemployment. I found some evidence of Granger-
causality between oil price fluctuations and GDP growth, and concluded that this 
relationship is stronger with normalised oil price changes. This suggests that oil price 
volatility leading up to a price shock contributes to its macroeconomic implications: 
unanticipated price shocks—those occurring after a period of stable prices—tend to 
have a larger impact on the economy. There was some, albeit muted, evidence for an 
asymmetric impact of oil price shocks on output growth rate. A rolling-window time-
varying parameter approach concluded that after 1980, oil price implications have 
dwindled in terms of magnitude despite retaining statistical significance in VAR 
specifications. This time-dependency of parameters carried onto IRF estimates. 
Although not all point estimates were statistically significant, the responses pointed 
to a time-dependent relationship. More specifically, 1974:2-2015:2 subsample 
suggested a 0.24% decrease in GDP growth as a result of a 10% increase in 
normalised oil prices, whereas the same model estimated over 1986:1-2015:2 led to a 
0.11% increase in GDP growth in response to the same shock. In spite of significant 
differences between the US and UK economies, this chapter highlights some 
fundamental similarities. For instance, unemployment rate is expected to follow a 
similar pattern following an oil price disturbance, since both countries have oil 
production activities and extensive direct and indirect employment within the sector. 
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3.1 Introduction 
This chapter shares much of its methodology with Chapter 2 but has just as strong a 
motivation, as the global oil market and its historical fluctuations have had 
implications for the UK as well as the US. More indirectly, as world economies 
become more closely linked through trade and financial markets, the same oil price 
shocks can have exaggerated effects on multiple economies simultaneously. With 
growing focus on renewable energy sources and a shift away from fossil fuels, 
dependence on non-renewable energy sources have been viewed as a global 
challenge. At the extreme, these traditional sources of energy have been described as 
an obstacle for sustainable global development and economic growth. The reasoning 
is twofold: first, if economic growth is closely linked to non-renewable sources, there 
will eventually be a scarcity of energy. Second, while these fuels continue to be 
important, fluctuations in their markets and prices can have significant impact on 
nations’ performance before reserves are exhausted.  
 
Numerous studies have examined the relationship between oil prices and GDP 
growth in the United States, but there has not been as much focus on determining the 
relationship between the price of oil and economic growth in the United Kingdom. 
As a net importer of oil, the nature of the relationship between oil prices and US 
GDP seems obvious: an oil price hike should, ceteris paribus, slow down economic 
growth. An in-depth analysis of this and empirical results are discussed in chapter 2. 
Because the UK had been a net exporter of oil until recently, the oil price hikes have 
traditionally been viewed from a different perspective. For many years, price rises 
have been thought to contribute to output growth in the UK and not hinder it. 
However, since the UK became a net importer of oil within the last decade, there has 
been growing concern that oil price hikes might affect growth in the UK the same 
way it does in the US. Although the market share of oil consumption has fallen for 
almost twelve years in a row, it still occupies a large part of the market accounting 
for 39 percent of total primary energy consumption in the country (BP, 2017). Figure 
3.1 shows crude oil imports and exports of the UK from 1970 onwards. These series 
from the Digest of UK Energy Statistics show that the UK became a net exporter of 
oil in 1981 and remained a net exporter until 2005. A priori, therefore, from 1980s 
onwards, we may observe a positive relationship between oil price increases and 
GDP growth in the country. 
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Figure 3.1. Crude oil imports and exports in the UK. Source: DUKES. 
 
Du, Yanan, & Wei (2010) implemented an approach similar to the one in this chapter 
to scrutinise the linkages between oil price fluctuations and the Chinese 
macroeconomy. Jiménez-Rodríguez & Sanchez (2005) used a panel of OECD 
countries to investigate the same relationship, and Park & Ratti (2008) studied the 
US and 13 European countries’ stock market performance following oil price shocks. 
Although different sets of countries have been studied along this vein, the UK has 
not received due attention on its own. When included in a study, the UK tended to 
be grouped with other European countries despite important macroeconomic 
differences, including the Bank of England’s independent monetary policy tool. This 
chapter aims to fill this gap and provide insights as to the nature of the relationship, 
its sensitivity to sample period and model specification. It also introduces a volatility 
component and implements time-varying parameter VARs in an impulse response 
context, none of which have been done for the UK. 
 
The sample period consists of the first quarter of 1955 through the second quarter of 
2015. Some variables have a shorter time series due to limitations on data availability. 
These are outlined in later sections. 
 
The next section is devoted to the description of the theoretical approach, literature 
review, transmission mechanisms through which oil prices propagate, and observed 
-
20,000
40,000
60,000
80,000
100,000
120,000
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
C
ru
d
e 
O
il
 I
m
p
o
rt
s 
a
n
d
 E
x
p
o
rt
s 
(t
h
o
u
sa
n
d
 t
o
n
n
es
)
Year
Imports-Exports
Imports
Exports
 82 
properties of the oil price–macroeconomy relationship. Section 3.3 outlines the 
models used for empirical analysis, and Section 3.4 presents the results obtained from 
these models. As a part of the analysis, VAR models are used to investigate empirical 
results across different dimensions, including sample period and model specification. 
This analysis is finalised with a discussion of impulse response functions in Section 
3.5, and Section 3.6 discusses similarities and differences observed between the US 
and the UK, followed by a conclusion in Section 3.7. 
3.2 Theoretical Analysis and Literature Review 
3.2.1 Oil Price-Macroeconomy Relationship 
Once the apparent relationship between the cyclical behaviour of macroeconomic 
variables and oil price movements was observed in US data, the relationship between 
these variables received considerable attention in the literature. Undoubtedly, one of 
the most important research aims within this framework has been forecasting when 
a recession is likely following an oil price shock. Accurately anticipating this would 
allow for various policy interventions ahead of time and diminish the detrimental 
effects of these shocks on economic activity. 
 
Similarly to the pattern observed in US data, post-World War II data indicate that 
majority of UK recessions were preceded by drastic increases in oil prices (Figure 
3.2). However, effects of changes in oil prices on real macroeconomic variables in the 
UK are likely to be more complex than those in nations that have historically been 
net importers. In the case of net importing and exporting countries alike, not all 
theoretical predictions have been corroborated by empirical estimations and impulse 
response analyses. A priori, unlike the case of US, I did not expect to find a negative 
correlation between oil price increases and GDP growth in the UK. On the contrary, 
during the period the UK was a net exporter of oil, we may expect an oil price hike 
to lead to faster growth. However, since findings in Chapter 2 suggested that oil price 
rises could cause a fall in GDP growth in the US, there could be indirect detrimental 
effects on the UK and global economy despite localised positive effects. As a result, 
ceteris paribus, the effect of a higher oil price level on the UK economy remains 
ambiguous from a theoretical perspective.
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Figure 3.2. Recessions and oil prices in the United Kingdom.
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Hamilton's (2005) simple OLS regression of GDP growth rates on its lagged values 
and the lags of logarithmic changes in nominal oil prices, shown in equation 2.1, 
found a statistically significant relationship between GDP and the lags of oil prices 
in the US from 1949:2 to 1980:4. As noted earlier, however, the simple OLS approach 
has been criticised and is not thought to provide reliable evidence of the relationship. 
Therefore, many researchers have resorted to more robust VAR and SVAR systems 
or general equilibrium models to reach a conclusion (Abeysinghe, 2001; Dalsgaard 
et al., 2002; Hamilton, 1983, 1996, 2003, 2005; Hooker, 1999; Jiménez-Rodríguez & 
Sanchez, 2005; Millard & Shakir, 2012). Most studies concluded that oil prices do 
have a statistically significant effect on the US economy (Carruth et al., 1998; 
Hamilton, 1983, 1996, 2003, 2005; Raymond & Rich, 1997; Rotemberg & 
Woodford, 1996), whereas Millard & Shakir's (2012) study of the UK economy found 
that the nature of the shock as well as the sample period affect the overall impact. 
 
Several researchers have also argued that the statistically significant impact of oil 
prices on macroeconomic variables is indirect and acts mostly through the two 
variables’ correlation with a third one (Barsky & Kilian, 2001, 2004, Hooker, 1996b, 
1999). Hamilton ruled out this possibility in pre-1980 US data by confirming that oil 
price changes cannot be predicted by lagged values of other macroeconomic variables 
in his dataset. In addition, he claimed that exogenous factors, such as military 
conflicts, have mostly driven oil price hikes in history, which provides evidence for 
the shocks being exogenous. However, the former claim has been widely criticised. 
Barsky & Kilian (2001, 2004) argued that monetary policy is a likely cause of some 
large drops in output growth, whereas Hooker (1999) stated that most of the effect of 
price hikes on output is through their impact on unemployment. More specifically, 
he argued that oil price increases lead to a heightened natural level of unemployment 
and impede output growth as a by-product (Hooker 1999). In the following analysis, 
I have included conditioning variables, such as unemployment, 3-month interbank 
rate, and import price inflation in an effort to isolate the real impact of increases in 
oil prices. Another idea that emerged in the literature in the late 1980s, and one that 
was extensively discussed in the previous chapter, is that of an asymmetric effect of 
oil price shocks on output. Several researchers found strong evidence that an oil price 
increase has a greater negative impact on output in absolute value than the positive 
effect of an oil price decrease (Lee et al., 1995; Mork, 1989). This issue is discussed 
theoretically in Section 3.2.3 and empirically in Sections 3.3.3 and 3.3.4. 
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3.2.2 The Transmission Mechanisms 
The channels through which changes in oil prices affect macroeconomic variables in 
the UK are, to a large extent, the same as those discussed in the context of the US in 
Chapter 2. Please refer to the discussion in Section 2.2.2 for details. This subsection 
provides further insights applicable to the UK and are relevant here. I begin by 
recognising that important differences between the two countries may mean 
additional channels prove to be important for the UK. By way of example, as a net 
exporter for part of the sample period, the UK's export revenues are expected to rise 
as the price of oil increases. This additional income could translate into increased 
economic activity, investment, and eventually GDP growth. On the contrary, these 
additional sales could appreciate the exchange rate and decelerate exports of other 
goods and services slowing down export-led growth in the country. This resource 
curse and Dutch disease idea is investigated at length on a global scale in the next 
chapter. 
 
To demonstrate how the effect of an oil price change propagates through each of the 
three transmission mechanisms discussed by Schneider (2004)—supply side, demand 
side, and terms of trade—suppose there is a rise in the price of oil. The immediate 
effect of the shock is increased production costs and thus a negative impact on 
aggregate supply. In the long-run, firms can opt for more energy-efficient production 
processes, but this switch is not feasible in the short run due to frictions. Reallocating 
the means of production is also costly, and firms are forced to pay fixed costs to 
implement a more energy-efficient production procedure (Schneider, 2004). 
Therefore, firms must decide whether the cost of continuing production using an oil-
intensive production process is indeed higher than increasing the energy efficiency of 
their production processes. These supply-side effects are shared with the US, 
although there are additional forces at play in the case of the UK. The price shock 
could cause to a global economic slow-down which could affect non-oil UK exports 
negatively and decrease slow down overall growth. Similarly, as noted above, an 
increase in oil sector profits due to an increase in price could have implications for 
the exchange rate. An appreciation due to an oil price increase could crowd out other 
exports with detrimental effects on growth.  
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On the demand side, inflation is expected to rise as a result of the price hike because 
oil is a raw input in the domestic market. Although the rise in inflation would reduce 
aggregate demand through lower real disposable income (Schneider, 2004), rising 
exports could offset this effect once again resulting in an ambiguous overall impact 
of the oil price innovation. The labour market is also affected. Decreasing real wages 
increase the pressure on downward rigid nominal wages, lead to lower demand for 
employment, and result in a decreased level of output. In the special case of the UK, 
the rising prices could lead to a booming oil sector and drive wages up across 
industries. These spillover effects could contribute to higher nominal wages 
stabilising real wages and preventing a fall in demand for employment. Investors’ and 
consumers’ confidence also play an important role in the relationship through their 
behaviour in the stock market. Because fluctuating oil prices can lead to a loss of 
confidence and the financial sector continues to have a substantial impact on 
macroeconomic fundamentals, the effect of the oil price shock can be amplified if the 
loss of confidence is passed on to the stock market (Schneider, 2004). This part of the 
literature has received abundant attention with numerous studies of the stock markets 
and oil price behaviour in various countries, including the UK. Some examples are 
Sadorsky (1999) for US and Canada, Park & Ratti (2008) for the US and 13 European 
countries, (Cong, Wei, Jiao, & Fan, 2008) for China, (Kilian & Park, 2009) for the 
US, and Fayyad & Daly (2011) for Gulf Coast countries, the UK, and the US. These 
studies have generally found that an oil price increase has a positive impact on stock 
market returns in oil-exporting countries and a negative one in oil-importing ones.  
 
Lastly, monetary policy responses to a change in the price of oil are likely to have 
significant effects on the economy as well. Researchers unanimously acknowledge 
that the effect of an innovation in the price of oil on a laissez faire economy is different 
from the case with intervention by the central bank. However, the magnitude of this 
impact is a point of debate. Bernanke et al. (1997) paper on the US argued through 
VAR simulations that the real effects of oil price shocks are mostly caused by the 
tightening of monetary policy as a response to the price shock and not by oil price 
shocks themselves. On the other hand, Hamilton & Herrera (2004) claimed that there 
are greater direct effects from the shock than those brought about by restrictive 
monetary policy. Since the monetary authority faces a trade-off between output 
stabilisation and inflation dampening and that central banks’ goals vary greatly across 
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countries, the effect of monetary policy response critically depends on the country in 
question.  
3.2.3 The Asymmetric Effect of Oil Prices 
As mentioned earlier and investigated thoroughly in the previous chapter, the impact 
of oil prices on US output growth was found to be asymmetric. Numerous other 
empirical studies have found strong evidence of asymmetric effects (Hamilton, 1996; 
Lee et al., 1995; Mork, 1989; Mory, 1993). More recently, Herrera, Karaki, & 
Rangaraju (2017) and Baumeister & Kilian (2016) found that the oil price fall of 2014-
15 had a negligible net stimulating effect on unemployment and real GDP in the US. 
However, in UK-centric studies, oil prices have not been explicitly modelled 
asymmetrically. This raises questions as to the validity of the asymmetry claim and 
how much it can be generalised beyond the US. To address these questions, two types 
of asymmetric oil prices are modelled here over sample periods in which the UK was 
a net oil exporter as well as a net importer. 
 
The question of asymmetry is just as interesting for the UK as it is for the US, since 
the dispersion hypothesis applies here as well and arguably to a greater extent. This 
hypothesis deals with reallocation of factors of production across sectors and 
underpins the idea that a rise in the price of oil may translate into higher inflation 
and lower output in the short run. As an example, an oil price rise may cause a fall 
in demand for fuel-inefficient goods. Despite the imbalance this causes in the demand 
for fuel-efficient and inefficient goods, labour and capital market frictions prevent free 
movement across sectors and limit production of highly demanded fuel-efficient 
goods in the short run. On the contrary, a decrease in oil prices may not have the 
opposite and equally-sized impact. Chapter 2 demonstrated this phenomenon for the 
US and this chapter investigates it for the UK. An added complication here is the 
most recent fall in oil prices. Since this fall in price had implications for the already-
declining crude oil production in the UK continental shelf and led to early 
decommissioning of some productive assets, the impact of a negative oil price change 
may be amplified. The impact on output is exacerbated by the lack of free movement 
of labour and capital across sectors as unemployment may rise temporarily as agents 
require additional training to change industries. In empirical results, this would be 
reflected by a larger effect, in absolute value, on output growth of a fall in the price 
of oil in the UK than the US. Hamilton (1988) and Atkeson & Kehoe (1999) have 
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confirmed that demand side output responses to oil prices are not log-linear implying 
that consumers may delay purchasing a car when oil prices increase but do not buy 
a second one when they decrease (Hamilton, 2005). More generally, a fall in the price 
of oil can add to uncertainty surrounding prices and lead to losses in output as factors 
of production are being reallocated (Hamilton, 2005).  
 
Another transmission mechanism underpinning asymmetric responses is downward 
nominal wage rigidities. Workers’ reaction to a drop in purchasing power due to an 
increase in oil prices is to press for higher wages. However, an increase in workers’ 
real wages as a result of a fall in oil prices does not lead to lower wages. As above, 
frequent oil price fluctuations introduce uncertainty to the economic environment, 
and consumers tend to slow down their purchases of durable goods, such as cars, real 
estate, and insulation, which can be perceived as the beginning of an economy-wide 
chain reaction (Hamilton, 2005). In this sense, volatility of oil prices could have 
implications for the oil price-macroeconomy relationship. This is one motivation for 
modelling oil price volatility in this context. Details are given in Section 3.3.4 with 
empirical results in Section 3.4.3.  
 
For the US, there is some evidence that the significance of the asymmetry observation 
depends on sample period. Pair-wise equality tests in some studies for increases and 
decreases in oil price concluded that the null hypothesis of equal positive and 
negative effects was not rejected for the sample period 1949:1 to 1986:1 but was 
rejected for 1949:1-1988:2 and 1949:1-1992:3. Besides asymmetry, researchers have 
observed that the impact of an oil price shock greatly depends on the industry and 
the production process of the firm. In particular, Davis & Haltiwanger (2001) 
demonstrated that firms with a high capital to labour ratio, which have capital 
intensive production processes, produce durable goods, and have strong needs for 
energy are most affected by price shocks. 
3.2.4 Modelling Literature Review  
The next section introduces each model specification in separate subsections. These 
specifications are increasingly complex and attempt to capture a different dynamic 
within the oil price-macroeconomy relationship. These are extensions of VAR 
models that appeared in the literature after the 1980s following Sims’ original 
implementation. Hamilton (1983) based his analysis on Sims' (1980) 6-variable 
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quarterly VAR model to demonstrate a strong causal relationship between oil price 
fluctuations and output growth using US data from 1948 through 1980. Mork (1989) 
extended the dataset to the second quarter of 1988 and concluded that the correlation 
between oil price changes and real GDP growth had weakened and was only 
marginally significant. Hooker (1996b) revisited the topic and claimed that the 
relationship between oil price changes and output growth was no longer statistically 
significant in its original form. More recently, the topic has received considerable 
attention with researchers implementing larger VAR specifications (e.g., Hamilton, 
2005; Jiménez-Rodríguez & Sanchez, 2005; Kilian, 2009), allowing for different 
types of oil price shocks (for example, Kilian, 2009), using groups of countries for 
their study (for example, Gómez-Loscos, Gadea, & Montañés, 2012), and explicitly 
testing for the asymmetric impact discussed above (for example, Kilian & Vigfusson, 
2011a). Most of these studies have focussed on the US with little attention to the UK 
even in studies involving the UK as one of the countries in the dataset. An exception 
is Millard & Shakir (2012) study of the relationship in the UK using an SVAR. The 
authors opted for a Kilian-like oil price modelling and concluded that nature of the 
shock as well as the sample period affect the overall impact of a price change on UK 
GDP. This literature is discussed further in Section 2.2 where details of how the 
debate has progressed over time are also available.  
 
As a part of oil price modelling, understanding oil price volatility has been a key 
objective in the literature. In essence, if oil price changes can help us anticipate a 
recession and determine the correct policy intervention, understanding the price 
behaviour and its implications would be key. As a part of this, researchers within 
economics and finance have implemented a suite of techniques mainly focussing on 
oil price volatility. Sadorsky (2006) attempted to forecast volatility; Lee et al. (1995), 
Ferderer (1997), Yang, Hwang, & Huang (2002), and Chen & Chen (2007) 
investigated the relationship between oil price volatility and the economy; Huang, 
Masulis, & Stoll (1996), and Sadorsky (1999, 2003) examined the linkages between 
oil price volatility and stock price performance; Plourde & Watkins (1998), Pindyck 
(1999), and Regnier (2007) studied the relative volatility of crude oil, refined 
petroleum product, and natural gas prices; and B.-N. Huang, Hwang, & Peng (2005) 
and Narayan & Narayan (2007) examined the asymmetry of oil price shocks’ impact 
on economic activity. The latter focussed particularly on understanding the 
asymmetry and persistence of shocks and implemented an exponential GARCH 
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specification. The authors found that positive and negative oil price shocks have 
different implications for volatility. Along these lines, Pindyck (2004b) argued that 
understanding oil price volatility is critical, since persistent changes in volatility can 
expose producers and consumers to risk and affect investment decisions, including 
those in production facilities and transportation. Modelling oil prices using high-
frequency data, Wei, Wang, & Huang (2010) found that “nonlinear GARCH-class 
models, which are capable of capturing long-memory and/or asymmetric volatility, 
exhibit greater forecasting accuracy than the linear ones.” The motivation behind 
these studies has been, at least partially, based on some of Pindyck’s observations. 
This study also stated that volatility has implications for derivative valuation, 
hedging decisions, and investment decisions in physical capital tied to production 
and consumption of oil. Lastly, Pindyck (2004a) argued that volatility has 
implications for total marginal cost of production and influences firms’ operating 
options and opportunity cost of production. As outlined in the next section, this 
chapter implements a unique approach by allowing explicitly for asymmetry and 
introducing oil price volatility into the VAR model through a GARCH model in line 
with the literature.  
3.2.5 Structural Differences between the US and the UK 
Among fundamental differences in the US and the UK economies, in the context of 
this chapter, the critical difference between the two is the role oil and gas sectors have 
played in the economy over the past several decades. As established in the 
introductory section, the UK has been both an importer and exporter of oil over the 
sample period considered. This has implications for empirical results as well as the 
transmission mechanisms at play. Based on the model introduced in Chapter 2, a key 
difference for the UK (while it was a net exporter of oil) is that 𝑚𝑡 in equation 2.2 is 
carries much less weight. Furthermore, the impact of oil price fluctuations on wages, 
employment, and firms’ mark-ups is ambiguous and depends on the relative 
significance of the oil sector in the economy as a whole. Given that the UK is a small 
open economy with too little production or consumption of oil to influence the global 
oil price, domestic inflation and households’ behaviour are still affected by the oil 
price fluctuations in a similar fashion to the US.  
 
An additional transmission mechanism not raised in Chapter 2 but may be relevant 
for the UK is the real exchange rates. In theory, significant changes in oil price could 
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influence the trade composition and influence relative prices—further discussion of 
this in a global context in Chapter 4. Since oil exports have accounted for a modest 
percentage of GDP in the UK, the most pronounced transmission mechanism from 
real exchange rates to macroeconomic fundamentals is the price level. To capture 
this and avoid introducing noise through the inclusion of nominal exchange rate 
series, I have opted to use inflation and import price inflation as proxy variables. 
These two variables bring in the identifying variation that would be expected in a real 
exchange rate series without the noise from the financial sector.  
3.3 Data, Models, and Methodology 
Models and methodology implemented here are similar to those discussed in the 
previous chapter. For completeness, this section provides an overview of each model 
in a UK context with references to the previous chapter, where appropriate. The 
analysis begins with a base model, which is sequentially extended to incorporate 
asymmetric oil price effects and oil price volatility. In later sections, a time-varying 
parameter approach using a rolling-window technique helps shed light on the nature 
of the relationship in the UK over time. Variables used in the estimation are listed in 
Section 3.3.1 and have been selected based on the debate and criticisms in the 
relevant literature. Although early studies preferred GNP, recent research has 
focussed on GDP, which is the case here. The choice between nominal and real GDP 
has been a point of debate. In VAR systems with an inflation measure, this concern 
is circumvented, since the inclusion of an implicit deflator in the model gives identical 
results to using real log differences (Mork, 1989). Lastly, some researchers, including 
Hamilton (1996), have deflated their measure of output using PPI in all commodities. 
To avoid introducing correlation between oil price and deflated GDP artificially, I 
have opted for PPI in manufactured goods, which excludes raw commodities like oil. 
Lastly, oil prices are captured using the Brent price as the most applicable measure 
for the UK. Refiners’ acquisition cost is not available for the UK and is arguably less 
useful than in the US due to limited refining activity in the former. 
3.3.1 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
Data are available through Thomson Reuters Datastream in quarterly frequency and 
originate from various sources. All variables in the VAR system are expressed in 
natural logarithm and are first-differenced to ensure their order of integration is zero. 
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Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests have been used to verify this across the board. 
Following natural logarithm and first difference transformations, removing time 
trends was not necessary in any variable. Table 3.1 below summarises the variables, 
data treatment, period of availability, and sources:  
 
Variable Description Period Data Treatment Source 
GDP 
Gross Domestic 
Product ($2010) 
1955:1 - 
2015:2 
Natural log, first 
difference, deflated 
using PPI in 
manufactured goods 
Office for 
National 
Statistics 
GDP deflator 
Implicit price 
deflator 
1955:1 - 
2015:2 
Natural log, first 
difference 
Office for 
National 
Statistics 
Brent oil price Spot UK price 
1957:1 - 
2015:2 
Natural log, first 
difference 
International 
Financial 
Statistics, 
IMF 
Import price 
index 
Import prices, 
Goods, Index, 
2012=100 
1970:1 - 
2015:2 
Natural log, first 
difference 
Office for 
National 
Statistics 
Real wage 
growth 
Weekly earnings, 
Index, 2005=100 
1963:1 - 
2015:2 
Natural log, first 
difference 
Main 
Economic 
Indicators, 
OECD 
3-month IB 
rate 
3-month 
Interbank rate 
1960:1 - 
2015:2 
Natural log, first 
difference 
Eurostat 
Unemployment 
rate 
Unemployment 
rate based on 
claimant count 
1971:1 - 
2015:2 
Natural log, first 
difference 
Office for 
National 
Statistics 
Table 3.1. Variable descriptions, availability, and sources.  
 
GDP is used as a measure of output and the variable enters the VAR system as 
ln(𝑦𝑡/𝑦𝑡−1), where 𝑦𝑡 denotes GDP deflated using PPI in manufactured goods. Since 
all variables undergo a logged differencing transformation, fluctuations in the 
resulting variables can be interpreted as percentage changes. Not all variables date 
back to the same starting point, so parts of the analysis were conducted with a shorter 
time series. Descriptive statistics for each sample period are shown in Table 3.2. 
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Variable Statistic 
1955:1 - 
1986:1 
1974:1 - 
2015:2 
1986:1 - 
2015:2 
1955:1 - 
2015:2 
Δln(GDP) 
Mean -0.0143 -0.0067 -0.0001 -0.0063 
Std dev 0.0242 0.0180 0.0097 0.0190 
Δln(Brent) 
Mean 0.0185 0.0084 0.0107 0.0146 
Std dev 0.1403 0.1463 0.1566 0.1484 
Δln(GDP deflator) 
Mean 0.0182 0.0137 0.0076 0.0130 
Std dev 0.0165 0.0146 0.0072 0.0139 
Δln(Real wage 
growth) 
Mean 0.0271 0.0174 0.0111 0.0182 
Std dev 0.0162 0.0153 0.0077 0.0145 
Δln(Unemployment 
rate) 
Mean 0.0268 0.0015 -0.0130 0.0005 
Std dev 0.0698 0.0585 0.0529 0.0619 
Δln(3-month IB 
rate) 
Mean 0.0096 -0.0192 -0.0274 -0.0100 
Std dev 0.1319 0.1317 0.1300 0.1319 
Δln(Import price) 
Mean 0.0265 0.0093 0.0038 0.0118 
Std dev 0.0315 0.0221 0.0183 0.0261 
Table 3.2. Descriptive statistics. 
 
As a part of empirical modelling, oil prices are split into the variable’s positive and 
negative counterparts to explicitly allow for asymmetry in the VAR model. In 
addition, oil price changes are modelled using GARCH specifications to normalise 
or scale them based on previous quarters’ price behaviour. Details of this approach 
are given in Section 3.3.4 in this chapter and in Section 2.3.3 in the previous one. 
Figure 3.3 demonstrates the outcome of normalising oil price fluctuations from 
1974:1 through 2015:2. The result of the normalisation process is a rescaled oil price 
change variable, where each quarter’s value is adjusted to incorporate oil price 
behaviour in the preceding two quarters.16 An oil price change preceded by a period 
of relatively stable prices is scaled upwards in absolute value to emphasise the 
unexpected nature of that particular shock. The opposite applies when an oil price 
change follows a period of highly variable oil prices. A particularly striking example 
of this is price behaviour in the first and second quarters of 1986. First quarter of this 
year saw a 46% decline in the Brent price. This was preceded by particularly small 
fluctuations in 1985. Therefore, this fall in price is represented by a much larger 
magnitude in the rescaled series, 𝜀∗. Further, the second quarter of 1986 experienced 
a further 32% decline in the oil price. However, because it was preceded by the large 
                                                 
 
16 Unlike the previous chapter, where four quarters were used in GARCH modelling, two quarters are 
used here.   
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46% fall in the previous quarter, normalisation process scales this change down to 
the equivalent of approximately a 20% decrease in price.  
 
 
Figure 3.3. Oil price changes and normalised oil price fluctuations. 
 
3.3.2 The Base Model 
As in the previous chapter, the model introduced here serves as a starting point for 
the empirical investigation of the oil price-GDP growth relationship in the UK. 
Although simple, this model is informative since it has not been applied to the UK. 
This 7-variable system is based on Sims' (1980) VAR specification and includes oil 
prices as an extension. Thus, the VAR system consists of GDP growth, oil price 
changes, GDP implicit deflator inflation, 3-month IB rate, real wage inflation, 
unemployment, and import price inflation. Formally, the GDP growth equation has 
the following form:  
 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝛽0 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑦𝑡−𝑖
4
𝑖=1
+ ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑜𝑡−𝑖
4
𝑖=1
+ ∑ ∑ 𝛿𝑖𝑗𝑥𝑡−𝑖,𝑗
𝑘
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4
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where, 𝑦𝑡 denotes changes in real GDP in period 𝑡, 𝑜𝑡 changes in nominal oil prices 
in period 𝑡, 𝑥𝑡 changes in other explanatory variables at time 𝑡, and 𝜀𝑡 is the error 
term. Estimation results of this equation are shown in Section 3.4.1.  
3.3.3 Asymmetric Effects Model 
This section introduces an extension to the base model, in which oil prices are 
modelled using their positive and negative components. Oil price increases and 
decreases enter the VAR system as separate variables to allow explicit evaluation of 
each variable’s contribution to the specification. As described in the previous chapter, 
the new variables are formulated as shown in equation 3.2 and extend the 7-variable 
base model to an 8-variable one. Denoting oil price changes as 𝑜𝑡, the new variables, 
𝑜+ and 𝑜−, are defined as follows: 
𝑜+ = {
𝑥, 𝑥 > 0
0, 𝑥 ≤ 0
 
𝑜− = {
0, 𝑥 ≥ 0
𝑥, 𝑥 < 0
 
(3.2) 
 
Regression results using this model are given in Section 3.4.2. 
3.3.4 Normalised Oil Price Model 
For the reasons discussed in this chapter and the previous one, modelling oil prices 
has received plenty of attention. If oil price changes can help us anticipate a recession 
and determine the correct policy intervention, understanding the price behaviour 
would be key. As a part of this, researchers within economics and finance have 
implemented a suite of techniques mainly focussing on oil price volatility. In this part 
of the literature, Narayan & Narayan (2007) motivated their study by explaining that 
highly volatile oil prices could introduce uncertainty and have a knock-on effect on 
the economy as a whole. In their study, the authors implemented an exponential 
GARCH model and found that positive and negative oil price shocks have different 
implications for volatility. Along these lines, Pindyck (2004b) argued that 
understanding oil price volatility is critical, since persistent changes in volatility can 
expose producers and consumers to risk and affect investment decisions. Modelling 
oil prices using high-frequency data, Wei et al. (2010) found that “nonlinear 
GARCH-class models, which are capable of capturing long-memory and/or 
asymmetric volatility, exhibit greater forecasting accuracy than linear ones.” This 
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chapter uses a GARCH (1,1) process to model positive and negative oil price 
innovations. In this implementation, oil price fluctuations are scaled (or normalised) 
using conditional variance of oil price changes estimated through the GARCH 
process. These normalised oil price changes aim to capture the idea that small price 
increases within volatile periods are expected to have little effect on economic agents’ 
behaviour, since small changes in a highly uncertain price environment are not 
surprising and do not incentivise irreversible investment decisions. These variables 
are often referred to as scaled oil price increases (SOPI) and scaled oil price decreases 
(SOPD). By construction, these variables contain identifying variation from changes 
in variance and not the level of oil prices. That is, the mean of real oil price changes 
may rise over time without agents being surprised as long as the new distribution of 
oil price changes remains the same. As in Chapter 2, these variables are constructed 
as follows: 
𝑧𝑡 =  𝛼0 +  ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝑧𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜀𝑡
4
𝑖=1
 (3.3) 
ℎ𝑡 =  𝛾0 +  𝛾1𝜀𝑡−1
2 + 𝛾2ℎ𝑡−1 (3.4) 
 
Here, 𝜀𝑡|𝐼𝑡−1~𝑁(0, ℎ𝑡), and 𝑧𝑡 are oil prices measured as RAC. The unexpected part 
of the oil price shock is simply the residual term of equation 3.3, 𝜀?̂? = 𝑧𝑡 − 𝑧?̂?. 
Normalised oil price shocks are then calculated as, 
 
𝜀𝑡
∗ = 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑂𝑖𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘 =
𝜀?̂?
√ℎ𝑡
 (3.5) 
 
This variable is then split into two parts as, 
𝑆𝑂𝑃𝐼𝑡 = 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑂𝑖𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘 (𝜀𝑡
∗+) = max(0, 𝜀𝑡
∗) (3.6) 
𝑆𝑂𝑃𝐷𝑡 = 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑂𝑖𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘 (𝜀𝑡
∗−) = min(0, 𝜀𝑡
∗ )  (3.7) 
 
Assuming unexpected variation in real oil prices indeed has an impact on how the 
price shocks affect real output, the normalised variable, 𝜀𝑡
∗, is predicted to have a 
“more systematic causal relation to real GDP than either 𝑧𝑡 or 𝜀?̂?” (Lee et al., 1995). 
These variables are used in a number of model specifications. A summary of 
specifications is given in Table 3.3 below. Following VAR analysis with these 
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specifications, impulse response functions are used to evaluate the size of the impact 
across model specification and sample period. Details of this implementation are 
given in Section 2.3.4. 
  
9
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Model 
Specification 
GDP 
Growth 
Oil 
Price 
Change 
Oil Price 
Increase 
Oil Price 
Decrease 
Normalised 
Oil Shock 
Normalised 
Positive Oil 
Shock 
Normalised 
Negative 
Oil Shock 
Net Oil 
Price 
Increase 
GDP 
Deflator 
Inflation 
3m IB 
rate 
Unemp. 
Rate 
Real 
Wage 
Inflation 
Import 
Price 
Inflation 
Base Model             
Asym. Eff. 
Model             
6-variable 
System 1             
6-variable 
System 2             
6-variable 
System 3             
7-variable 
System 1             
7-variable 
System 2             
7-variable 
System 3             
8-variable 
System 1             
8-variable 
System 2             
8-variable 
System 3             
 
Table 3.3. Model specifications. 
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3.4 Empirical Results 
As in the previous chapter, empirical results and hypothesis testing in this section 
refer to Granger causality with a null hypothesis that has a binary outcome. 
Throughout the discussion in this section, the rejection of the null hypothesis suggests 
the coefficient estimates in question are statistically significantly different from zero 
and, thus, provide evidence for Granger causality. Similarly, if the null hypothesis is 
not rejected, there is no evidence for Granger causality. In other words, the null 
hypothesis is equivalent to no Granger causality, whereas the alternative suggests 
Granger causality.  
3.4.1 The Base Model 
This section provides an outline of the empirical results obtained through the 
implementation of the model described in Section 3.3.2 across different sample 
periods. The periods in question are 1963:1 through 1986:1, 1974:1 through 2015:2, 
1986:1 through 2015:2, and finally the entire sample period. These have been selected 
for ease of comparison with results from Chapter 2, which is a key objective for this 
chapter. As in the previous chapter, these sample periods allow a formal investigation 
of the oil price-macroeconomy relationship over time and pave the way for a rolling-
window implementation in later sections.  
 
Table 3.4 is a summary of test statistics and p-values from joint F-tests of the overall 
significance of four lags of oil price changes in the GDP growth equation. Often 
referred to as exclusion tests, these tests are a formal way of investigating whether oil 
price fluctuations Granger-cause changes in GDP growth controlling for other 
variables in the system. The null hypothesis is that none of the four coefficients are 
statistically different from zero, which translates into no Granger causality between 
oil price changes and GDP growth.  
 
Variable 1963:1-1985:4 † 1974:1-2015:2 †† 1986:1-2015:2 ††† 1963:1-2015:2 † 
Oil Price 
Change 
2.131 3.022 12.064** 2.120 
(0.712) (0.554) (0.017) (0.714) 
Table 3.4. Exclusion tests for the base model. The values in parentheses are p-values. Statistical 
significance is shown at the 10% level (*), 5% level (**) and 1% level (***). 
 
Interestingly, the results indicate that oil price fluctuations Granger-cause changes in 
GDP growth only in the most recent sample. Formally, I failed to reject the null 
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hypothesis of no Granger-causality for all sample periods and model specifications 
except in the 1986:1-2015:2 subsample, where the null hypothesis is rejected at the 
5% level. This is in line with the a priori expectation established based on Figure 3.1 
but is not considered conclusive evidence of a robust relationship due to two main 
reasons. First, oil prices in this model specification do not allow for asymmetry. 
Modelling this explicitly could change the outcome. Second, model specifications 
shown in the table above vary across sample periods due to data availability and for 
purposes of comparison. The most comprehensive specification, indicated with †††, 
is estimated over the period 1986:1-2015:2.17 The 7-variable VAR system consists of 
real GDP growth, oil price changes, implicit GDP deflator inflation, real wage 
inflation, unemployment rate, 3-month TB rate, and import price inflation. 
Estimating the 7-variable system using the 1974:1-2015:2 subsample yielded the same 
outcome as the 6-variable system shown in Table 3.4, suggesting that import price 
inflation is not the underlying cause for the significance of the oil price variable in the 
more recent sample period. This is in sharp contrast with the US results in Table 2.4 
and is an early indication of the differences between the two countries in question.  
 
5- and 6-variable specifications estimated over the 1986:1-2015:2 sample period 
yielded similar results to the 7-variable model: exclusion tests on oil price changes 
resulted in the rejection of the null hypothesis across all specifications in this sample 
period. Similarly, using the 5-variable base specification over 1974:1-2015:2 instead 
of the 6-variable system resulted in qualitatively similar results. Control variables 
appear to play an important role as well. The GDP deflator and real wage inflation 
both showed statistical significance in the GDP equation across sample period and 
model specification. In the same equation, there was less evidence of Granger 
causality for unemployment, 3-month interbank rate, and import price inflation. 
However, the first two showed statistical significance in the GDP deflator equation 
indicating that unemployment and 3-month interbank rate are closely linked to the 
deflator. Further, both GDP deflator and import price inflation had p-values less than 
0.05 in the 3-month interbank rate equation. These observations provide evidence for 
an indirect transmission mechanism from oil price fluctuations to GDP growth 
                                                 
 
17 Table 3.4 shows results for different model specifications corresponding to each sample period: 5-
variable VAR (base model, denoted as †), 6-variable VAR (base model + 3-month TB rate, denoted 
as ††) and 7-variable VAR (base model + 3-month TB rate + import price inflation, denoted as †††) 
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patterns. As an example, based on the 7-variable VAR system estimated over 1986:1-
2015:2, an oil price increase is expected to induce an increase in the GDP deflator 
and/or import prices. These changes then translate into an increase in the 3-month 
interbank rate, unemployment rate, and real wages. Jointly, these have a negative 
impact on GDP growth. As discussed in Section 3.2.5, the significance of import 
price inflation is linked to real exchange rate dynamics as well. In an oil exporting 
country like the UK over much of this sample period, exchange rate dynamics and 
balance of payments can have a pronounced impact on macroeconomic 
fundamentals. Empirical findings in this section support the notion that import price 
inflation, and by extension real exchange rate dynamics, have a direct impact on 
GDP growth as well as an indirect impact through interbank rate, unemployment 
rate, and real wages. There is an opposite direct effect as well. Increasing oil prices 
mean greater revenue from that sector, more government income, and higher sectoral 
wages and employment. Hence, the overall impact is ambiguous and further 
investigation is required. I return to this idea in the context of impulse responses.  
 
The results in this section serve as a good starting point: the VAR implementation 
has pointed to the importance of control variables and indirect transmission 
mechanisms. Moreover, sample period appears to be key: oil price changes have a 
significant impact on output growth only in the most recent sample period. Having 
established appropriate control variables for the VAR system, the next section turns 
to modelling asymmetry in oil prices explicitly.  
3.4.2 Asymmetric Effects Model 
Having observed a potential link between oil price fluctuations and GDP growth in 
the most recent subsample, this section aims to differentiate between the impact of 
oil price increases and decreases through the implementation outlined in section 
3.2.3. Table 3.5 below contains exclusion test results for all variables in the output 
growth equation.  
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Variable 
1963:1-
1985:4 † 
1974:1-
2015:2 †† 
1986:1-
2015:2 ††† 
1963:1-
2015:2 † 
Oil Price Increase 
2.372 6.860 2.395 4.835 
(0.668) (0.143) (0.664) (0.305) 
Oil Price Decrease 
1.965 0.288 4.004 0.964 
(0.742) (0.991) (0.405) (0.915) 
Inflation, GDP Deflator 
4.437 10.931** 8.976* 4.828 
(0.350) (0.027) (0.062) (0.305) 
3-month IB Rate — 
12.946** 5.061 
— 
(0.012) (0.281) 
Unemployment Rate 
6.795* 9.115* 2.290 11.198** 
(0.095) (0.058) (0.683) (0.024) 
Real Wage Inflation 
6.709 10.574** 5.651 18.869*** 
(0.152) (0.032) (0.227) (0.001) 
Import Price Inflation — — 
11.482** 
— 
(0.022) 
Table 3.5. Exclusion tests of asymmetric effects model with GDP growth as the dependent variable. 
The values in parentheses are p-values. Statistical significance is shown at the 10% level (*), 5% level 
(**) and 1% level (***). 
 
The results demonstrate the sensitivity of the observed oil price-GDP growth 
relationship to model specification. When the oil price series is split into its positive 
and negative components, neither of the variables appear to significantly affect 
growth throughout the whole sample period. However, inflation, 3-month IB rate, 
unemployment rate, real wage inflation, and import price inflation all play an 
important role in the GDP growth equation. Estimated coefficients on these control 
variables had the expected signs. Although not shown in the table, estimating the 8-
variable system over 1974:1-2015:2 yielded similar results such that both real wage 
and import price inflation Granger-cause output growth. On this basis, this set of 
control variables were considered robust and relevant within the VAR framework.  
 
Interestingly, both increases and decreases in oil price appear to have an impact on 
other variables included in the system. As shown in Table 3.6, oil price rises were 
linked to an increase in inflation across all sample periods and model specifications. 
Similarly, oil price decreases were related to a fall in inflation except in the earlier 
subsample. 3-month IB rate appears to react to decreases in the price of oil more than 
increases. Specifically, oil price falls tended to relate to looser monetary policy with 
high statistical significance in Granger-causality tests, whereas price rises had an 
ambiguous effect on the interest rate. This suggests that in the relevant sample period, 
decreases in oil price may have triggered an increase in the 3-month IB rate due to 
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either direct or indirect reaction by the Bank of England. Given the observation that 
oil price fluctuations may not affect GDP growth directly (Table 3.5), the 
corresponding change in interest rates is likely to be a reaction to other 
macroeconomic fundamentals. In this context, inflation is of particular importance 
but so are unemployment rate, real wage inflation, and import price inflation. Using 
1974:1-2015:2 sample period as an example, results in Table 3.6 suggest that a 
decrease in the price of oil could lead to a fall in GDP deflator inflation, 
unemployment rate, real wage inflation, and import price inflation.18 Jointly, these 
changes could strengthen growth and allow more flexible monetary policy, 
suggesting that the Bank of England has not reacted to oil price fluctuations but rather 
their consequences.  
 
There are also signs of an asymmetric relationship between oil price changes and the 
macroeconomic variables in question. By way of example, increases in the oil price 
appear to have a more pronounced and stable relationship with rising real wages than 
decreases in oil price do with falling wages. Hence, oil price increases are expected 
to have a larger impact on output growth through this transmission channel than 
decreases in price. Furthermore, 7- and 8-variable systems estimated over the 1974:1-
2015:2 sample period suggested a fall in the unemployment rate regardless of the 
direction of oil price movements. This is in contrast to the apparent relationship in 
the US and introduces a new dynamic into the system: the negative effect on GDP 
growth of oil price increases observed for the US may be ameliorated in the UK 
through the positive impact on employment. In a deeper sense, the meaning of 
“asymmetry” appears to shift in the UK vis-à-vis the US. I return to this theme in 
later sections in the context of impulse response analysis to observe the dynamics in 
question across time and model specification.  
 
                                                 
 
18 Although the equation for import price inflation is not shown in Table 3.6 for consistency with Table 
3.5, the results are as described in the text. 
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Equation Variable 
1963:1-
1985:4 † 
Coefficient 
Sign 
1974:1-
2015:2 †† 
Coefficient 
Sign 
1986:1-
2015:2 ††† 
Coefficient 
Sign 
1963:1-
2015:2 † 
Coefficient 
Sign 
Inflation, GDP Deflator 
Oil Price 
Increase 
14.119*** 
+ 
18.651*** 
+ 
13.311*** 
+ 
14.005*** 
+ 
(0.007) (0.001) (0.010) (0.007) 
Oil Price 
Decrease 
8.187* 
+ 
9.199* 
- 
15.843*** 
- 
9.530** 
- 
(0.085) (0.056) (0.003) (0.049) 
3-month IB Rate 
Oil Price 
Increase 
— — 
4.912 
+/- 
8.669* 
+/- — — 
(0.296) (0.070) 
Oil Price 
Decrease 
— — 
38.597*** 
+ 
39.606*** 
+ — — 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Unemployment Rate 
Oil Price 
Increase 
37.581*** 
+/- 
21.144*** 
- 
4.211 
+ 
21.652*** 
+/- 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.378) (0.000) 
Oil Price 
Decrease 
15.554*** 
- 
15.336*** 
- 
16.081*** 
- 
12.661** 
- 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.013) 
Real Wage Inflation 
Oil Price 
Increase 
20.096*** 
+ 
24.238*** 
+ 
5.223 
+ 
26.758*** 
+ 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.265) (0.000) 
Oil Price 
Decrease 
11.873** 
- 
7.821* 
- 
5.102 
- 
4.869 
- 
(0.018) (0.098) (0.277) (0.301) 
Import Price Inflation 
Oil Price 
Increase 
— — — — 
6.836 
+ — — 
(0.145) 
Oil Price 
Decrease 
— — — — 
6.570 
- — — 
(0.160) 
Table 3.6. Exclusion tests in control variables' equations. Coefficient signs are based on the cumulative sum of estimated coefficients. The values in parentheses are p-values. 
Statistical significance is shown at the 10% level (*), 5% level (**) and 1% level (***).  
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3.4.3 Normalised Oil Price Model 
Based on the discussion in Sections 3.2 and 3.3, there is theoretical reason to believe 
that the impact of an oil price shock has a different impact on macroeconomic 
variables depending on oil price behaviour in preceding time periods. Having 
observed slightly increasing standard deviations in oil prices over time, this section 
focusses on the estimation of equations 3.3 and 3.4 as well as the implementation of 
equations 3.5 through 3.7 within a VAR system. Table 3.7 summarises the estimated 
coefficients from the GARCH (1,1) model.  
 
Parameter 1963:1-1985:4 1974:2-2015:2 1986:1-2015:2 1963:1-2015:2 
α0 
-0.002 0.013 0.026 0.020* 
(0.742) (0.288) (0.162) (0.062) 
α1 
0.770*** 0.409** 0.458** 0.302* 
(0.000) (0.014) (0.036) (0.056) 
α2 
0.255 -0.313*** -0.366*** -0.235** 
(0.242) (0.004) (0.001) (0.042) 
α3 
0.281 0.184** 0.172* 0.119 
(0.333) (0.021) (0.055) (0.151) 
α4 
-0.095* -0.095 -0.103 -0.074 
(0.099) (0.224) (0.267) (0.130) 
γ0 
0.001 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.017* 
(0.309) (0.001) (0.000) (0.068) 
γ1 
5.494 0.333 0.556 0.107 
(0.190) (0.314) (0.280) (0.568) 
γ2 — 
0.166 0.106 0.171 
(0.272) (0.591) (0.149) 
Table 3.7. Parameter estimates for GARCH (1,1). The numbers in parentheses are p-values. Statistical 
significance is shown at the 10% level (*), 5% level (**) and 1% level (***). 
 
Note that the second sample period starts from 1974:2 as opposed to 1974:1 due to 
lack of convergence in the GARCH specification using the latter as the starting point. 
The reason for lack of convergence is that 1974:1 coincides with the OPEC embargo 
of the period and is an outlier in the series. Overall, the GARCH (1,1) representation 
appears more accurate for refiners’ acquisition cost and PPI in crude petroleum in 
the US case than for the Brent series in the UK case. Although there is still evidence 
of AR(4) behaviour in more recent samples, ARCH and GARCH terms are not as 
central in capturing fluctuations in Brent price. Further, there is evidence of a moving 
average (MA) component in the series. I investigate this in detail in Section 3.6.1 and 
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discuss its implications. For the remainder of this section, I proceed with the GARCH 
specifications, as the output presented in Table 3.7 are point estimates in each sample 
period and the main objective here is to implement a time-varying approach and 
recalculate the parameters in question over many different sample periods.  
 
An analysis of autocorrelation in residuals of the GARCH model showed that there 
is no unexploited information in residuals in any sample period. Although there is 
some autocorrelation in residuals for the most recent sample period, increasing the 
number of AR lags or ARCH and GARCH terms did not improve the behaviour of 
the residuals. For the 1963:1-2015:2 subsample, GARCH (1,1) residuals resulted in 
a Ljung-Box Q statistic of 17.25 (p=0.838). Furthermore, Bollerslev, Chou, & Kroner 
(1992) argue that low-order GARCH models outperform alternative methods. 
Hence, the GARCH (1,1) specification is adopted as a parsimonious representation 
of the conditional variance of 𝜀𝑡 and this specification is used to calculate 𝜀𝑡
∗. 
 
As an intermediate step towards using normalised price changes as the main oil price 
variable in the VAR models, three transitional specifications are estimated. Table 3.8 
provides exclusion test results for 6-, 7-, and 8-variable systems over each sample 
period. There is little evidence here that the normalised oil price shocks are more 
highly correlated with changes in real GDP than oil price changes. Test statistics for 
normalised price shock variables do not provide evidence for Granger causality 
between them and GDP growth except in the earliest sample period. As discussed in 
the previous chapter, the correlation between oil price changes and their normalised 
counterparts is masking the true underlying link between normalised price changes 
and output growth. When normalised and non-normalised price variables are tested 
together, they are jointly significant, which suggests that when considered together, 
oil prices fluctuations Granger-cause changes in GDP growth (i.e. the null hypothesis 
of no Granger causality is rejected). More importantly, however, these specifications 
lack asymmetry in oil prices. It is, therefore, possible that positive or negative changes 
have a statistically significant effect on GDP, but that effect is simply not observed 
when the two series are merged. It is worth noting that the control variables retain 
their importance in these specifications, as they appear to Granger-cause fluctuations 
in GDP as well as being linked to oil price changes. This corroborates the claim that 
a monetary policy response to an oil price shock could have a much larger impact on 
the macroeconomy than the original shock. It is interesting to note that the change 
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in statistical significance of normalised oil price shocks from 1963:1-1985:4 to later 
sample periods were not due to worse model fit, as measured by RMSE, since all 
specifications had comparable RMSE across sample periods.  
 
Specification Variable 
1963:1-
1985:4 
1974:2-
2015:2 
1986:1-
2015:2 
1963:1-
2015:2 
6-variable 
System 1 
Oil Price 
Change 
3.200 2.141 3.614 6.679 
(0.525) (0.710) (0.461) (0.154) 
Normalised 
Oil Price 
Shock (ε*) 
10.922** 2.692 1.313 6.691 
(0.027) (0.611) (0.859) (0.153) 
7-variable 
System 1 
Oil Price 
Change 
— 
1.128 4.051 
— 
(0.890) (0.399) 
Normalised 
Oil Price 
Shock (ε*) 
— 
1.521 1.791 
— 
(0.823) (0.774) 
8-variable 
System 1 
Oil Price 
Change 
— — 
6.878 
— 
(0.142) 
Normalised 
Oil Price 
Shock (ε*) 
— — 
2.826 
— 
(0.587) 
Table 3.8. Exclusion tests for normalised oil price shocks. The numbers in parentheses are p-values. 
Statistical significance is shown at the 10% level (*), 5% level (**) and 1% level (***). 
 
Given that testing for asymmetry is a key objective, these specifications are extended 
to include positive and negative price changes explicitly. The results, shown in Table 
3.9, indicate that normalised positive oil price shocks have a highly significant impact 
on GDP growth in the two earlier sample periods. Negative price shocks do not have 
a statistically significant impact in any sample period, as I fail to reject the null 
hypothesis of no Granger causality between normalised negative oil price 
fluctuations and output growth. Therefore, as speculated above, using positive and 
negative oil price shocks together appears to weaken their joint statistical 
significance. Furthermore, there is a strong indication that the oil price-GDP growth 
link has weakened over time, particularly just after the UK became a net exporter of 
oil. In line with previous discussion, this could have two different underlying causes. 
The underlying economic relationship may have fundamentally changed over time 
or the model specification is not appropriate in all sample periods. Information on 
the latter can be deduced from RMSE for each estimation. The RMSE values 
suggested that the models perform equally well across sample periods, which suggests 
that the point estimates are responsible for the observed pattern and not how precisely 
they are estimated by the models. Based on these observations, the remainder of this 
section discusses the implications of modelling choices on findings in detail.   
 108 
 
Specification Variable 
1963:1-
1985:4 
1974:2-
2015:2 
1986:1-
2015:2 
1963:1-
2015:2 
6-variable 
System 2 
Normalised 
Positive Oil Price 
Shock (ε*+) 
11.720** 17.390*** 4.479 3.043 
(0.020) (0.002) (0.345) (0.551) 
Normalised 
Negative Oil 
Price Shock (ε*-) 
0.841 2.541 0.994 0.445 
(0.933) (0.637) (0.911) (0.979) 
7-variable 
System 2 
Normalised 
Positive Oil Price 
Shock (ε*+) 
— 
19.407*** 4.625 
— 
(0.001) (0.328) 
Normalised 
Negative Oil 
Price Shock (ε*-) 
— 
5.486 2.467 
— 
(0.241) (0.651) 
8-variable 
System 2 
Normalised 
Positive Oil Price 
Shock (ε*+) 
— — 
4.699 
— 
(0.320) 
Normalised 
Negative Oil 
Price Shock (ε*-) 
— — 
3.872 
— 
(0.424) 
Table 3.9. Exclusion tests for specifications using normalised oil prices with asymmetry. The values 
in parentheses are p-values. Statistical significance is shown at the 10% level (*), 5% level (**) and 1% 
level (***). 
The Oil Price-GDP Relationship Across Time 
Table 3.9 suggests that although increases in oil prices Granger-caused changes in 
UK GDP growth in the past, this apparent relationship no longer has as much 
evidence. 6- and 7-variable models estimated in several sample periods corroborated 
this. Formally, I find that normalised positive oil price shocks Granger-caused a fall 
in UK GDP growth until 1986 but not in more recent decades. This was mainly 
driven by changes in parameter estimates and not higher RMSE across sample 
periods. To refrain from putting too much weight on a single set of point estimates, 
a rolling-window time-varying parameter approach is adopted here. A rolling 
window of 132 quarters is estimated sequentially from 1974:2 onwards. Exclusion 
tests are conducted after each iteration to observe changes in statistical significance 
of oil price shocks over time.19 
 
                                                 
 
19 Note that although this section focuses on a discussion of statistical significance of point estimates, 
other sections put an emphasis on interval estimates and how wide they are. The purpose of focussing 
on point estimates and p-values here is to address the ongoing debate in the literature.  
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The resulting p-values on normalised positive oil price shocks in 7-variable system 2 
are shown in Figure 3.4 below.20 With the exception of a few quarters, there is a clear 
pattern: normalised oil price rises had a significant impact on GDP growth in the UK 
until the second quarter of 1979. From 1980 onwards, the exclusion test p-values are 
considerably larger, and the oil price-GDP link appears to have disappeared. Unlike 
positive oil price shocks, negative ones do not appear to have a strong link as shown 
in Figure 3.5. Since focussing solely on one model specification to draw conclusions 
would be unwise, the next subsection investigates how model specification may affect 
these findings. One objective is to extend the VAR systems with additional control 
variables, such as import price inflation, as a robustness check.  
 
 
Figure 3.4. Exclusion test p-values for normalised positive oil price shocks in 7-variable system 2 using 
a rolling window against starting quarter. 
 
                                                 
 
20 P-values shown in the figures are not identical to those presented in Table 3.9, since the former use 
a 132-quarter rolling window sample period whereas the latter uses as much of the sample period as 
available. 
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Figure 3.5. Exclusion test p-values for normalised negative oil price shocks in 7-variable system 2 using 
a rolling window against starting quarter. 
 
The Effect of Allowing for Asymmetry 
Figure 3.4 and Figure 3.5 show that SOPI Granger-cause fluctuations in GDP growth 
for much of history whereas SOPD do not. This subsection revisits this asymmetry 
discussion in a time-varying parameter context across different model specifications. 
Figure 3.6 and Figure 3.7 below summarise the estimated p-values in 8-variable 
system 2 and 6-variable system 2 using normalised negative oil price shocks, 
respectively. Both figures provide evidence for asymmetry, highlighting that SOPD 
have historically not had a strong link with real GDP growth.  
 
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.70
0.80
0.90
1.00
1974Q2 1975Q2 1976Q2 1977Q2 1978Q2 1979Q2 1980Q2 1981Q2 1982Q2
p
-v
a
lu
es
Starting Quarter
7-variable System 2 (SOPD)
Engle-Granger Exclusion Test p-values
 111 
 
Figure 3.6. Exclusion test p-values for normalised negative oil price shocks in 8-variable system 2 using 
a rolling window against starting quarter. 
 
 
Figure 3.7. Exclusion test p-values for normalised negative oil price shocks in 6-variable system 2 using 
a rolling window against starting quarter. 
Model Performance Across Specifications 
To investigate model performance across model specifications, the models are set up 
with a nested structure. For example, as shown in Table 3.3, 6-variable system 2 is 
nested within 7-variable system 2, which is in turn nested within 8-variable system 2. 
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These specifications are estimated separately, and their results are interpreted to 
identify the optimal model. In this context, the optimal model is not only based on 
performance parameters and information criteria but also a series of observations. In 
this chapter, I have put weight on parameter stability across sample periods and 
across choice of oil price proxy, stability of impulse responses each model generated, 
and overall model size. To elaborate on the final objective, a key aim was to strike a 
balance between the size of each model and avoiding omitted variables. Throughout 
the analysis, these two aspects of modelling were in competition because smaller 
models were tempting to maximise degrees of freedom but risked the omission of 
critical identifying variation. Based on the underlying structural model, I chose 
optimal models that captured key variables but were not too large to prohibit the 
rolling-window implementation adopted here, while maintaining the other objectives 
listed above. Looking ahead, the optimal model could depend on sample period 
considered, but 7- and 8-variable system 2 (one of the largest specifications) have 
performed well and capture the richest dynamics. The latter model includes import 
price inflation, which is used as a proxy for real exchange rate dynamics. As a result, 
much of the following analysis focuses on these two model specifications with three-
dimensional surface plots in the Chapter Appendix based on the latter.  
 
Returning to Table 3.9 and re-estimating 8-variable system 2 over the 1974:2-2015:2 
sample period yields an intriguing result. The exclusion test statistics on positive and 
negative normalised oil price shocks were 4.30 (p=0.367) and 4.34 (p=0.361), 
respectively. Regardless of sample period, import price inflation plays a key role in 
the GDP growth equation. This finding begs an obvious question: is the significant 
relationship between rises in oil prices and output growth observed in Table 3.9 and 
Figure 3.4 simply due to an omitted variable? To investigate this and to ensure an 
isolated case does not dictate the overall conclusion, I estimated the 8-variable 
specification in question over a rolling window as above. Turning to Figure 3.8 
below, I observed a similar pattern to that in Figure 3.4. Namely, SOPI remain 
statistically significant until 1979:3. This suggests that the oil price-GDP growth 
Granger-causality tests are robust to additional variables, and that sample period is a 
more fundamental determinant of the underlying relationship.  
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Figure 3.8. Exclusion test p-values for normalised positive oil price shocks in 8-variable system 2 using 
a rolling window against starting quarter. 
 
A similar observation holds for extending 6-variable system 2 to 7-variable system 2 
by including 3-month IB rate in the model specification. Figure 3.9 shows exclusion 
test p-values based on 6-variable system 2, which are qualitatively identical to those 
in Figure 3.4 (7-variable system 2) and Figure 3.8 (8-variable system 2).  
 
Figure 3.9. Exclusion test p-values for normalised positive oil price shocks in 6-variable system 2 using 
a rolling window against starting quarter. 
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One final objective within the model specification discussion was to determine 
whether normalised oil price variables Granger-cause fluctuations in GDP growth 
more often and in a more stable manner than non-normalised measures. This 
question is revisited in an impulse response context in the next section. From a 
statistical significance perspective, revisiting tables and figures above can help shed 
some light. Table 3.8 and Table 3.9 have pointed to normalised variables having a 
more robust and sustained link to GDP growth, and Figure 3.4, Figure 3.8, and 
Figure 3.9 provide further evidence in a rolling-window time-varying context. Figure 
3.10 below provides a more elaborate overview of exclusion test p-values (z-axis) 
across model specification (y-axis) against starting quarter (x-axis). The two left-most 
specifications, 6- and 7-variable system 1, demonstrate that with a non-normalised 
oil price series, the empirical model would indicate no Granger-causality between oil 
prices and real output growth. This is indeed what many researchers have observed. 
6- and 7-variable system 2 yield a much different p-value profile, however. As 
observed earlier in this section, normalised oil price rises Granger-cause GDP growth 
in the UK until 1980. The three-dimensional representation below also allows a 
snapshot across specifications at a given starting quarter. As an example, considering 
a slice across specifications on 1975:1 indicates p-values greater than 0.05 for the first 
two specifications and less than 0.05 for the rest. 
 
Ultimately, the way oil prices are captured and how they enter a VAR appears to 
greatly influence the observed oil price-macroeconomy relationship. In addition to 
this, two further key points have emerged from this discussion: 1) sample period 
appears to matter with recent years showing a weakening relationship between oil 
price fluctuations and GDP growth in a Granger-causality sense, and 2) modelling 
asymmetry in oil prices is critical, as only rises in oil price appear to matter.  
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Figure 3.10. Exclusion test p-values (z-axis) across model specification (y-axis) with varying starting quarter (x-axis). Excluded variables as follows. 6-variable system 1: oil 
price changes; 6-variable system 2: normalised positive oil price changes; 7-variable system 1: oil price changes; 7-variable system 2: normalised positive oil price changes. 
Each colour contour on the z-axis represents an increment of 0.05. 
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3.5 VAR Results and Impulse Response Analysis 
Having discussed statistical significance in previous sections, this part turns its focus 
to estimating the magnitude of the impact oil price fluctuations have on 
macroeconomic variables. Cholesky-decomposed orthogonalised impulse response 
functions (IRFs) were used for this purpose, which captured a twenty-quarter time 
horizon. Static IRFs based on 7-variable system 2 estimated over the 1974:2-2015:2 
subsample suggested a negative cumulative impact on GDP growth of a positive 
normalised oil price shock. A negative price innovation of the same size using the 
same specification over the same sample period yielded a positive cumulative effect. 
Figure 3.11 and Figure 3.12 show an overview of the estimated impact on GDP 
growth in each case with a 10% normalised oil price shock.  
 
 
Figure 3.11. IRF showing GDP growth response to a 10% normalised positive oil price shock. 
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Figure 3.12. IRF showing GDP growth response to a 10% normalised negative oil price shock. 
 
Starting with Figure 3.11, I observed that only the fourth quarter’s confidence bands 
exclude zero and that the GDP response becomes weaker over time. Unlike in the 
case of the US, there is minimal overshooting in this case such that negative point 
estimates continue until the ninth quarter and positive estimates are small. Keeping 
in mind the confidence intervals include zero, I interpret the cumulative effect 
cautiously. The estimated annualised effect on GDP growth of a 10% increase in 
normalised oil price was -0.24 after 20 quarters in this model specification and sample 
period combination. This suggests that a 10% increase in price is expected to reduce 
real GDP growth by 0.24% over a five-year horizon. 8-variable system 2 over the 
same sample period resulted in a virtually identical outcome. Figure 3.15 in the 
chapter appendix shows the estimated IRF for this specification over the most recent 
sample period, 1986:1-2015:2. This figure shows more of an overshooting behaviour 
in GDP growth following an oil price increase, which is further discussed in a time-
varying parameter context below. In all these figures, the estimated OIRF converges 
to zero, which suggests that an orthogonalised innovation to the corresponding oil 
price variable does not have a permanent effect on real GDP growth rate in the UK. 
 
A fall in oil price has a more ambiguous but positive effect on GDP growth based on 
the results shown in Figure 3.12. Much like positive shocks, negative ones also do 
not appear to have a long-run impact on GDP growth. Although the confidence 
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interval includes zero throughout the 20-quarter horizon, the estimated impact in the 
first five quarters, except the third quarter, is positive. The estimated cumulative 
annualised effect on GDP growth of a 10% decrease in normalised oil price was 
0.15%. This effect was halved in the later sample period, however: IRF estimated 
based on 7-variable system over 1986:1-2015:2 resulted in an overall impact of just 
0.07%. This provides further evidence for the previously observed pattern of a 
weakening relationship over time.  
 
To investigate changes in the magnitude of the impact over time, I implemented 
rolling-IRFs using a rolling-window approach akin to the approach introduced above 
in a VAR context. Figure 3.13 shows the estimated GDP growth effect from a 
positive shock, while Figure 3.14 summarises the results of a negative shock. Starting 
with the latter, I confirm the observation above, as the estimated impact on output 
growth rate of a negative price shock decreases along the y-axis. The former figure 
implies a similar characteristic as well. The largest impact, in absolute value, on GDP 
growth of an oil price rise is estimated in the sample window starting in the third 
quarter of 1977 with previous quarters of that year close behind. In sample periods 
starting after 1980, the overall effect is greatly diminished. In the early 1980s, there is 
a short-lived positive overshooting effect observed as two distinct domes in the three-
dimensional surface. It is no coincidence, of course, that this was a period of 
increasing oil production in the UK and a turning point for the country, since it 
became a net exporter of oil in 1981. This is reflected with the opposite effect in 
Figure 3.14, where the early 1980s did not see a rise in GDP growth because of a fall 
in oil prices even though earlier periods had done so. These results were not sensitive 
to model specification, as 8-variable system 2 resulted in the same conclusions (see 
Figure 3.16 and Figure 3.17 in Chapter Appendix). In fact, the negative GDP growth 
implications of an oil price rise are so diminished in recent decades that the overall 
estimated effect becomes positive over a 5-year horizon. Table 3.10 highlights this 
observation using two static sample periods. 
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Figure 3.13. Rolling IRFs showing the impact on GDP growth rate of a 10% normalised positive oil price shock. 
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Figure 3.14. Rolling IRFs showing the impact on GDP growth rate of a 10% normalised negative oil price shock. 
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Specification Proxy 1974:2-2015:2 1986:1-2015:2 
7-variable System 2 
Oil Price Increase 
-0.24 0.11 
(-0.05) (0.02) 
Oil Price Decrease 
0.15 0.07 
(0.03) (0.01) 
8-variable System 2 
Oil Price Increase — 
0.07 
(0.01) 
Oil Price Decrease — 
0.10 
(0.02) 
Table 3.10. IRF results: Annualised percent changes in output growth rate as a response to a 10 percent 
change in oil prices over a 20-quarter horizon. Values in parentheses are average per year responses 
of output growth rate to the impulse. 
 
The results in this table confirm numerically that the nature of the oil price-GDP 
growth relationship has evolved over time in the UK. This can partially explain why 
coefficient estimates on oil prices were not statistically significant for some sample 
periods, which in turn emphasises the importance of rolling-window modelling. 
There is also evidence for asymmetry in the earlier sample since the estimated 
cumulative impacts have different signs. The remaining discussion in this section 
focuses on the impact of oil price fluctuations on other macroeconomic variables.  
 
Inflation has obvious links to oil prices as the commodity is not only consumed by 
households directly but also by firms in their production processes. Figure 3.18 in 
chapter appendix demonstrates how inflation adjusts in response to an oil price rise. 
The striking characteristic of the surface plot is that, much like GDP growth, post 
1980s showed a much smaller effect feeding from the oil price increases to inflation. 
IRFs often indicated alternating signs on inflation as a result of the shock such that 
the first quarter two quarters saw a small decline in inflation followed by a larger 
increase and another small fall. The impact tended to die out by the sixth quarter, 
especially in more recent years. Response of unemployment is another key 
transmission mechanism of oil price pass-through. This dynamic is particularly 
interesting in the UK due to large employment potential in the oil industry. Based on 
Figure 3.19, a 10% oil price rise is expected to cause an increase in unemployment. 
Although this effect is small in the first few quarters, by quarter four, it is substantial. 
Despite the isolated dip in the surface corresponding to 9-13th quarters of mid 1970s, 
the overall impact is overwhelmingly positive such that an increase in price causes 
an increase in unemployment. The response to a fall in oil price is less clear. Figure 
3.20 suggests that an initial large fall in unemployment rate in response to the fall in 
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price is matched by a rise in unemployment of roughly the same size a few quarters 
later. The effect subsides from approximately the 9th quarter onwards, but the 
cumulative impact on unemployment is estimated to be negative in all cases. This 
contradicts theoretical predictions for an oil exporting country and the UK exhibits 
characteristics of an oil importer in this context. The primary reason for this is that, 
although relatively large, UK’s oil industry has not accounted for a large share of its 
GDP throughout history. Having said that, underlying the apparent outcome lies a 
more complex dynamic: following a fall in oil price, unemployment falls initially (as 
in an oil importer) but eventually rises (as in an oil exporter) as the industry responds 
to the new price environment. The latter effect has more of a lag than the former due 
to investment inertia in the oil sector as well as inflexibility of upstream exploration 
and production activities.21 The dynamics remain prominent throughout the entire 
sample period, but the estimated cumulative impact is more muted in recent years, 
adding to previous evidence that oil price fluctuations may indeed be losing relevance 
in the UK macroeconomic context. 
3.6 Differences and Similarities between the US and the UK 
This study is in a unique position to compare the oil price-macroeconomy 
relationship in two of the most important economies of the world. Having 
implemented the modelling approach in both countries, I now turn to a comparison 
of findings.  
3.6.1 Measures of Oil Price and Suitability of GARCH 
Chapter 2 normalised oil prices based on a GARCH (1,1) specification with an AR(4) 
structure. This setup worked effectively for both oil price measures (refiners’ 
acquisition cost and producer price index in crude petroleum). This approach proved 
appropriate for the UK as well, but further investigation of modelling Brent price 
series led to some side findings that are worth mentioning. There is a rich literature 
on modelling and forecasting global oil prices. Among these are He, Yu, & Lai 
                                                 
 
21 For example, it is unusual for an upstream exploration and production company to change activities 
immediately following an oil price change. Among other reasons, such as investment commitments 
made to shareholders and formal applications to the Oil and Gas Authority, this is driven by the nature 
of conventional oil production. Reservoir pressure and characteristics need to be maintained 
throughout the production process. If production is stopped and started repeatedly, operators risk 
formation damage and a lower recovery factor.  
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(2012), Jammazi & Aloui (2012), Morana (2001), Narayan & Narayan (2007), 
Sadorsky (1999), Xie, Yu, Xu, & Wang (2006), and Yu, Wang, & Lai (2008). Fields 
outside of economics and econometrics have made contributions to this effort as well. 
Examples include Wang, Yu, & Lai (2005) and Xie et al. (2006). Each approach has 
its advantages and has seen some success, but Bollerslev et al. (1992) insisted on low-
order GARCH models—GARCH (1,1) in particular—as they tend to perform well 
within economic modelling and often outperform alternative methods based on 
standard testing. In this case, I find that there is some merit to capturing oil price 
dynamics using a GARCH (1,0) with an AR(3) structure. For part of the sample, this 
approach appeared to fit the series better than the original approach. There is also 
some evidence of a moving average structure in the oil price series, as an ARMA 
(4,2) also performed well. These findings did not apply to the US and I opted for the 
GARCH (1,1) specification for consistency in the analysis and because modelling 
conditional variance of oil prices was an intermediate step to investigating a more 
general relationship. Certain model specifications could be better suited for parts of 
the sample but implementing a different model for each window introduces 
confounding factors into the analysis and makes it impossible to disentangle whether 
the observed effects are influenced by changes in the underlying model.  
3.6.2 Exogeneity of Oil Prices 
How oil prices behave in empirical models has also been a focus of scrutiny. 
Researchers, including Kilian (2009) and Hamilton (2009) have tried to understand 
the root cause of oil price shocks and capture this information in modelling oil prices. 
A detailed overview of this literature can be found in Section 2.5.4. Blanchard & Galí 
(2007) summarised their approach by suggesting that a more exogenous proxy for oil 
shocks could be used, which is the approach adopted by Kilian (2009) through the 
construction of a proxy for unexpected movements in global oil production. In 
addition to validity concerns of this measure and other attempts at constructing 
proxies, Blanchard & Galí (2007) argued that the price households and firms pay, 
and not the level of global oil production, is what matters. From this perspective, 
higher Chinese demand leading to a rise in the price of oil is just as exogenous to 
other countries as an OPEC-induced supply shock. In practice, there is some 
evidence of endogeneity of oil prices. This was observed for the US in Section 2.5.4. 
An important difference between the US and the UK oil industries is, of course, their 
sizes. It is conceivable that US production, especially since the US shale revolution, 
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influences the global oil price. The UK is smaller by comparison and this potential is 
more limited. For empirical investigation, Table 3.11 summarises Granger-causality 
tests for real GDP growth in the oil price equation in the VAR system. Based on the 
results, real output fluctuations appear to Granger-cause oil price changes in most 
sample periods. Separating positive and negative shocks resulted in a lower test 
statistic for oil price increases in the most recent subsample.  
 
Equation 
1963:1-
1985:4 † 
1974:1-
2015:2 †† 
1986:1-
2015:2 ††† 
1963:1-
2015:2 † 
Oil Price Change 
17.913*** 24.093*** 13.798*** 17.556*** 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.008) (0.002) 
Oil Price Increase 
11.743** 27.483*** 6.864 21.114*** 
(0.019) (0.000) (0.143) (0.000) 
Oil Price Decrease 
6.338 9.600** 17.106*** 5.876 
(0.175) (0.048) (0.002) (0.209) 
Table 3.11. Exclusion tests for real GDP growth in each corresponding oil price equation. The values 
in parentheses are p-values. Statistical significance is shown at the 10% level (*), 5% level (**) and 1% 
level (***). Recall that different model specifications are used in each sample period: 5-variable VAR 
(base model, denoted as †), 6-variable VAR (base model + 3-month TB rate, denoted as ††) and 7-
variable VAR (base model + 3-month TB rate + import price inflation, denoted as †††) 
 
Given these observations, it is empirically more accurate to include oil prices in the 
VAR system as an endogenous variable such that its equation is estimated jointly 
with all other macroeconomic variables, which was also the case for the US.  
3.6.3 Impulse Responses and Asymmetry 
The US and the UK appear to share a complex form of asymmetry in the response 
of some macroeconomic variables to changes in oil price. An example is the two 
countries’ unemployment rates. Since both countries have substantial oil production 
activities and employment within the industry, they exhibit characteristics that would 
be expected in oil importers and oil producers. As discussed in Section 3.5, an oil 
price rise is expected to cause an overall increase in UK unemployment rate, and this 
largely holds in the US as well (see Figure 3.21). Further, the impact of a decline in 
oil price appears to follow a similar pattern in the two countries. A difference 
emerges, however, when the total estimated impact of an oil price fall on 
unemployment rate is calculated: although such a change leads to an overall decline 
in unemployment in both countries, the magnitude of the effect is lessening in the 
UK but increasing in the US. Moreover, the response of US unemployment seems to 
be more exaggerated than the UK unemployment rate. As Figure 3.22 shows, US 
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unemployment declines very rapidly immediately following the fall in oil prices, 
which is in line with characteristics of a country where oil production activities have 
far-reaching employment implications. Five quarters after the original shock, 
unemployment starts increasing as the rest of the economy adjusts to the new price 
environment.  
3.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has focussed on identifying the implications of oil price fluctuations on 
the UK economy. With an emphasis on GDP growth, I have investigated the nature 
of the oil price-macroeconomy relationship in the UK over time, across model 
specifications, and in the presence of asymmetric oil prices. I found some evidence 
of Granger-causality between oil price fluctuations and GDP growth, and concluded 
that this relationship is stronger with normalised oil price changes. This suggests that 
oil price volatility leading up to a price shock contributes to its macroeconomic 
implications. More specifically, unanticipated price shocks—those occurring after a 
period of stable prices—tend to have a larger impact. I also found evidence that 
changes in price have linkages with other macroeconomic variables, such as inflation 
and unemployment rate, pointing to indirect transmission mechanisms for oil price 
passthrough to output growth. Section 3.4.2 provided evidence of an asymmetric 
impact of price shocks but this was not as pronounced as in the US. Further, there 
was some evidence that significance of oil for the economy may have weakened in 
recent decades. A rolling-window time-varying parameter approach concluded that 
after 1980, oil price implications have dwindled in terms of magnitude despite 
retaining statistical significance in VAR specifications.  
 
To estimate the magnitude of the impact, I implemented orthogonalised impulse 
response functions. Although not all point estimates were statistically significant, the 
estimated responses pointed to a time-dependent relationship. More specifically, 7-
variable system 2 estimated over the 1974:2-2015:2 subsample suggested a 0.24% 
decrease in GDP growth as a result of a 10% increase in normalised oil prices, 
whereas the same model estimated over 1986:1-2015:2 led to a 0.11% increase in 
GDP growth in response to the same shock. This observation was corroborated by 
rolling IRFs, which showed that the characteristics of the relationship have shifted as 
the UK’s domestic oil production increased. Lastly, Section 3.6 focussed on the 
comparison between the US and the UK. Despite significant differences between the 
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two economies, results from this chapter and the previous one highlighted some 
fundamental similarities. For example, since both countries have oil production 
activities, unemployment rate appears to react to oil price fluctuations in a similar 
fashion. 
 
As a part of future work on this theme, different (G)ARCH specifications could be 
used to model the Brent series. As more frequent data and a longer time series become 
available, implementing rolling models with larger specifications are becoming 
feasible. Modelling oil price volatility has recently regained importance in the finance 
literature in the context of stock market behaviour. The error variance modelling 
approach implemented here has applications in that literature and could be an 
extension to the work presented here. 
 
From a macroeconomic modelling and policy perspective, monetary policy response 
is often a key determinant of economic performance. As a next step, optimal 
monetary policy could be investigated in response to an oil price shock. Based on the 
findings in this chapter, the monetary authority should not respond to every shock 
the same way because price volatility in preceding periods is shown to matter. If 
identified correctly, an optimal policy implementation could, in theory, ameliorate 
the detrimental effects of the shocks in question.  
3.8 Chapter Appendix 
 
Figure 3.15. IRF showing GDP growth response to a 10% normalised positive oil price shock. 
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Figure 3.16. Rolling IRFs showing the impact on GDP growth rate of a 10% normalised positive oil price shock. 
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Figure 3.17. Rolling IRFs showing the impact on GDP growth rate of a 10% normalised negative oil price shock. 
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Figure 3.18. Rolling IRFs showing the impact on GDP deflator inflation of a 10% normalised positive oil price shock. 
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Figure 3.19. Rolling IRFs showing the impact on unemployment of a 10% normalised positive oil price shock. 
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Figure 3.20. Rolling IRFs showing the impact on unemployment of a 10% normalised negative oil price shock. 
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Figure 3.21. Rolling IRFs showing the impact on unemployment of a 10% normalised positive oil price shock for the US. 
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Figure 3.22. Rolling IRFs showing the impact on unemployment of a 10% normalised negative oil price shock for the US.
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 Oil Rents and the Real Exchange Rate22 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This chapter investigates whether a relationship exists between oil rents and the real 
exchange rate in oil-exporting countries. When a relationship exists, it is analysed 
from a Balassa-Samuelson perspective. Empirical modelling is based on two new 
measures of profits in countries’ oil sectors in a large-N, large-T panel dataset. 
Exploiting this dataset structure, I find that the B-S mechanism holds in some oil-
exporting countries but not all. For most countries, the relationship is non-negligible 
in size and precisely estimated. I also find some evidence that oil rents have a more 
pronounced effect on the real exchange rate in countries where the oil sector accounts 
for a larger share of the country’s GDP. However, surprising findings include an 
ambiguous relationship in OPEC countries. Potential underpinnings for this are 
discussed in the chapter alongside empirical testing of hypothesised explanations, 
such as differing currency regimes and validity of assumptions. Throughout the 
analysis, oil prices were identified as an important covariate with coefficients of a 
similar size and sign to oil rents variables. 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
 
22 In collaboration with Anna Brocklebank as described in the Declarations section.  
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4.1 Introduction 
It seems counter-intuitive for abundant valuable natural resources to lead to sluggish 
economic growth and development. Observing this in practice begs a question about 
its underlying causes and transmission mechanisms. A popular explanation has been 
the Dutch disease, where an increase in resource wealth leads to a real appreciation 
of the exchange rate that crowds out other exports. This topic has been widely studied 
in an effort to verify or refute the existence of this pattern and explain the poor growth 
performance of some resource-rich countries. In addition to making the casual 
observation that most resource-rich countries have relatively low levels of GDP, 
Sachs & Warner (2001) have empirically illustrated that high resource intensity is 
correlated with slow growth. Other post-war growth studies have corroborated this 
finding (see Sachs & Warner, 1995, 1997, for example). As discussed in Sala-i-Martin 
& Subramanian (2003), the case of Nigeria is particularly interesting because per 
capita oil revenues rose from $33 in 1965 to $325 in 2000 with very little rise in real 
GDP per capita. Counter-examples, such as Norway and Australia, have led to a 
debate about the existence and significance of resource curse leading to the 
conclusion that other factors, such as corruption, account for most of the problems 
associated with slow economic development. In order to shed light on this debate, 
Sachs & Warner (1997) have implemented empirical models that included up to nine 
control variables, including corruption, and found that natural resource abundance 
still plays a key role in determining growth rates. In light of this finding, it has been 
postulated that exchange rates affect growth through hindrance of export-led growth. 
However, the existence of the resource curse is still controversial: some authors 
(Atkinson & Hamilton, 2003; Sachs & Warner, 1999) argue that it exists and is 
important, while others disagree (Brunnschweiler & Bulte, 2008; Mehlum, Moene, 
& Torvik, 2006). For a review of evidence in favour of the resource curse in oil, see 
Ross (2012). 
 
The resource curse literature is relevant in a study of the relationship between 
resource rents and the real exchange rate because one of the mechanisms by which 
resources are meant to curse a country is via the real exchange rate. The idea is that 
a resource bonanza could cause a real appreciation which would, in turn, make other 
exports, such as manufactured exports, uncompetitive. Origins of this phenomenon 
date back to The Netherlands in 1959 following the discovery of large gas fields in 
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the country. If the exports and economic activity being crowded out by the 
appreciation were in industries with large positive externalities, such as 
agglomeration economies, economies of scale, and knowledge spillovers, crowding 
them out could reduce a country’s long-run growth rate, even though it is following 
its comparative advantage in the short run. And while the presence or absence of a 
real appreciation in response to an increase in resource rents would not conclusively 
prove or disprove the existence of the resource curse, concluding one versus the other 
could strengthen or weaken the case. If an exchange rate transmission channel does 
not exist, resource curse must be operating through other means, such as corruption 
of the political system. 
 
This chapter focuses on a particular mechanism behind the real exchange rate 
appreciation, which is closely linked to the Dutch disease—the Balassa-Samuelson 
or the Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis. This hypothesis explains the exchange 
rate appreciation phenomenon through relative productivity changes of tradable and 
non-tradable sectors in resource-rich economies. The chapter contributes to the 
general literature on the Balassa-Samuelson effect but specifically focuses on the oil-
producing countries. There are three distinctive features of the chapter: a new dataset 
has been constructed based on revenues and costs of oil exporters from Wood 
Mackenzie’s (WM) Global Economic Model (GEM), which has not been used in 
this context before; a diverse set of oil-exporting countries is analysed; and Pesaran 
& Smith's (1995) pool mean group estimator is implemented. This approach restricts 
the long-run coefficients for all panels to be the same but allows the short-run 
coefficients to vary. This is a desirable property given the heterogeneous nature of the 
countries in the dataset, since there is reason to believe that short-run dynamics may 
differ across countries but converge towards a common long-run equilibrium. These 
new data and techniques have allowed me to quantify the long-run relationship 
between movements in real exchange rates that could be attributed to the changes in 
the oil rents per capita and oil rents as a percentage of GDP. Two findings are worth 
noting: I found evidence in favour of the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis for most 
countries in the sample but evidence for OPEC countries is ambiguous. 
  
The chapter is organised as follows: Section 4.2 reviews the Balassa-Samuelson (B-
S) hypothesis and its transition mechanism, Section 4.3 provides a literature review, 
Section 4.4 describes the dataset in detail, Section 4.5 focuses on the determining 
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stationarity properties of the variables, Section 4.6 describes the econometric 
methods implemented and provides the results of the estimations, and Section 4.7 
concludes. 
4.2 The Balassa-Samuelson Effect and the Transmission Mechanisms 
One popular explanation for the resource curse has a crowding-out logic. If activity 
X drives growth and the extraction of natural resources crowds-out this activity, 
natural resources harm growth through the elimination of activity X. This activity 
could be in a manufacturing industry with positive externalities that would lead to 
improved efficiency and international competitiveness. Since natural resource 
exports dominate, however, other industries cannot compete in the global market 
and productivity-boosting spillovers are minimal. Therefore, if production and 
exports of natural resources lead to the appreciation of the domestic currency, 
domestic economic growth would be hurt. In addition, positive wealth shocks from 
the natural resource sector result in higher demand for non-traded goods and create 
excess demand for non-traded products driving up their prices. This rise in prices 
includes input costs and wages which squeezes profits in traded activities, including 
manufacturing, that use the non-traded products as inputs but sell on the 
international market at relatively fixed prices. The decline in manufacturing then has 
ramifications that slow down the growth process.  
 
Balassa (1964), Harrod (1933), and Samuelson (1964) all independently pointed at 
precisely this phenomenon. They noted that countries with more productive labour 
in the tradable sector should have relatively higher prices in their non-tradable sector. 
This would then lead to a higher overall price level in countries with productive 
tradable sectors and indirectly to the appreciation of the currency. For instance, 
consider oil-exporting countries A and B. The former is similar to the United Arab 
Emirates and has a highly productive oil sector in which capital and labour input 
costs are low. The latter is similar to Kazakhstan where productivity in the oil sector 
is considerably lower and input costs are much higher. Exports of oil from both 
countries represent a high fraction of total exports and a large portion of their GDP. 
Assuming capital is perfectly mobile across sectors within and between countries, but 
labour is mobile only within the country and not internationally, I would expect a 
higher overall price level in country A than in B. The external mechanism through 
which this occurs can be explained as follows: 
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PT = XRAT × PT
∗  
Law of one price holds for tradable goods 
only 
RER =
XRAT
P
  
Rodrik (2008) and Macdonald & Vieira 
(2010) 
WT = PT × MPLT → PT =
WT
MPLT
  
Workers are paid their marginal product 
WN = PN × MPLN → PN =
WN
MPLN
  
WN = WT  Workers can move freely between sectors 
P = PT
α × PN
1−α  Overall price level composition 
PN
PT
=
1
PT
×
WN
MPLN
=
1
PT
×
WT
MPLN
=
PT
PT
×
MPLT
MPLN
=
MPLT
MPLN
  
MPLT ↑⟹ PN ↑⟹ P ↑⟹ RER ↓  Appreciation of the currency 
Table 4.1. The B-S effect transmission mechanism. 
 
In Table 4.1, PT denotes the price of tradables, PN the price of non-tradables, PT
∗ the 
price of tradables abroad, XRAT the nominal exchange rate, which is defined as the 
number of units of the domestic currency that buy one US dollar, P the overall 
domestic price level, 𝛼 the share of tradables in the overall domestic price level, WT 
the wages in tradable sector, WN the wages in non-tradable sector, MPLT the marginal 
product of labour in tradable sector, MPLN the marginal product of labour in non-
tradable sector, and RER the real exchange rate. Using the definition of the exchange 
rate introduced here, increases in the exchange rates are equivalent to depreciation 
of the domestic currency. 
 
Since the marginal product of labour in country A is higher than that in country B, 
MPLT
A > MPLT
B , the price level of non-tradables will be higher leading to a higher 
overall price level in the country. This, in turn, drives the appreciation of the real 
exchange rate. In fact, Balassa made the observation that "the greater are the 
productivity differentials in the production of tradable goods between countries, the 
larger will be the differences in wages and in the prices of services and 
correspondingly the greater will be the gap between purchasing power parity and the 
equilibrium exchange rate" (Balassa, 1964). 
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Although the B-S has been observed globally, the magnitude of the effect can be 
influenced by country-specific characteristics. For example, if oil rents account for a 
relatively small proportion of GDP, increases in oil rents or revenues may not have 
a notable impact on the domestic price level and the real exchange rate. To isolate 
this effect, this chapter focuses on subsets of countries with certain characteristics—
further details of this are given in Section 4.4. Furthermore, the transmission 
mechanisms may be weaker if assumptions of the B-S effect fail to hold. As explained 
earlier in this section, an efficient labour market is key to B-S effect’s transmission to 
real exchange rates. If workers are paid their marginal product, can move freely 
between sectors, and the labour market is competitive such that all workers doing the 
same job are paid the same wage, increased productivity in the tradable sector (rising 
oil rents in this context) should lead to an appreciation of the local currency. 
However, labour markets in some countries in my dataset do not exhibit these 
characteristics. In such cases, the observed effect can be distorted. This phenomenon 
is discussed in detail in Section 4.6.4. 
4.3 Literature Review 
After Balassa (1964) popularised the aforementioned notion, it was adopted not only 
in the exchange rate and resource curse literature but also created a new niche of its 
own. Atkinson & Hamilton (2003), Brunnschweiler & Bulte (2008), Mehlum et al. 
(2006), Sachs & Warner (1995, 1997, 1999, 2001), and Sala-i-Martin & Subramanian 
(2003) are some of the significant contributions to the resource curse literature. 
Within the B-S literature, time series and panel analyses largely support the B-S 
hypothesis, whereas initial cross-sectional analyses have led to mixed results. 
 
Balassa (1964) was first to attempt to verify the B-S hypothesis empirically by 
regressing PPP as a percentage of exchange rates on per capita GNP. The author 
analysed 12 OECD countries in 1960 and found a significant relationship, which was 
interpreted as a confirmation for his proposition. This study gave rise to a large cross-
sectional literature, which includes Clague (1986, 1988), De Vries (1968), Officer 
(1976), and others. Most studies used the real exchange rate or PPP as the dependent 
variable with various measures of productivity as the explanatory variables of 
interest. These include GDP per capita, ratios of total factor productivity, and real 
income. Control variables, such as openness to trade, trade balance, money supply 
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growth, sometimes feature in the analysis as well. This part of the literature has not 
provided conclusive results, as different specifications yielded different outcomes.  
 
In the 1980s and 1990s, researchers took a different approach as more and better data 
became available. This part of the literature on the productivity bias hypothesis 
focused on country-level time-series analysis which took country-specific 
circumstances into account that could not have been captured in cross-sectional 
studies. These studies include Bahmani-Oskooee & Rhee (1996), Hsieh (1982), 
Rogoff (1992), and others. Different time series approaches were implemented, 
including Johansen approach, Engle-Granger analysis, Dickey-Fuller tests, and 
ARDL modelling. Bahmani-Oskooee & Nasir (2005) provide a comprehensive 
review of this literature, in which most studies supported the B-S hypothesis.  
 
More recently, starting from the late 1990s and early 2000s, studies of the B-S 
mechanism have predominantly been based on panel econometric methods. The 
then-new non-stationary panel methods were adopted into the B-S literature in an 
effort to exploit cross-country relationships. Studies before this stage had tested 
individual countries for cointegration and proceeded with conventional panel 
methods, such as seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) or fixed effects (FE) 
estimations. Asea & Mendoza (1994) and De Gregorio, Giovannini, & Wolf (1994) 
were among the first influential studies. Both papers included demand side variables 
in accordance with Rogoff (1992), and the latter showed that the ratio of sectoral 
productivity per capita should be used in the context of the B-S hypothesis instead of 
levels productivity per capita. However, the literature consequently continued to use 
levels as a proxy. 
 
Many studies have since questioned the assumptions of the empirical models and 
their validity as a whole versus the validity of parts of the model. For instance, Égert 
et al. (2003) implemented a panel cointegration analysis to study nine Central and 
Eastern European countries using quarterly average labour productivity data over the 
period from 1995 to 2000. Although their conclusion suggested strong evidence in 
favour of the B-S effect, the authors noted that only part of the phenomenon is being 
captured. They argued that the increase in the price level could also be explained by 
increasing quality of goods, which was not captured by CPI. Faria & León-Ledesma 
(2003) tested for evidence of a long-run B-S effect using relative real output per capita 
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as a proxy for relative labour productivity among four countries—Germany, Japan, 
the UK, and the US—for the period 1960 to 1996. The authors implemented models 
using levels and first-differences, but neither pointed to a significant long-run 
relationship between price level and output ratios. However, they suggested that their 
rejection of the B-S effect did not necessarily mean the PPP hypothesis holds: their 
investigation of the first-differenced output ratios suggested that causality exists, but 
that it goes from price ratios to output ratios, which violates the assumptions of PPP. 
On the contrary, Choudhri & Khan's (2005) analysis of 16 developing countries with 
different income levels over the period from 1976 to 1994 illustrated the existence of 
a long-run relationship between the countries' productivity differentials and their real 
exchange rates. According to the findings, the strength of the relationship is sensitive 
to variation in income levels and the authors argue that terms of trade also have an 
influence on the real exchange rate.  
 
García-Solanes, Sancho-Portero, & Torrejón-Flores (2008) extended the Égert et al. 
(2003) study and, similarly to Asea & Mendoza (1994), found that the internal 
transmission mechanism—an increase in the overall price level in response to an 
increase in productivity in the tradable sector—holds in their sample, but that the 
appreciation of the real exchange rate cannot be fully attributed to productivity 
differentials. Their work involved six new EU countries (Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Slovak Republic) and six other countries from EU-15 
(Finland, France, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden) using data from 1995 
through 2004. They suggested that the external transition mechanism is not fulfilled 
because PPP does not hold in the tradable sector. However, García-Solanes et al. 
(2008) showed that both internal and external mechanisms exist in their analysis of 
16 Latin American countries. This is in contrast with 16 OECD countries, where 
only internal mechanisms were confirmed. Drine & Rault's (2002) analysis of six 
Asian countries using panel cointegration techniques questioned the assumptions of 
the B-S hypothesis and provided evidence that two assumptions of the model—PPP 
for tradable goods and the relationship between prices of non-tradables and the real 
exchange rate—can sometimes be violated, which would explain the rejection of the 
B-S hypothesis in empirical work. 
 
Chong, Jordà, & Taylor (2012) evaluated the adjustment of the real exchange rate to 
its long-run equilibrium for 21 OECD countries and confirmed that the B-S effect is 
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not just an essential component of the equilibrium, but the size of the B-S effect varies 
by country and influences the speed of adjustment of the real exchange rate to the 
equilibrium after a shock. Chinn (2000) estimated a panel error correction model and 
found some evidence in support of the productivity bias hypothesis in five East Asian 
countries. He also investigated effects of government spending and real oil prices on 
the real exchange rates and found that, contrary to Chinn's (1997) study of 14 OECD 
countries, government spending did not exhibit a significant effect, and the oil price 
was significant for only three countries in his sample—one oil exporter and two oil 
importers. These three countries had the predicted sign: an increase in price led to an 
appreciation of the currency for the oil exporter (Indonesia) and depreciation for the 
other two (Japan and South Korea).  
 
Despite extensive coverage of the B-S hypothesis in the literature, there has been 
limited focus on oil-producing and developing countries. Most research concerns 
OECD countries, even though the B-S effect is more likely to be present in poorer 
countries. In the last decade, transition economies have gained attention, including 
oil exporters such as Russia and Kazakhstan. However, manifestation of the 
productivity bias hypothesis through the oil-producing sector has yet to be explored. 
This is a good avenue for research, since oil producer countries tend to rely on 
primary exports for revenue and growth, and exports of crude oil form a large portion 
of these exports. Korhonen & Juurikkala (2009) investigated this relationship with a 
primary interest in the effects of oil prices on the real exchange rates of OPEC 
countries. Using GDP per capita as a measure of productivity, they rejected the B-S 
hypothesis for their sample but found a strong and significant relationship between 
the oil price and the real exchange rates of these countries. The authors emphasise 
that it would be useful to analyse all oil-exporting countries—including non-OPEC—
in one panel framework, as similar results were found for non-OPEC countries, such 
as Russia (Oomes & Kalcheva, 2007) and OPEC countries, such as Venezuela 
(Zalduendo, 2006). 
 
Égert (2005) included Russia and South Eastern European countries, such as Ukraine 
and Turkey, in his analysis of exchange rate behaviour in transition economies with 
undervalued currencies—those with nominal exchange rates below the PPP 
exchange rate. The author concluded that the B-S effect is not strong and noted that 
the B-S assumption that an increase in productivity causes relative price increases 
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does not seem to hold. A particularly interesting result was that oil revenues do not 
prove to be important for exchange rate fluctuations in Russia. On the contrary, 
Égert, Halpern, & Macdonald (2006) provided an extensive overview of the exchange 
rate behaviour in 14 transition economies and despite stating that the movements in 
the exchange rate should not be attributed to the B-S mechanism, the authors noted 
that Russia and Kazakhstan—both of which feature in the analysis in this chapter—
are negatively affected by the Dutch disease, and that the oil price has a significant 
effect on real exchange rate movements. In contrast, however, Egert & Leonard 
(2008) examined the Kazakh economy for the presence of Dutch disease and tested 
for the B-S effect during the years 1996 through 2005 when oil prices had been rising. 
The authors concluded that the non-oil tradable sector was unaffected by the increase 
in oil revenues and that the appreciation of the currency was mostly due to the change 
in the nominal rate instead of an increase in the price level. In more recent work, 
Amin & El-Sakka (2016) found a long-run relationship between oil prices, GDP, and 
real exchange rates of dollar-pegged GCC countries and noted that there is causality 
going from oil prices to the exchange rate but that the adjustment of the exchange 
rate to the equilibrium is very slow.  
 
Due to limitations in publicly available data, most studies that analyse oil-exporting 
countries focus on the effects of changes in the oil price rather than on country-level 
changes in productivity. For example, Habib & Kalamova (2007) found no 
relationship between oil prices and real exchange rates in Norway and Saudi Arabia 
but established a positive relationship in Russia. Aziz & Bakar (2009), however, 
found no long-run relationship for net oil exporters—Canada, Denmark, and 
Malaysia—but net oil importers in their sample appeared to have a negative 
relationship between the oil price and their currency values. Further discussion on 
the relationship between the oil price and the real exchange rates in oil-rich countries 
can be found in Rickne (2009) and Frankel (2017).  
 
Although the literature on the B-S hypothesis is extensive and spans several decades 
and econometric approaches, I hope to fill three main gaps: 1) analysing the effect 
with data on country-level productivity rather than revenue; 2) using a more diverse 
set of oil-exporting countries; and 3) implementing panel estimation methods that 
require large-N and large-T data structure. Previous work suggests the second point 
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as a possible extension of current work, and the first and third points are feasible only 
with a dataset like the one used here.  
4.4 Data and Descriptive Statistics  
4.4.1 Sources and Format 
The main sources of data are Penn World Table version 7.1, Wood Mackenzie’s 
Global Economic Model, and BP’s Statistical Review of World Energy. Table 4.2 
below lists all the key variables and their sources.  
 
Variable Abbreviation Description Source 
Real 
exchange rate 
rer 
Real exchange rate (local currency 
units per I$) 
PWT 7.1 
Oil rents per 
capita 
oilrents_pc 
Total oil rents (constant million 
2005 US$) divided by population 
Wood Mackenzie 
& BP 
Real GDP per 
capita 
rgdpch 
PPP converted GDP per capita 
chain series (2005 I$) 
PWT 7.1 
Brent price brent Brent oil price (2005 US$) 
Thomson Reuters 
Datastream 
Openness to 
trade 
openc Openness at current prices (%)23 PWT 7.1 
Table 4.2. Key variables and their sources. 
 
The dataset has a panel format and covers 42 countries over 45 years: 1965 through 
2009. The panel is unbalanced with partial gaps in most countries’ time series. Table 
4.4 outlines the number of years available for each country. The shortest time series 
available are for Romania, Azerbaijan, and India with 6, 9, and 11 years of data, 
respectively. On average, the dataset has 28 years of data for each of the 42 countries 
for a total of 1114 observations of oil rents. Table 4.3 provides summary statistics for 
key variables and their natural logarithms, where appropriate.  
 
 
                                                 
 
23 Defined as the sum of exports and imports as a fraction of GDP 
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Variable N Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Oil rents per capita 1114 1632 3545 1.90 40979 
ln(oil rents per capita) 1114 5.81 1.95 0.64 10.62 
Oil rents as % of GDP 1114 1.16 0.18 1.00 2.15 
ln(oil rents as % of GDP) 1114 0.14 0.14 0.00 0.76 
Real exchange rate 1114 1.72 0.96 0.21 15.00 
ln(real exchange rate) 1114 0.42 0.48 -1.54 2.71 
Real GDP per capita 1114 14428 16684 612 118771 
ln(real GDP per capita) 1114 8.98 1.12 6.42 11.68 
Brent 45 39.55 19.82 15.07 91.12 
ln(brent) 45 3.56 0.47 2.71 4.51 
Openness to trade 1114 74.87 40.14 14.68 354.11 
ln(openness to trade) 1114 4.19 0.50 2.69 5.87 
Table 4.3. Coverage by variable (N + T dimension). 
 
 
Country Country code Number of years OPEC D1024 
Algeria DZA 45  
Angola AGO 24  
Argentina ARG 18 - - 
Australia AUS 37 - - 
Azerbaijan AZE 9 - 
Brazil BRA 17 - - 
Brunei BRN 36 - 
Canada CAN 25 - - 
China CHN 13 - - 
Colombia COL 24 - - 
Congo, Republic of COG 34 - 
Denmark DNK 32 - - 
Ecuador ECU 13  
Egypt EGY 37 - 
Equatorial Guinea GNQ 17 - 
Gabon GAB 37 - 
India IND 11 - - 
Indonesia IDN 42 - - 
Iraq IRQ 40  
Italy ITA 36 - - 
Kazakhstan KAZ 13 - 
Libya LBY 24  
Malaysia MYS 37 - 
Mexico MEX 16 - - 
Nigeria NGA 36  
Norway NOR 32 - 
Oman OMN 36 - 
                                                 
 
24 Countries, in which oil rents exceed 10% of GDP in 2008. 
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Peru PER 30 - - 
Qatar QAT 24  
Romania ROM 6 - - 
Russia RUS 20 - 
Saudi Arabia SAU 24  
Sudan SDN 10 - 
Syria SYR 36 - 
Thailand THA 25 - - 
Trinidad & Tobago TTO 35 - 
Tunisia TUN 43 - - 
United Arab 
Emirates 
ARE 24 
 
United Kingdom GBR 34 - - 
Venezuela VEN 21  
Vietnam VNM 20 - 
Yemen YEM 21 - 
 
Table 4.4. Coverage by country (time dimension) and subsample composition. 
 
4.4.2 Construction of Oil Rents per Capita and its Natural Log 
As an intermediate step to calculating total oil rents, I calculate a cost ratio. This 
interim variable is the ratio of total costs and gross revenue from Wood Mackenzie’s 
GEM. The former consists of capital and operating costs that are summed to get total 
costs. Due to the nature and coverage of GEM data (further explained in Section 
4.4.3 below), revenues from Wood Mackenzie are not used directly in my 
estimations. Instead, I calculate oil revenues using BP production figures and Brent 
price series obtained from Datastream. These steps are summarised in Table 4.5: 
 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑡  (𝑊𝑀) = 0.2 × ∑ 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑡
0
𝑡=−4
 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 = 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑡  (𝑊𝑀) + 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑡 (𝑊𝑀) 
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 (𝑊𝑀)
𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 (𝑊𝑀)
 
𝑂𝑖𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 ≔ 𝑂𝑖𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝐵𝑃) × 𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 
𝑂𝑖𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 = 𝑂𝑖𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 × (1 − 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜) 
Table 4.5. Construction of oil rents. 
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4.4.3 Data Treatment and Limitations 
All key variables with the exception of 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑐, which is expressed as a percentage, 
are used in natural logarithm form.25 One important limitation of GEM data was its 
coverage. The database was structured based on concessions and exploration license 
areas. To get an idea of the whole country’s petroleum industry, I aggregated the 
granular data points. In some cases, however, Wood Mackenzie’s coverage of the 
country’s production was limited to certain areas only. This posed a problem for the 
oil rents variable, since the underlying assumption of the calculation shown in 
Section 4.4.2 is that the cost ratio is applicable to the whole country. This may not 
hold if the GEM database’s coverage of the country is quite limited. To resolve this, 
I impose a restriction that an oil rents observation is used only if WM’s field-by-field 
cost estimations cover at least 10% of the country’s production as captured by BP’s 
Statistical Review of World Energy. This procedure discards observations where the 
WM data is less likely to be representative of the country as a whole. Figure 4.1 and 
Figure 4.2 facilitate visualisation of the resulting series for all the countries in the 
dataset in two selected years—2000 and 2009, respectively. 
 
                                                 
 
25 In a small number of year and country combinations, per capita oil rents were observed to be negative. 
These tend to occur in countries with relatively small economies and in years just after a discovery when 
substantial upstream investment is taking place within the petroleum industry such that total costs exceed 
gross revenue. Examples of this include Australia in 1970-71 and Brunei in 1970-1973). The negative 
numbers posed a data treatment issue while transforming the variable with the natural log function. To 
avoid this obstacle, a small number of observations were dropped. However, I repeated the analysis with 
other transformations, such as Winsorising, and adding a constant to the series to eliminate negatives. The 
choice of method does not appear to affect any of the main qualitative findings.  
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Figure 4.1. Natural logarithm of oil rents per capita in 2000. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2. Natural logarithm of oil rents per capita in 2009. 
 
4.4.4 Country Coverage and Subsamples 
Since I expect to observe stronger evidence for the hypothesis in oil-dependent 
countries, I focus on two subsamples of countries: OPEC countries and those in 
which oil rents exceed 10% of GDP in 2008—referred to as “D10” countries. 
Unsurprisingly, these categories are not mutually exclusive. Table 4.4 shows which 
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countries OPEC and D10 categories consist of and Table 4.6 summarises the key 
variables for each subsample.  
 
Oil rents per capita in OPEC and D10 countries are considerably higher than in the 
rest of the world. Mean oil rents, in 2005 US$, per capita for OPEC and D10 
countries are about $2800 and $2200 per capita, respectively, whereas that for the rest 
of the countries is $150 per capita. Note here that OPEC is a subset of D10 countries 
and that not all OPEC countries are covered by the dataset. Note, also, that Indonesia 
was not included in OPEC countries because it was often a marginal member due to 
relatively low exports. Indonesia originally joined OPEC in 1962 but left in 2009 after 
being a net importer for some years. The country then re-joined in 2016 only to 
suspend its membership by the end of the year.  
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 OPEC 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Oil rents per capita 2980.38 4766.74 6.98 40978.83 
ln(oil rents per capita) 7.03 1.48 1.94 10.62 
Oil rents as % of GDP 1.28 0.21 1.00 2.15 
ln(oil rents as % of GDP) 0.23 0.15 0.00 0.76 
Real exchange rate 1.67 1.11 0.21 7.76 
ln(real exchange rate) 0.35 0.61 -1.54 2.05 
Real GDP per capita 16161.26 21983.25 975.75 118770.50 
ln(real GDP per capita) 8.90 1.24 6.88 11.68 
Openness to trade 85.59 48.72 23.61 354.11 
N / n 10 / 275 
          
 D10 
  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Oil rents per capita 2471.91 4232.11 2.14 40978.83 
ln(oil rents per capita) 6.65 1.71 0.76 10.62 
Oil rents as % of GDP 1.23 0.19 1.00 2.15 
ln(oil rents as % of GDP) 0.20 0.14 0.00 0.76 
Real exchange rate 1.78 1.09 0.21 15.00 
ln(real exchange rate) 0.45 0.52 -1.54 2.71 
Real GDP per capita 14682.95 19046.53 612.40 118770.50 
ln(real GDP per capita) 8.89 1.19 6.42 11.68 
Openness to trade 87.80 42.06 23.61 354.11 
N / n 26 / 705 
          
  World (excl. D10) 
  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Oil rents per capita 184.31 250.97 1.90 1777.12 
ln(oil rents per capita) 4.37 1.44 0.64 7.48 
Oil rents as % of GDP 1.03 0.04 1.00 1.29 
ln(oil rents as % of GDP) 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.26 
Real exchange rate 1.60 0.67 0.64 4.88 
ln(real exchange rate) 0.39 0.40 -0.45 1.58 
Real GDP per capita 13988.43 11535.15 711.97 40820.35 
ln(real GDP per capita) 9.12 0.99 6.57 10.62 
Openness to trade 52.60 23.59 14.68 151.71 
N / n 16 / 409 
          
  World 
  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Oil rents per capita 1632.03 3545.29 1.90 40978.83 
ln(oil rents per capita) 5.81 1.95 0.64 10.62 
Oil rents as % of GDP 1.16 0.18 1.00 2.15 
ln(oil rents as % of GDP) 0.14 0.14 0.00 0.76 
Real exchange rate 1.72 0.96 0.21 15.00 
ln(real exchange rate) 0.42 0.48 -1.54 2.71 
Real GDP per capita 14427.96 16683.82 612.40 118770.50 
ln(real GDP per capita) 8.98 1.12 6.42 11.68 
Openness to trade 74.87 40.14 14.68 354.11 
N / n 42 / 1114 
 
Table 4.6. Descriptive statistics by subsample.  
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Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4 show the distribution and evolution over time of the real 
exchange rate in OPEC countries and the rest of the world. With the exception of the 
early years in the dataset, OPEC countries’ real exchange rates behave similarly to 
the rest of the world. More specifically, from 1990 onwards, log real exchange rate 
has a similar median in OPEC and non-OPEC countries, although the minima and 
first quartiles are slightly larger in OPEC countries. 
 
Figure 4.3. Natural log of real exchange rate across time. 
 
 
Figure 4.4. Natural log of real exchange rate across time in OPEC countries. 
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In Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6, I turn to one of the main explanatory variables, oil rents 
per capita. Unsurprisingly and as previously observed, OPEC countries have higher 
per capita oil rents than the rest of the world. This holds across time as shown by 
larger median values in OPEC countries as well as a tighter distribution around these. 
 
Figure 4.5. Natural log of oil rents per capita. 
 
 
Figure 4.6. Natural log of oil rents per capita in OPEC countries. 
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A second measure adopted in this chapter is oil rents as a percentage of GDP to 
emphasise how important oil rents are relative to the size of the economy. Box plots 
of this variable are shown in Figure 4.7 and Figure 4.8.  
 
Figure 4.7. Oil rents as a percentage of GDP. 
 
 
Figure 4.8. Oil rents as a percentage of GDP in OPEC countries. 
 
This measure reveals a similar pattern to oil rents per capita, since oil rents constitute 
a larger share of OPEC countries’ GDP than the rest of the world, especially from 
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1985 onwards. Unlike the rest of the world, no OPEC country has oil rents 
accounting for 0% of GDP. Further, non-OPEC countries have a wider distribution 
around a smaller median value throughout the sample period. Figure 4.9 and Figure 
4.10 below show that although mean GDP for OPEC countries is very similar to the 
global average (as shown in Table 4.6), the series has behaved differently over time. 
For instance, global GDP appears to have a positive time trend, whereas this is much 
less pronounced in OPEC countries, especially in the earlier years of the dataset. As 
Ross (2012) observed, this is part of the resource-curse puzzle. Resource-rich 
economies do not seem to experience higher growth rates in practice. In fact, 
generally, OPEC countries’ median GDP per capita appears slightly lower than the 
rest of the world. Although this is not indicative of a causal link between high oil 
rents as a percentage of GDP and lower GDP per capita, it signals a potential 
explanation. This GDP per capita behaviour in OPEC countries over time is partially 
due to the fluctuations in oil prices and production in some years, since oil rents 
constitute a relatively large portion of these countries’ GDPs.  
 
 
Figure 4.9. Natural log of real GDP per capita. 
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Figure 4.10. Natural log of real GDP per capita in OPEC countries 
 
Finally, Figure 4.11 and Figure 4.12 combine the first set of key variables in question. 
Casual inspection reveals a negative relationship between real exchange rates and oil 
rents per capita. To see this, a simple linear line fitted into the top-right quadrant of 
these two figures would be sloping downward, suggesting that lower 𝑙𝑟𝑒𝑟 is more 
likely (appreciation) at higher oil rents per capita. This is along the lines of what 
theory predicts and will be discussed in detail in the rest of the chapter. Interestingly, 
the OPEC subsample has a clearer and more negative relationship. This provides 
preliminary evidence for the B-S hypothesis and is investigated further in later 
sections. Before formal testing, I observe that this is in sharp contrast with the pattern 
that emerges using oil rents as a percentage of GDP. As Figure 4.13 and Figure 4.14 
demonstrate, the relationship between real exchange rates and rents is much less clear 
when the latter is measured as a percentage of output. Furthermore, the relationship 
changes sign in OPEC countries, which is a surprising result that not only contradicts 
the findings with per capita oil rents but also the existence of a B-S-type dynamic. 
This finding motivated me to explore the impact of variable specification on the 
estimated relationship. The results of this investigation are presented where 
appropriate and the analysis proceeds with both explanatory variables in mind. 
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Figure 4.11. Real exchange rate versus oil rents per capita. 
 
 
Figure 4.12. Real exchange rate versus oil rents per capita in OPEC countries. 
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Figure 4.13. Real exchange rate versus oil rents as a percentage of GDP. 
 
 
Figure 4.14. Real exchange rate versus oil rents as a percentage of GDP in OPEC countries. 
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4.4.5 Individual Country Statistics and Plots 
This section aims to provide further clarity on individual countries in the dataset by 
summarising and graphing key variables. Generally, I observe a negative relationship 
between the logarithm of real exchange rates, 𝑙𝑟𝑒𝑟, and the main explanatory 
variable, the logarithm of per capita oil rents, 𝑙𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠_𝑝𝑐. The simple correlation 
coefficient between the two variables using the whole dataset is -0.26.26 This 
coefficient is -0.33 when the sample is restricted to D10 countries. It is, therefore, not 
surprising that I observe an inverse relationship between the two series in most 
countries in the dataset. Angola and Norway are shown below as examples.  
 
 
Figure 4.15. Real exchange rates and oil rents per capita in Angola. 
 
 
                                                 
 
26 Recall that the exchange rate is defined as national currency per US dollar, so that an increase in 
the variable represents a depreciation. Thus, a correlation coefficient of -0.26 implies that a rise in oil 
rents is associated with an appreciation (i.e. a decrease in lrer). 
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Figure 4.16. Real exchange rates and oil rents per capita in Norway. 
 
In Figure 4.15 and Figure 4.16, increases in oil rents tend to be associated with a fall 
in the exchange rate measure suggesting an appreciation of the currency. This pattern 
is common throughout the dataset but, unsurprisingly, not all countries follow it. A 
counter example is Australia, where the real exchange rate fluctuates independently 
of per capita oil rents in parts of the series. The underlying reason for this is the little 
contribution of oil rents in Australian GDP: mean oil rents in Australia are 1.3% of 
GDP and they have never exceeded 4% of GDP. Despite this, I observe periods with 
a clear link between the real exchange rate and oil rents, but overall there are larger 
drivers of the Australian real exchange rate than rents from oil production.  
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Figure 4.17. Real exchange rates versus oil rents per capita in Australia. 
 
This motivated further investigation of the alternative oil rents measure using rents 
as a share of GDP. Returning to the same countries discussed above, I observe a less 
stable relationship between exchange rates and rents as a percentage of GDP. All 
three countries—Angola, Australia, and Norway—show signs of both a positive and 
negative link between the two series at different time periods. Since visual analysis is 
inconclusive in this context, formalised results are reported in later sections. 
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4.5 Unit Root Tests 
I start the analysis by testing for stationarity of the variables. This has implications 
for the estimation techniques to be adopted and often involves multiple tests in a 
panel context. A popular early panel unit root tests is the Levin and Lin test, 
originally introduced in 1992. In recent literature, the most commonly used tests in 
applied research are LLC (Levin, Lin, & Chu, 2002), IPS (Im, Pesaran, & Shin, 
2003), Hadri (2000), and Fisher-type tests (Fisher, 1925). Preference is generally 
given to tests that can be applied to unbalanced panels that do not assume a common 
unit root process (a requirement for LLC and Hadri tests) or require the same number 
of observations in all panels (a requirement for IPS test). To overcome these 
obstacles, I use a Fisher-type test proposed by Maddala & Wu (1999), which carries 
out individual independent unit root tests for each panel and combines resulting p-
values. The test does not restrict panels to have the same number of observations or 
the same number of lags. Another useful property of the test is that it can combine 
significance levels from different individual unit root tests. These are desirable in my 
case given the heterogenous nature of countries in the dataset. Restricting the sample, 
such as dropping observations to reduce it to a balanced panel, is an option to 
potentially improve size and power properties and perform the more restrictive panel 
unit root tests. However, Maddala & Wu (1999) showed that the Fisher test 
outperforms LLC and IPS in Monte-Carlo studies. Given the trade-off between loss 
of observations and the ability to run additional tests, the Fisher-type test is the best 
choice here. Besides, Pesaran (2012) noted that there is no theoretical basis for a 
homogeneous autoregressive structure in the context of testing the PPP hypothesis, 
which makes the LLC and Hadri tests even less appropriate for this analysis. Further, 
Davidson & MacKinnon (2004) compared augmented the Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test 
to others and found that the former exhibits better power properties in finite samples.  
 
These tests assume, in principle, that number of panels, 𝑁, is fixed and number of 
time periods, 𝑇, tends to infinity. This is reasonable for some panels within the 
dataset, but the number of panels exceeds the average observations per country in the 
unbalanced panel structure. Table 4.7 reports the results of the Fisher-type test with 
individual ADF regressions. The number of lags varies from zero to two, and all tests 
are performed with and without a trend. The null hypothesis states that all the panels 
contain unit roots and the default significance level is chosen to be 5%.  
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Variable Trend 
Number 
of lags 
Test 
statistic 
p-value Result 
lrer 
No 0 79.51 0.62 All panels are non-stationary 
No 1 133.63 0.00 At least some panels are stationary 
No 2 119.80 0.01 At least some panels are stationary 
Yes 0 61.22 0.97 All panels are non-stationary 
Yes 1 233.87 0.00 At least some panels are stationary 
Yes 2 105.43 0.06 All panels are non-stationary 
loilrents_pc 
No 0 191.43 0.00 At least some panels are stationary 
No 1 118.05 0.01 At least some panels are stationary 
No 2 73.39 0.79 All panels are non-stationary 
Yes 0 183.86 0.00 At least some panels are stationary 
Yes 1 119.61 0.01 At least some panels are stationary 
Yes 2 45.25 1.00 All panels are non-stationary 
loilrents_rgdp 
No 0 119.61 0.01 At least some panels are stationary 
No 1 95.80 0.18 All panels are non-stationary 
No 2 72.31 0.81 All panels are non-stationary 
Yes 0 83.90 0.48 All panels are non-stationary 
Yes 1 72.08 0.82 All panels are non-stationary 
Yes 2 67.49 0.91 All panels are non-stationary 
lrgdpch 
No 0 61.20 0.97 All panels are non-stationary 
No 1 94.25 0.21 All panels are non-stationary 
No 2 87.70 0.37 All panels are non-stationary 
Yes 0 94.86 0.20 All panels are non-stationary 
Yes 1 113.75 0.02 At least some panels are stationary 
Yes 2 63.30 0.96 All panels are non-stationary 
lopenc 
No 0 180.92 0.00 At least some panels are stationary 
No 1 172.19 0.00 At least some panels are stationary 
No 2 97.74 0.15 All panels are non-stationary 
Yes 0 198.49 0.00 At least some panels are stationary 
Yes 1 136.09 0.00 At least some panels are stationary 
Yes 2 58.55 0.98 All panels are non-stationary 
 
Table 4.7. Panel unit root tests. 
 
Based on these results, 𝑙𝑟𝑒𝑟 appears to be non-stationary with no lags in the DF 
regression, but the null hypothesis is rejected when one or more lags are included. 
𝑙𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠_𝑝𝑐 and 𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑐 exhibit the opposite behaviour: I fail to reject 𝐻0 of non-
stationarity of all panels when two lags are included. The test results strongly suggest 
that the GDP-based measures, 𝑙𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠_𝑟𝑔𝑑𝑝 and 𝑙𝑟𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑐ℎ, are non-stationary. The 
null hypothesis is rejected only in one specification for 𝑙𝑟𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑐ℎ.  
 
Although powerful in some respects, Fisher-type tests have a major drawback: the 
null hypothesis is formulated such that it implies non-stationarity of all panels against 
the alternative hypothesis that some are stationary. Given that the test has low power 
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properties in small samples, it may be informative and practical to run individual unit 
root tests for each panel. This approach can become impractical in datasets with large 
𝑁 but offers the most flexibility: each panel can be tested on its own for different 
orders of integration. The results from individual ADF tests are presented in Table 
4.22 through Table 4.26 of the Chapter Appendix. A summary of these tables is 
presented in Table 4.8. 
 
Variable Trend 
No of 
lags 
Number of countries (out 
of 42) for which the null 
hypothesis is rejected 
Fraction of countries for 
which the null hypothesis is 
not rejected 
loilrents_pc 
No 0 7 83% 
No 1 3 93% 
No 2 2 95% 
Yes 0 6 86% 
Yes 1 6 86% 
Yes 2 1 98% 
loilrents_rgdp 
No 0 4 90% 
No 1 1 98% 
No 2 2 95% 
Yes 0 2 95% 
Yes 1 3 93% 
Yes 2 2 95% 
lrer 
No 0 2 95% 
No 1 6 86% 
No 2 6 86% 
Yes 0 2 95% 
Yes 1 6 86% 
Yes 2 3 93% 
lrgdpch 
No 0 2 95% 
No 1 3 93% 
No 2 4 90% 
Yes 0 2 95% 
Yes 1 5 88% 
Yes 2 2 95% 
lopenc 
No 0 4 90% 
No 1 6 86% 
No 2 2 95% 
Yes 0 5 88% 
Yes 1 6 86% 
Yes 2 2 95% 
 
Table 4.8. Summary of country-by-country ADF tests. 5% significance level is used. H0 is that a unit 
root is present in the series. 
 
These results paint a different picture in that most of the series appear non-stationary 
and some of the results observed through the Fisher-type panel unit root test may 
have been driven by a minority of panels. 𝑙𝑏𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 was tested separately using Elliot, 
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Rothenberg, & Stock's (1996) DF-GLS test, a more powerful modification of the 
ADF test. The lag length is chosen according to the modified Akaike information 
criterion (Ng & Perron, 2001) and set to one. The null hypothesis is not rejected at 
the 10% significance level for up to 9 lags, which confirms that the Brent price series 
is non-stationary. All 45 observations are used for this test as opposed to restricting 
the series to some panels’ time series. The test results are shown in Table 4.9. 
 
Variable Trend Number of lags Test statistic Result 
lbrent No 1 -1.65 Series is non-stationary 
lbrent Yes 1 -1.97 Series is non-stationary 
Table 4.9. Unit root test for lbrent. Maximum lag length determined by Schwert criterion, and the 
optimal lag length by modified Akaike information criterion. Critical values are non-standard. 
 
In these tests, maximum lag length was determined by the Schwert criterion27 and 
the optimal lag length by the modified Akaike information criterion. Given these 
findings, I proceed with the analysis on the basis that all variables are non-stationary. 
4.6 Methodology and Estimations 
4.6.1 Testing for Cointegration 
Having established the non-stationarity properties of the variables in Section 4.5, the 
analysis continues with an investigation of a cointegrating relationship between 𝑙𝑟𝑒𝑟 
and 𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠_𝑝𝑐 or 𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠_𝑟𝑔𝑑𝑝. Other potential determinants of the real exchange 
rate are also included in this analysis. If the variables prove to have a long-run 
relationship, then the dynamic ordinary least squares estimator (DOLS) introduced 
by Stock & Watson (1993), the mean-group estimator (MG) of Pesaran & Smith 
(1995) and the pooled mean-group estimator (PMG) of Pesaran, Shin, & Smith 
(1999) will be used to evaluate the magnitude of the coefficients in the long-run 
equation. The short-run dynamics will also be discussed. The DOLS estimator has 
been frequently used in the literature in the context of the B-S hypothesis (e.g., Chong 
et al., 2012, and MacDonald & Ricci, 2007), but the MG and PMG estimators are 
not yet prevalent, despite some analyses along these lines, such as Camarero (2008).  
 
                                                 
 
27 As discussed in Schwert (1989). 
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OLS estimation of the cointegrated non-stationary variables also produces consistent 
estimates, but they generally do not follow a Gaussian distribution, so the 
conventional test statistics are meaningless. Stock & Watson's (1993) DOLS was 
suggested as a solution to this problem. The estimator is asymptotically efficient and 
normally distributed. This is achieved by the inclusion of the leads and lags of the 
differenced explanatory variables, which orthogonalises the error term with respect 
to the innovations in the regressors. This has the added advantage of eliminating 
potential endogeneity between the error term and the stationary component of the 
non-stationary variables. Asymptotically valid standard errors can be computed 
using a heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent estimator. In this case, 
Newey-West standard errors will be used. According to Kao & Chiang (2001), DOLS 
outperforms panel OLS and fully modified least squares estimator (FMOLS) because 
of smaller bias and smaller finite sample size distortions. The DOLS equation has the 
following form: 
 
𝑙𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝑋𝑖𝑡 𝛽 + 𝛼𝑖 + ∑ ∆
𝑏
𝑘=−𝑎
𝑋𝑖𝑡+𝑘𝜃 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 (4.1) 
 
Where 𝑙𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 is the real exchange rate of country 𝑖 at time 𝑡 measured in natural 
logarithm, 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is the vector of explanatory variables, 𝛽 is the vector of the long-run 
DOLS coefficients, 𝛼𝑖 are the country fixed effects, 𝜃 is a vector of the coefficients on 
the lags and leads of the first-differenced explanatory variables, and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 denotes the 
error term. Maximum lag and lead lengths are shown by 𝑎 and 𝑏, respectively.  
 
To test for the presence of cointegration in the context of panel data, Pedroni (1999, 
2004) suggested seven test-statistics in the Engle-Granger tradition. The null 
hypothesis of the tests is no cointegration. Four statistics are panel and three are 
group statistics. The former assume homogeneity of the panels and pool the data 
across the within dimension, constraining the coefficients to be the same. Group 
statistics allow for heterogeneity of the panels and calculate averages for the statistics 
from individual time-series estimations. The latter are more relevant for the 
estimation, as it would be reasonable to expect coefficients to vary across countries. 
The residuals for the Pedroni test are obtained from the long-run DOLS equation that 
has the following form: 
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𝑙𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝑙𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠_𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑡 𝛽 + 𝛼𝑖 + ∑ ∆
1
𝑘=−1
𝑙𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠_𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑡+𝑘𝜃 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 (4.2) 
 
The results for the Pedroni tests are presented in Table 4.10. In all specifications for 
this test and for the subsequent DOLS estimation, one lead and one lag are used in 
order to avoid constraining the number of observations, particularly in the case of 
countries with a short time series. The main findings are robust to an increased 
number of leads and lags in constrained datasets with these countries dropped. The 
table indicates that two out of seven tests reject the null of no cointegration at the 
10% significance level for the whole sample as shown in column (1) of the table. D10 
countries show stronger evidence of cointegration with four rejections of the null 
hypothesis. Interestingly, however, there seems to be no cointegrating relationship 
between per capita oil rents and real exchange rate in OPEC countries. This is an 
unexpected result, as it suggests that the productivity bias hypothesis does not explain 
movements in the real exchange rate through the productivity of the oil sector in these 
countries, even though the oil sector accounts for a large fraction of exports.  
 
The results are qualitatively the same when oil rents are captured using 
𝑙𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠_𝑟𝑔𝑑𝑝 for the whole sample and D10 countries. They differ substantially for 
OPEC countries. For comparison, the test statistics calculated using oil rents as a 
percentage of GDP are given in column (4) of Table 4.10. Six out of seven tests reject 
the null hypothesis of no cointegration in this subsample, which is the strongest 
evidence of cointegration I have identified in the sample. This provides further 
evidence that the way oil rents are measured matters. More specifically, and as theory 
would suggest, there is a stronger link between oil rents and real exchange rate in 
countries where rents account for a large part of GDP.  
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Test statistic (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel 
v-statistic 2.639*** 1.906* 1.046 1.738* 
rho-statistic -1.838* -2.109** -1.201 -2.509** 
t-statistic -1.547 -2.203** -1.208 -2.937*** 
ADF-statistic -0.977 -1.508 -1.571 -2.203** 
Group 
rho-statistic 0.3997 -0.8219 0.3235 -0.7922 
t-statistic -1.287 -3.18*** -0.6863 -2.89*** 
ADF-statistic -1.47 -0.5297 -2.216** -2.503** 
Oil rents variable loilrents_pc loilrents_pc loilrents_pc loilrents_rgdp 
Subsample World D10 OPEC OPEC 
N 42 26 10 10 
Lags 1 1 1 1 
 
Table 4.10. Pedroni (1999, 2004) cointegration test results using oil rents per capita and oil rents as a 
percentage of GDP. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Test 
statistics have a standard normal distribution under the null hypothesis of no cointegration. 
 
To further investigate the existence of a key cointegrating relationship, I conduct 
Westerlund (2007) cointegration tests. Unlike Pedroni tests, these tests are robust to 
cross-sectional dependence and are based on estimating an ECM-type equation, as 
shown in equation 4.3, and testing whether the panels are error-correcting. The 
original test has four test statistics, which share a common null hypothesis but have 
different alternative hypotheses. The tests are: 𝐺𝑡, 𝐺𝑎, 𝑃𝑡, and 𝑃𝑎. 𝐺𝑡 and 𝐺𝑎 test the 
null hypothesis of no cointegration, 𝜙𝑖 = 0 for all 𝑖, against the alternative that at 
least one panel contains a cointegrating relationship, 𝜙𝑖 < 0 for at least one 𝑖. 𝑃𝑡 and 
𝑃𝑎 share the same null hypothesis, but the alternative is formulated such that all 
panels exhibit cointegration, 𝜙𝑖 < 0 for all 𝑖. I focus on 𝑃𝑡 and 𝑃𝑎 because some 
panels have small numbers of observations and 𝐺𝑡 and 𝐺𝑎 are more likely to suffer 
from low power, which is exacerbated by lags and leads in the ECM used to estimate 
the residuals reducing the degrees of freedom available for the test even further. The 
lag length is once again set to one, although if the sample is restricted to countries 
with larger number of observations and the optimal leg length is selected according 
to the Akaike information criterion, the results remain unchanged.  
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∆𝑙𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑𝑖(𝑙𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝛽𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠_𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑡−1)  + 𝛼𝑖 + ∑ ∆
𝑝
𝑘=1
𝑙𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡−𝑝𝛿𝑖
+ ∑ ∆
𝑝
𝑘=0
𝑙𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠_𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑡−𝑘𝜃𝑖 +  𝑣𝑖𝑡 
(4.3) 
 
where 𝜑𝑖 is a speed of adjustment coefficient, 𝛿𝑖 is a 𝑝 × 1 vector of coefficients on 
the lagged first-differenced dependent variable, 𝜃𝑖 is a ((𝑝 + 1) × 1) vector of 
coefficients on the lagged first-differenced regressor, and 𝑣𝑖𝑡 denotes the error term.  
 
Westerlund cointegration test results are shown in Table 4.11 and Table 4.12. The 
former uses oil rents per capita and the latter uses oil rents as a percentage of GDP. 
The two sets of results follow roughly the same pattern. Columns (1) and (2) of the 
tables suggest a cointegrating relationship, since both 𝑃𝑡 and 𝑃𝑎 statistics reject the 
null in almost all cases. Lack of cointegration in OPEC countries shown in column 
(3) of Table 4.11 is in agreement with Pedroni tests discussed previously. This finding 
is in line with test statistics reported in columns (4) and (5), since the cointegrating 
relationship appears to strengthen from a statistical significance perspective when 
OPEC countries are omitted from the sample. It is noteworthy that all test statistics 
in these columns reject the null hypothesis at the 1% significance level. Column (3) 
in Table 4.12 contradicts Pedroni test results, however. Even though the Pedroni test 
suggested cointegration between the real exchange rate and oil rents as a percentage 
of GDP, results of the Westerlund test disagree. Both test statistics fail to reject the 
null hypothesis of no cointegration for OPEC countries. This result is further 
corroborated by columns (4) and (5) where I observe evidence for a cointegrating 
relationship in the rest of the world. I investigate this further in the sections that 
follow. 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Pt 
2.85*** 2.33** 0.48 4.62*** 3.87*** 
(0.002) (0.010) (0.316) (0.000) (0.000) 
Pa 
1.32* 0.84 0.60 4.57*** 3.61*** 
(0.094) (0.200) (0.727) (0.000) (0.000) 
      
Subsample World D10 OPEC World-OPEC D10-OPEC 
N 40 25 10 30 15 
Lags & leads 1 1 1 1 1 
 
Table 4.11. Westerlund (2007) panel cointegration tests using oil rents per capita. *, **, and *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. H0: No cointegration in any panel (𝜙𝑖 = 0 ∀𝑖; 
Ha: Cointegration in the panel as a whole (𝜙𝑖 < 0 ∀𝑖). Two countries, Romania and Sudan, were 
dropped for these tests due to their short time series. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Pt 
2.95*** 2.06** 0.60 3.46*** 2.37*** 
(0.002) (0.020) (0.273) (0.000) (0.009) 
Pa 
2.95*** 1.90** 0.31 3.89*** 2.56*** 
(0.002) (0.029) (0.378) (0.000) (0.005) 
      
Subsample World D10 OPEC World-OPEC D10-OPEC 
N 40 25 10 30 15 
Lags & leads 1 1 1 1 1 
 
Table 4.12. Westerlund (2007) panel cointegration tests using oil rents as a percentage of GDP. *, **, 
and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. H0: No cointegration in any 
panel (𝜙𝑖 = 0 ∀𝑖); Ha: Cointegration in the panel as a whole (𝜙𝑖 < 0 ∀𝑖). Two countries, Romania and 
Sudan, were dropped for these tests due to their short time series.  
 
As a part of this analysis, cointegration tests were performed using other explanatory 
variables (oil price and real per capita GDP) as well. Albeit less clear than oil rents, 
these variables appear to have a cointegrating relationship with the real exchange rate 
in countries outside of OPEC. As observed earlier, no cointegration is identified in 
OPEC countries. The results are presented in Table 4.27 and in the Chapter 
Appendix. Although surprising at first glance, the no-cointegration result in OPEC 
countries is not entirely unexpected. As raised in Section 4.2, labour market 
assumptions of B-S effect are likely to fail in these countries, obscuring the link 
between oil rents and the real exchange rate.  
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To summarise, the cointegration tests discussed here strongly suggest that there is a 
long-run relationship between the real exchange rate and productivity of the oil sector 
in most oil-exporting countries in the sample. This relationship is less clear in OPEC 
countries due to contradicting test results. OPEC countries are kept in the sample for 
further analysis and because they are a particularly interesting group in this context. 
I interpret the results relating to OPEC countries accordingly and further discuss the 
potential failure of the B-S hypothesis in OPEC countries in Section 4.6.4.  
4.6.2 Dynamic OLS Results 
As noted earlier, DOLS estimations are used as a robust alternative to Panel OLS. 
The number of observations for some panel units are limited and pooling data can 
improve the power of the results. My main interest lies in the long-run relationship 
between the real exchange rate and the main explanatory variables, oil rents per 
capita and oil rents as a percentage of GDP. A panel cointegration model using 
DOLS is implemented to treat the non-stationarity of the variables appropriately. 
This approach has been used extensively within the B-S literature. Following Stock 
& Watson's (1993) work introducing the approach, Kao & Chiang (2001) showed 
that DOLS estimates have a smaller bias in finite samples than POLS and fully 
modified OLS. Similarly to Section 4.6.1, one lag and one lead are used such that 
𝑎 = 𝑏 = 1 in equation 4.4. The main findings are robust to an increased number of 
leads and lags. Time fixed effects are excluded in the model, as these were observed 
to have little effect on the results. Furthermore, unlike in Gubler & Sax (2011), where 
time fixed effects were critical, my dependent variable is calculated relative to the US 
dollar.  
 
Having established the existence of panel cointegration in the previous section, I 
interpret 𝛽 in equation 4.1 as the long-run coefficient. In addition to estimating this 
long-run relationship, I include an error correction specification to capture the short-
run dynamic adjustment of the real exchange rate towards equilibrium. The error 
correction model (ECM) has the following form:  
∆𝑙𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾 + 𝜑𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡−1 + ∑ ∆𝑙𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡−𝑗𝜙𝑗
𝑗=1
+ ∑ ∆𝑋𝑖𝑡−𝑗𝜔𝑗
1
𝑗=0
+ 𝜈𝑖𝑡 (4.4) 
where  
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𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡 = 𝑙𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 − 𝑋𝑖𝑡 𝛽 − 𝛼𝑖 − ∑ ∆𝑋𝑖𝑡+𝑘𝜃
1
𝑘=−1
 (4.5) 
and 𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡 is estimated as the residuals of equation 4.1.   
 
The empirical results are shown in Table 4.13 below. In almost all specifications and 
subsamples, I find a negative coefficient that is significantly different from zero at the 
5% level on the per capita oil rents variable. A larger coefficient, in absolute value, is 
observed in the case of OPEC countries. This result corroborates the B-S hypothesis 
in the sample and suggests that the impact of oil rents per capita on real exchange 
rate is greater in OPEC countries than the rest of the world. Since these long-run 
coefficients have an elasticity interpretation, a 10% increase in oil rents per capita in 
D10 countries leads to a 1.2% appreciation of the currency based on column (8). In 
the case of OPEC countries, column (12) implies that a 10% increase in per capita oil 
rents implies approximately 11.5% appreciation of the currency. However, results for 
OPEC countries could be spurious as I failed to establish cointegration in the earlier 
section.  
 
Having observed a stable cointegrating relationship between the real exchange rate 
and oil rents as a percentage of GDP, all model specifications were re-estimated using 
𝑙𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠_𝑟𝑔𝑑𝑝 instead of 𝑙𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠_𝑝𝑐. The results, shown in Table 4.14, are 
puzzling in some respects but unsurprising in others. The speed of adjustment 
coefficient is estimated to be negative and statistically significant at the 1% level 
across the board. This suggests a cointegrating relationship in all specifications and 
subsamples. Although qualitatively identical with 𝑙𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠_𝑝𝑐 results, these results 
generally indicate a slower adjustment—a longer half lifetime. With regard to long-
run coefficients, oil rents appear to play a much more muted role in non-D10 and 
non-OPEC countries as indicated by columns (1) through (4) of the table. However, 
long-run coefficients on oil rents become highly statistically significant when I focus 
on D10 and OPEC countries. This is demonstrated by columns (6) through (12). To 
refrain from placing too much weight on point estimates, the confidence interval of 
the coefficient estimate for 𝑙𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠_𝑟𝑔𝑑𝑝 was [0.13, 1.25] in column (6), [0.12, 1.15] 
in column (8), and [4.09, 4.95] in column (12). These suggest that the coefficients are 
precisely estimated with reasonable standard errors and hypothesis testing is 
meaningful.  
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Perhaps the most puzzling outcome of this exercise was the change in sign of the 
estimated long-run coefficient on oil rents when switching from oil rents per capita 
to oil rents as a percentage of GDP. Moreover, the estimated positive coefficients 
have a much larger magnitude suggesting that the real exchange rate is highly 
sensitive to movements in rents as a share of GDP. Based on column (8) of Table 
4.14, a 1% increase in oil rents’ share in GDP of D10 countries is expected to lead to 
a 0.6% increase in the real exchange rate. This impact is amplified in OPEC countries 
and as shown in column (12) of the same table, a 1% increase in 𝑙𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠_𝑟𝑔𝑑𝑝 is 
expected to cause a 4.5% depreciation of the currency. This movement is in the 
opposite direction of theoretical predictions as well as empirical findings, including 
those in this chapter. Interestingly, however, the sign change on oil rents is 
accompanied—and to some extent compensated for—by a sign change on oil price 
and GDP per capita variables. The negative coefficient on 𝑙𝑏𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 highlights the 
linkages between the global oil price and currencies of countries that rely on their oil 
exports. This long-run relationship appears important for all countries in the sample 
and not only those in D10 and OPEC. By way of example, column (8) suggests that 
a 10% increase in the price of oil is expected to cause a 3% appreciation of the current 
in D10 countries. This pattern is not observed for real GDP per capita. In non-OPEC 
countries, an increase in 𝑙𝑟𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑐ℎ is expected to have a positive impact on the real 
exchange rate—a depreciation. This is reversed in OPEC countries such that an 
increase in real per capita GDP leads to an appreciation of the currency. Lastly, the 
short-run adjustment terms show a clear decreasing pattern with increasing 
specification size in OPEC countries—see columns (9) through (12) of Table 4.14. 
This signals that the equilibrium adjustment of the real exchange rate may have 
transmissions mechanisms through variables in addition to oil rents. This is hardly 
surprising given the complexity of real exchange rate dynamics and strong linkages 
within an economy but differs from what I observed in Table 4.13 when per capita 
oil rents were used. 
 
 
 
  
1
7
3
 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
loilrents_pc 
-0.055*** -0.020 -0.067** -0.066** -0.068*** -0.007 -0.142*** -0.121*** -0.407*** -0.956*** -1.190*** -1.157*** 
(0.001) (0.454) (0.013) (0.012) (0.007) (0.868) (0.001) (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
lbrent — 
-0.089** -0.053 -0.071** 
— 
-0.177*** -0.048 -0.071 
— 
0.930*** 1.051*** 1.014*** 
(0.022) (0.151) (0.049) (0.004) (0.424) (0.235) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
lrgdpch — — 
0.272*** 0.126** 
— — 
0.380*** 0.248*** 
— — 
0.506 0.582 
(0.000) (0.015) (0.000) (0.001) (0.173) (0.106) 
lopenc — — — 
0.005*** 
— — — 
0.004*** 
— — — 
-0.002 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.265) 
Speed of 
adjustment 
-0.238*** -0.236*** -0.249*** -0.242*** -0.254*** -0.267*** -0.281*** -0.272*** -0.111** -0.132** -0.108** -0.108** 
Half 
Lifetime 
(years) 
2.55 2.58 2.42 2.50 2.37 2.23 2.10 2.18 5.87 4.91 6.07 6.05 
Subsample World excl. OPEC D10 excl. OPEC OPEC 
N 32 16 10 
Number of 
observations 
819 415 245 
Table 4.13. Dynamic OLS results using oil rents per capita. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Columns (1) through (4) use the 
whole sample excluding OPEC countries, whereas columns (5) through (8) restrict it to D10 countries excluding OPEC, and (9) through (12) to OPEC countries only. In each 
of these cases, the model specification becomes increasingly more general such that columns (1), (5), and (9) are based a DOLS regression of real exchange rate on oil rents 
per capita. In turn, columns (2), (6), and (10) come from regressions with oil rents per capita and oil price as explanatory variables. 
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Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
loilrents_rgdp 
-0.205 0.338 0.279 0.441** -0.128 0.691** 0.566** 0.634** 3.297*** 4.701*** 4.561*** 4.524*** 
(0.228) (0.122) (0.193) (0.033) (0.470) (0.016) (0.045) (0.016) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
lbrent — 
-0.168*** -0.187*** -0.210*** 
— 
-0.296*** -0.314*** -0.309*** 
— 
-0.923*** -0.789*** -0.794*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
lrgdpch — — 
0.163*** 0.032 
— — 
0.201*** 0.098* 
— — 
-0.472** -0.359** 
(0.000) (0.477) (0.000) (0.096) (0.014) (0.025) 
lopenc — — — 
0.005*** 
— — — 
0.005*** 
— — — 
-0.002** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.012) 
Speed of 
adjustment 
-0.211*** -0.207*** -0.209*** -0.203*** -0.220*** -0.226*** -0.234*** -0.225*** -0.107*** -0.263*** -0.227*** -0.239*** 
Half 
Lifetime 
(years) 
2.92 2.99 2.95 3.06 2.80 2.70 2.60 2.72 6.11 2.27 2.70 2.54 
Subsample World excl. OPEC D10 excl. OPEC OPEC 
N 32 16 10 
Number of 
observations 
819 415 245 
Table 4.14. Dynamic OLS results using oil rents as a percentage of GDP. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Columns (1) through 
(4) use the whole sample excluding OPEC countries, whereas columns (5) through (8) restrict it to D10 countries excluding OPEC, and (9) through (12) to OPEC countries 
only. In each of these cases, the model specification becomes increasingly more general such that columns (1), (5), and (9) are based a DOLS regression of real exchange rate 
on oil rents per capita. In turn, columns (2), (6), and (10) come from regressions with oil rents per capita and oil price as explanatory variables. 
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4.6.3 Mean Group and Pooled Mean Group Results 
In addition to the DOLS approach, I re-estimated the ECM using Mean Group and 
Pooled Mean Group estimators. Although not very common within the B-S 
literature, these estimators exploit the large-N, large-T panel structure effectively. The 
general model has the following form:  
 
𝑙𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝜆𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡−𝑗
𝑝
𝑗=1
+ ∑ 𝜂′𝑖𝑗𝑥𝑖,𝑡−𝑗
𝑞
𝑗=0
+ 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (4.6) 
 
where 𝑥𝑖𝑡 is a 𝑘 × 1 vector of explanatory variables for group 𝑖, 𝜇𝑖 represent country 
fixed effects, 𝜆𝑖𝑗 are scalar coefficients, 𝜂𝑖𝑗 is a 𝑘 × 1 vector of coefficients to be 
estimated, and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 denote the error term. If the variables are 𝐼(1) and cointegrated, 
they respond to deviation from the long-run equilibrium. Therefore, it is helpful to 
reparametrise this general model into the ECM form as follows:  
∆𝑙𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑𝑖(𝑙𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝛽𝑖
′𝑋𝑖𝑡) + ∑ 𝜆𝑖𝑗
∗ ∆𝑙𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡−𝑗
𝑝−1
𝑗=1
+ ∑ 𝜂𝑖𝑗
′∗∆𝑋𝑖,𝑡−𝑗
𝑞−1
𝑗=0
+ 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (4.7) 
where 𝜑𝑖 = −(1 − ∑ 𝜆𝑖𝑗)
𝑝
𝑗=1 , 𝛽𝑖 = ∑ 𝜂𝑖𝑗/(1 − ∑ 𝜆𝑖𝑘)𝑘
𝑞
𝑗=0 , 𝜆𝑖𝑗
∗ = − ∑ 𝜆𝑖𝑚
𝑝
𝑚=𝑗+1  
with 𝑗 = 1, 2, … , 𝑝 − 1, and 𝜂𝑖𝑗
∗ = − ∑ 𝜂𝑖𝑚
𝑞
𝑚=𝑗+1 , with 𝑗 = 1, 2, … , 𝑞 − 1. 
 
 
In most cases, including mine, the parameter of interest is 𝜑𝑖, which represents the 
speed of adjustment of the real exchange rate towards the long-run equilibrium. As 
in all ECM parameterisations, if a long-run relationship exists among the variables, 
the speed of adjustment is expected to be negative and significant. The parameter 
vector 𝛽𝑖
′ contains the long-run coefficients and has an important interpretation in 
this context.  
 
As noted by Frank & Blackburne (2007), when 𝑁 and 𝑇 are large, equation 4.7 can 
be estimated by a few methods; the spectrum of estimators runs from fixed effects 
estimation to Pesaran & Smith's (1995) Mean Group estimator. If the former is 
implemented, the intercepts are allowed to vary across panel units, but not the slope 
coefficients. FE is consistent only if the slope parameters are homogeneous. If they 
are not, the MG estimator, which is on the other end of the spectrum, should be used. 
MG estimates a separate set of coefficients for each panel unit and calculates the 
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arithmetic average. This allows all parameters, including error variances, to vary 
across countries. In this context, this approach has an a priori advantage, since the 
countries in the dataset have some heterogeneous characteristics. A hybrid approach 
between these two estimators is Pesaran et al.'s (1999) Pooled Mean Group estimator, 
which pools the long-run coefficients across panels, while averaging intercepts, short-
run coefficients and error variances. In order to select the appropriate approach 
between MG and PMG estimator, I use a traditional Hausman test. If the null 
hypothesis that the two sets of coefficients are not systematically different is not 
rejected, PMG is preferred as a more efficient estimator. Otherwise, MG is more 
appropriate.  
 
Before turning to empirical results, it is helpful to form ex ante expectations about the 
choice of estimator. As hinted at earlier, a heterogenous group of countries would 
warrant the use of the MG estimator. However, we can observe efficiency gains by 
using the PMG estimator when dealing with countries with common long-run 
coefficients. Given the wide country coverage in my global dataset, it would be 
appropriate to expect different long-run coefficients. However, it is conceivable that 
smaller subsamples, such as OPEC countries, share a common long-run relationship, 
even if their short-run dynamics differ. The same could be said for D10 countries, 
since the oil sector forms a non-negligible part of their economies. In general, the link 
between oil rents and real exchange rates is my focus, so a different long-run 
relationship between per capita GDP and the real exchange rate in a given group of 
countries is of little interest. To investigate this formally, I opted for a standard 
Hausman test approach with the expectation that subsamples used in the estimation 
are likely to share a common long-run coefficient. Table 4.15 shows the results from 
the models that have been selected by the test.28  
 
Focussing on columns (1) through (4), I observe negative and statistically significant 
speed of adjustment coefficients across all specifications and estimation techniques. 
These coefficients as well as others in the table are estimated precisely with narrow 
confidence intervals. For example, the confidence interval around the speed of 
adjustment terms in columns (5) and (6) were [-0.35, -0.14] and [-0.33, -0.14] 
                                                 
 
28 Note that Azerbaijan, Romania, and Sudan were dropped from the sample for this analysis due to 
their short time series.  
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respectively. These findings point to the existence of a cointegrating relationship in 
each specification and provide a robustness check to the cointegration tests discussed 
in Section 4.6.1. Columns (1) and (2) show PMG results, since relevant Hausman 
tests failed to reject the null hypothesis that MG and PMG results are not 
systematically different. The estimated long-run coefficients on oil rents per capita 
and oil price variables are also significantly different from zero in these columns. 
Using column (1) as an example, I find that a 10% increase in oil rents per capita 
leads to a two percent appreciation of the currency in the long run. This provides 
evidence for the B-S hypothesis, but the effect is not very pronounced. Turning to 
column (2) changes this interpretation. When the per barrel oil price was also 
considered, the long-run coefficient on per capita oil rents became positive. This 
suggests that a 10% increase in oil rents per capita is expected to cause a 2% 
depreciation in the real exchange rate, which would be compensated for by the 
negative long-run coefficient estimated on the price of oil. Given the coefficients, the 
estimated effect of a 10% oil price rise would be a 4% appreciation of the currency.  
 
  
1
7
8
 
 
Dependent 
variable: Δlrer 
            
Specifications (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Hausman (MG 
vs PMG) 
PMG PMG DOLS DOLS PMG PMG DOLS DOLS PMG PMG DOLS DOLS 
Speed of 
adjustment 
-0.220*** -0.245*** -0.238*** -0.236*** -0.246*** -0.237*** -0.254*** -0.267*** -0.168*** -0.225*** -0.111** -0.132** 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.047) (0.023) 
Long-run 
Coefficients 
                        
loilrents_pc 
-0.162*** 0.204*** -0.055*** -0.020 -0.158*** -0.147*** -0.068*** -0.007 -0.205*** 0.113 -0.407*** -0.956*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.454) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.868) (0.000) (0.217) (0.000) (0.000) 
lbrent — 
-0.407*** 
— 
-0.089** 
— 
-0.020 
— 
-0.177*** 
— 
-0.481** 
— 
0.930*** 
(0.000) (0.022) (0.748) (0.004) (0.002) (0.000) 
Half Lifetime 
(years) 
2.8 2.5 2.55 2.58 2.5 2.6 2.37 2.23 3.8 2.7 5.87 4.91 
Subsample World excl. OPEC D10 excl. OPEC OPEC 
N 29 14 10 
N x T 775 819 392 415 265 245 
Log likelihood 725.3 758.6 437.5 439.1 331.5 341.9 431.4 431.7 196.4 204.0 415.8 427.7 
 
Table 4.15. Error correction model estimation results using oil rents per capita. P-values in parentheses. Hausman test was used to determine whether mean group or pooled 
mean group results should be reported. Half lifetime was calculated as ln(0.5) / ln (1 + 𝜑). DOLS results reproduced from Table 4.13 for ease of comparison here. *, **, and 
*** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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Half-life, calculated as ln(0.5) / ln (1 + 𝜑), was approximately 2.5 years. This implies 
that we may expect the real exchange rate to close half of the gap between its current 
level and the long-run equilibrium in a 2.5-year period. DOLS results reproduced 
here are a subset of those presented in Table 4.13 and are shown for ease of 
comparison. Relative to PMG results, DOLS estimates of the long-run parameters 
are smaller in absolute value. However, the speed of adjustment as well as half-life 
figures are similar in magnitude. This pattern holds for the smaller D10 subsample, 
whose results are shown in columns (5) through (8). PMG estimates for D10 
countries excluding OPEC members generally showed a slightly quicker speed of 
adjustment: half-lives were calculated as 2.8 and 2.5 years in columns (1) and (5), 
respectively. This is in agreement with DOLS results, where I observed the same 
pattern in columns (3) and (7) as well as (4) and (8). 
 
Columns (3) and (4) and, to a lesser extent, columns (1) and (2) viewed as pairs signal 
that, for non-OPEC countries, the inclusion of oil price in the specification has 
implications for the sign, size, and statistical significance of the coefficient estimate 
on oil rents per capita. More specifically, including the Brent price appears to increase 
the standard error and therefore reduce significance of oil rents. This is demonstrated 
by the confidence intervals corresponding to the point estimates in question. The 
confidence interval for the coefficient on 𝑙𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠_𝑝𝑐 in column (3) was 
[-0.09, -0.02], whereas that in column (4) was [-0.07, 0.03]. This pattern is less clear 
in D10 and OPEC countries where oil rents retain their importance in larger model 
specifications. Even so, column (10) suggests that only the oil price is cointegrated 
with the real exchange rate, since the long-run coefficient on oil rents per capita is 
not significant and that on Brent is. This is further evidenced by columns (4) and (8), 
since oil rents lose their statistical significance when Brent is added to the model. 
Recall from columns (9) through (12) of Table 4.13, however, that in OPEC 
countries, oil rents per capita appeared to matter independently of model 
specification. Having observed this, investigating the behaviour in non-OPEC and 
non-D10 countries could shed light on the underlying mechanism of this pattern. 
Table 4.16 shows DOLS estimation results of the ECM using oil rents per capita. The 
evidence here, especially in columns (14) and (15), points to the absence of a long-
run relationship between oil rents or oil price and the real exchange rate. Real GDP 
per capita and openness to trade appear to matter more in this set of countries, since 
there is no strong link between these countries’ economies and the oil sector. In 
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practice, this is represented by a cointegrating relationship between the real exchange 
rate and real GDP per capita or openness to trade as opposed to oil rents or Brent.  
 
Variables (13) (14) (15) (16) 
loilrents_pc 
-0.040* -0.029 -0.026 -0.058* 
(0.062) (0.348) (0.387) (0.064) 
lbrent — 
-0.006 -0.018 -0.046 
(0.890) (0.680) (0.250) 
lrgdpch — — 
0.220*** -0.044 
(0.001) (0.568) 
openc — — — 
0.008* 
(0.060) 
Speed of adjustment -0.213*** -0.211*** -0.203*** -0.183*** 
Half Lifetime (years) 2.90 2.92 3.06 3.43 
Subsample World excl. D10 
N 16 
Number of observations 404 
 
Table 4.16. Dynamic OLS error correction results using oil rents per capita. P-values in parentheses. 
Half lifetime was calculated as ln(0.5) / ln (1 + 𝜑). *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Lastly, I move on to OPEC output shown in columns (9) through (12) of Table 4.15. 
I interpret these coefficients cautiously, keeping in mind the discussion of OPEC 
countries in Section 4.6.1 on cointegration testing. Firstly, I note that the highly 
significant speed of adjustment coefficients contradicts some of the earlier findings 
using Pedroni and Westerlund panel cointegration tests: both PMG and DOLS ECM 
estimations point to the existence of a cointegrating relationship. The speed of 
adjustment coefficients are smaller, in absolute value, than in the rest of the sample 
and imply a half-life of about five to six years when using DOLS and three to four 
years when using PMG. Secondly, despite a smaller—in absolute value—speed of 
adjustment coefficient, I observe a larger—again in absolute value—long-run 
coefficient on per capita oil rents. DOLS results in column (12) imply a nearly unit-
elastic long-run coefficients, such that a 10% increase in oil rents per capita leads to 
approximately 10% appreciation of the currency. In addition to being much smaller 
than DOLS long-run coefficient estimates, PMG estimates are more sensitive to 
model specification. Even so, the significant coefficient in column (9) implies a 2% 
appreciation of the currency as a result of a 10% increase in oil rents per capita. As a 
final comment, a likely cause for the sensitivity to model specification observed here 
is data availability and the fact that the number of panels is small for both OPEC and 
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D10 excluding OPEC subsamples. Given the asymptotic properties of the PMG 
estimator and the requirement for both 𝑁 and 𝑇 → ∞, I acknowledge the unreliability 
of these estimates and put more weight on DOLS results. In this sense, I include 
PMG results as a robustness check as opposed to a conclusive estimate. 
 
In the output Table 4.15 above, I have opted for smaller model specifications 
consisting of per capita oil rents and oil price. This was to focus on the main message, 
since including real GDP per capita and openness to trade did not lead to a 
previously-unobserved outcome. To see this, I turn to Table 4.17 below, which 
summarises the PMG results estimated using the largest subsample. Note that, as 
above, the Hausman test was used to determine whether MG or PMG is more 
appropriate. 
 
Dependent variable: Δlrer     
Specifications (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Hausman (MG vs PMG) PMG PMG PMG PMG 
Speed of adjustment 
-0.220*** -0.245*** -0.213*** -0.167*** 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Long-run Coefficients     
loilrents_pc 
-0.162*** 0.204*** -0.089*** 0.122*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
lbrent — 
-0.407*** -0.075** -0.172*** 
(0.000) (0.048) (0.000) 
lrgdpch — — 
-0.188** -0.595*** 
(0.023) (0.000) 
lopenc — — — 
1.252*** 
(0.000) 
Half Lifetime (years) 2.8 2.5 2.9 3.8 
Subsample World excl. OPEC 
N 29 
N x T 775 
Log likelihood 725.345 758.594 835.311 1004.21 
 
Table 4.17. Pooled Mean Group error correction results using oil rents per capita. P-values in 
parentheses. Half lifetime was calculated as ln(0.5) / ln (1 + 𝜑). *, **, and *** denote significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Although I observe negative and statistically significant speed of adjustment 
coefficients across all specifications, long-run coefficients behave unexpectedly in 
columns (2) and (4). More specifically, 𝑙𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠_𝑝𝑐 has a positive coefficient that 
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cannot simply be explained by model specification. Interestingly, the coefficient in 
question becomes negative when real GDP per capita is added as an additional 
explanatory variable but reverts to positive when openness to trade is introduced. To 
investigate this further, I analysed output from other subsamples and a pattern 
emerged. There is some evidence that the coefficients on real GDP per capita and 
openness to trade are heterogeneous across countries unlike oil rents per capita and 
oil price, particularly in D10 and OPEC countries. Estimating a simple specification 
with GDP per capita as the only explanatory variable confirmed this observation. 
The inverted sign on oil rents can, at least partially, be explained by the link between 
𝑙𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠_𝑝𝑐 and 𝑙𝑟𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑐ℎ, especially in D10 and OPEC countries. Based on 
Balassa's (1964) original work and the findings elsewhere in this chapter, I would 
expect a negative and significant coefficient. Given that the speed of adjustment 
coefficient is negative and significantly different from zero, this behaviour could be 
attributed to the correlation between the three explanatory variables in specification 
(3) in Table Table 4.17. Calculating a simple correlation matrix shows that the 
correlation between 𝑙𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠_𝑝𝑐 and 𝑙𝑟𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑐ℎ is approximately 0.5, which appears 
to be sufficiently high to cause misleading results. Due to these observations, I have 
opted for smaller model specifications.  
 
Having concluded the analysis using one potential measure for oil rents, oil rents per 
capita, I now turn to the alternative measure, oil rents as a percentage of GDP. Table 
4.18 was produced as an analogue to Table 4.15 and provides a summary of the ECM 
results using 𝑙𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠_𝑟𝑔𝑑𝑝. As observed earlier, the short-run adjustment 
coefficient is negative and significantly different from zero across all subsamples and 
model specifications. Estimated half lifetime durations are also similar to those 
calculated for per capita oil rents, although the adjustment appears slower here. Sign-
switching of the oil rents variable observed earlier applies here too: columns (1) and 
(2), columns (5) and (6), and columns (9) and (10) demonstrate this. Unlike the results 
so far, PMG estimates are more robust to increasing model specification here than 
DOLS in non-OPEC countries. As an example, in the largest subsample with all 
countries excluding OPEC, PMG coefficient estimates on oil rents as a percentage of 
GDP remain significantly different from zero—columns (1) and (2)—whereas those 
indicated by DOLS do not—columns (3) and (4). Turning now to columns (9) 
through (12), the two estimation techniques point to the same relationship between 
rents and real exchange rates in OPEC countries. There is a short-run adjustment in 
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the real exchange rate when oil rents’ share of GDP changes. As in Section 4.6.2, the 
long-run coefficient on oil rents is not negative as expected. Based on this outcome, 
I find evidence of a long-run link between real exchange rates and oil rents but in the 
opposite direction of the theoretical prediction. I investigate this further in this section 
and the next. To ensure the findings in this section did not suffer from empirical 
modelling inaccuracies, I reviewed not only the point estimates but also confidence 
intervals and other estimation characteristics. The changing parameter estimates and 
statistical significance are due to different coefficients and not a side effect of model 
choice.  
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Dependent 
variable: Δlrer 
            
Specifications (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Hausman  
(MG vs PMG) 
PMG PMG DOLS DOLS PMG PMG DOLS DOLS PMG PMG DOLS DOLS 
Speed of 
adjustment 
-0.157*** -0.148*** -0.211*** -0.207*** -0.181*** -0.143*** -0.220*** -0.226*** -0.133*** -0.237*** -0.107*** -0.263*** 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.007) (0.000) 
Long-run 
Coefficients 
            
loilrents_rgdp 
-0.449** 8.136*** -0.205 0.338 -0.506*** 1.441*** -0.128 0.691** -1.883*** 4.099*** 3.297*** 4.701*** 
(0.020) (0.000) (0.228) (0.122) (0.010) (0.000) (0.470) (0.016) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
lbrent — 
-0.244*** 
— 
-0.168*** 
— 
-0.365*** 
— 
-0.296*** 
— 
-0.822*** 
— 
-0.923*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Half Lifetime 
(years) 
4.1 4.3 2.92 2.99 3.5 4.5 2.80 2.70 4.9 2.6 6.11 2.27 
Subsample World excl. OPEC D10 excl. OPEC OPEC 
N 29 14 10 
N x T 775 819 392 415 265 245 
Log likelihood 725.3 758.6 437.5 439.1 331.5 341.9 431.4 431.7 196.4 204.0 415.8 427.7 
 
Table 4.18. Error correction model estimation results using oil rents as a percentage of GDP. P-values in parentheses. Hausman test was used to determine whether mean 
group or pooled mean group results should be reported. Half lifetime was calculated as ln(0.5) / ln (1 + 𝜑). DOLS results reproduced from Table 4.13 for ease of comparison 
here. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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In an effort to disentangle the observation I have made here, I refocus attention to 
other subsamples. Further investigation of D10 countries excluding OPEC revealed 
that there is reason to believe real exchange rates react differently to changes in oil 
rents and other explanatory variables across countries. Table 4.19 corroborates this 
claim, since the Hausman test suggested systematic differences in coefficient 
estimates of MG and PMG for larger specifications shown in columns (3) and (4).  
 
Dependent variable: Δlrer     
Specifications (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Hausman (MG vs PMG) PMG PMG MG MG 
Speed of adjustment 
-0.181*** -0.143*** -0.483*** -0.515*** 
(0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) 
Long-run Coefficients     
loilrents_rgdp 
-0.506*** 1.441*** 3.095*** 2.345*** 
(0.010) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) 
lbrent — 
-0.365*** -0.465*** -0.485*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
lrgdpch — — 
0.286 0.667 
(0.326) (0.176) 
lopenc — — — 
0.296 
(0.297) 
Half Lifetime (years) 3.5 4.5 1.1 1.0 
Subsample D10 excl. OPEC 
N 14 
N x T 392 
Log likelihood 347.418 418.967 519.004 582.323 
 
Table 4.19. Mean Group and Pooled Mean Group error correction results using oil rents as a 
percentage of GDP. Half lifetime was calculated as ln(0.5) / ln (1 + 𝜑). *, **, and *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
The unexpected sign on oil rents in these countries could have a few explanations in 
line with the B-S hypothesis. First, although oil rents are important in D10 countries, 
they may not be the main driver of economic activity at least temporarily.29 Second, 
the share of rents may fall not because the productivity of the oil sector has declined 
but because other sectors have grown. If this secondary growth is not in a tradable 
sector, the importance of oil rents and exports could be masked by an increase in 
GDP in general. Although unlikely to be the case for all OPEC countries, recent years 
                                                 
 
29 Recall that D10 countries are those in which oil rents accounted for at least 10% of the country’s 
GDP in 2008.  
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have seen growth in sectors outside of oil in some of these countries. This highlights 
the difference between the two measures of oil rents used in this analysis. Oil rents 
per capita are not as sensitive to changes in the composition of the economy as oil 
rents as a percentage of GDP. It may, therefore, be the preferred measure if there is 
evidence for strong growth in non-oil activities in a group of countries. Based on 
columns (9) through (12) in Table Table 4.15 and Table Table 4.18, there is empirical 
evidence of this phenomenon in OPEC countries. This implies that parameter 
estimates based on 𝑙𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠_𝑟𝑔𝑑𝑝 measure more than the B-S effect. The next 
section focuses on OPEC countries to investigate the failure of B-S assumptions.  
4.6.4 Further Investigation of OPEC Countries 
The discussion in this section emphasises per capita oil rents, since Pedroni tests 
involving this variable did not find a cointegrating relationship between rents and real 
exchange rate. Westerlund tests of both oil rents variable found no cointegrating 
relationship as well, so reference is also made to oil rents as a percentage of GDP. To 
investigate the potential lack of a long-run relationship, I opted for country-by-
country cointegration tests based on the traditional Engle & Granger (1987) 
approach. As a part of this approach, I applied ADF tests on the residuals from static 
regressions of the real exchange rate on oil rents. Critical values for this test differ 
from the standard ADF test and are provided by MacKinnon (2010). Although the 
results are robust to lag length selection, optimal lag length was chosen according to 
Ng & Perron (1995). As shown in Table 4.20, cointegration was identified for only 
three countries at the 5% level and four countries at the 10% level.30 Further 
investigation revealed that real exchange rate and the oil price are not cointegrated 
either. Moreover, if oil price, oil rents, and the real exchange rate were used in the 
same long-run equation, there was no strong evidence for cointegration in these 
countries. 
  
                                                 
 
30 Ecuador was dropped from the sample due to its short time series. 
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Country 
Code 
Optimal  
Lag Length 
Maximum 
Lag Length 
Test 
statistic 
1% 
cr.value 
5% 
cr.value 
10% 
cr.value 
No of 
obs 
AGO 0 8 -1.60 -3.77 -3.517 -3.091 15 
ARE 5 8 -3.75** -3.77 -2.96 -2.489 15 
DZA 0 9 -1.81 -3.77 -3.273 -2.96 35 
IRQ 5 9 -3.52** -3.77 -2.988 -2.683 30 
LBY 0 8 -2.40 -3.77 -3.517 -3.091 15 
NGA 0 9 -2.56 -3.77 -3.373 -3.039 26 
QAT 6 8 -2.91* -3.77 -3.024 -2.482 15 
SAU 0 8 -2.83 -3.77 -3.517 -3.091 15 
VEN 3 8 -3.44** -3.77 -3.079 -2.574 12 
 
Table 4.20. Country-by-country cointegration tests for OPEC countries using oil rents per capita. 
Optimal lag length determined according to Ng and Perron (1995), and maximum lag length 
determined by Schwert criterion. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. 
 
One potential explanation for the difference in the exchange rate behaviour of OPEC 
countries from the other oil exporters in the sample could be linked to the countries’ 
currency regimes. Appreciation of the real exchange rate could be due to an 
appreciation of the nominal exchange rate or an increase in the price level. The latter 
change, when caused by an increase in productivity of tradable goods and services, 
is the mechanism behind the B-S hypothesis. Devereux (2014) noted that the nominal 
exchange rate fluctuations introduce noise into the estimation of the B-S effect as they 
tend to change more rapidly compared to the price level. In practice, for much of 
history, most OPEC countries did not have free floating currency regimes. Saudi 
Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates all peg their currencies to the US dollar 
and have done so throughout the estimation period. Similarly, Venezuela pegged 
their currency to the US dollar in 2003, and Ecuador adopted the US dollar as an 
official currency in 2000 after almost two decades of a crawling peg. Iraq’s currency 
regime is a managed float, but the official rate has been pegged to the US dollar at 
various times. Lastly, Libya’s currency is pegged to a composite exchange rate 
anchor.31 In theory, for a pegged currency, it should be easier to separate changes in 
the real exchange rate attributable to adjustments in the price level versus the nominal 
exchange rate, since the numerator of the real exchange rate is fixed. It is possible 
that the long-run relationship found in D10 minus OPEC countries is driven by the 
nominal exchange rate rather than the price level adjustments, and the absence of the 
                                                 
 
31 The discussion here has benefited from Reinhart & Rogoff's (2004) exchange rate classification.  
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B-S mechanism is just more prominent in OPEC countries. This is exacerbated by 
the fact that the nominal exchange rate in some non-OPEC countries—Russia, for 
example—is likely to be highly responsive to oil price fluctuations. This phenomenon 
would be most evident in countries where oil represents a large fraction of exports. 
As an example, despite its short time series, Sudan was identified to have a 
cointegrating relationship between its real exchange rate and oil rents. Considering 
85% of Sudan’s 2009 exports consisted of crude oil and refined petroleum products,32 
it is possible that the relationship detected earlier is not driven by the B-S mechanism 
but by the nominal appreciation of the currency. This is more likely to occur for oil 
than other tradable commodities, since oil has a price inelastic demand in the short- 
to medium-run.  
 
To test the proposition above, Westerlund cointegration tests have been conducted 
using log of nominal exchange rate, 𝑙𝑥𝑟𝑎𝑡, and log of PPP price level, 𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑝, as 
dependent variables and oil rents per capita or oil rents as a percentage of GDP as an 
independent variable. However, the results presented in Table 4.21 do not support 
this proposition. There is strong evidence of cointegration between both the nominal 
exchange rate and the price level and oil sector productivity—measured by both oil 
rents variables—in non-OPEC countries. Neither of the two dependent variables are 
cointegrated with either of the oil rents measures in OPEC countries.  
  
                                                 
 
32 According to The Atlas of Economic Complexity, http://atlas.cid.harvard.edu/ 
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Dependent 
variable 
Independent 
variable 
 (1) (2) (3) 
lxrat 
loilrents_pc 
Pt 
-16.64*** -30.30*** 1.17 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.122) 
Pa 
-6.00*** -10.28*** 1.14 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.873) 
loilrents_rgdp 
Pt 
-18.59*** 6.54*** 2.97 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.999) 
Pa 
-7.14*** 1.79** 2.07 
(0.000) (0.037) (0.981) 
lppp 
loilrents_pc 
Pt 
-19.10*** -44.88*** 0.19 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.426) 
Pa 
-7.82*** -18.32*** 1.28 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.900) 
loilrents_rgdp 
Pt 
-24.88*** -14.80*** 3.94 
(0.000) (0.000) (1.000) 
Pa 
-10.72*** -5.37*** 2.64 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.996) 
        
Subsample  World-OPEC D10-OPEC OPEC 
N  30 15 10 
Lags & leads   1 1 1 
 
Table 4.21. Westerlund (2007) cointegration tests for nominal exchange rate, 𝑙𝑥𝑟𝑎𝑡, and price level, 
𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑝. P-values in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. H0: No cointegration in any panel (𝜙𝑖 = 0 ∀𝑖; Ha: Cointegration in the panel as a whole 
(𝜙𝑖 < 0 ∀𝑖). Two countries, Romania and Sudan, were dropped for these tests due to their short time 
series.  
 
Another potential explanation for this observation is that some assumptions of the B-
S hypothesis may not hold in practice in the context of OPEC countries. More 
specifically, the price level in these countries may not be adjusting as expected when 
productivity in a tradable sector rises. In fact, most OPEC countries appear to have 
a lower price level than non-OPEC countries with similar per capita income levels. 
Figure 4.18 provides evidence for this. Of particular interest are Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
UAE, and Libya, which have lower-than-expected price levels. These countries also 
share migration policies that allow large numbers of temporary low-wage workers 
(De Bel-Air, 2014c, 2014b, 2014a).33 Given the migration policies in these countries 
                                                 
 
33 For Libya, we are referring to the pre-civil war. "Migrant workers make up the majority of the 
population in Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (and more than 80 per cent of 
the population in Qatar and the United Arab Emirates); while in construction and domestic work in 
Gulf States, migrant workers make up over 95 per cent of the work force." (Labour Migration (Arab 
 190 
and how actively local and migrant workers are differentiated, these migrants often 
receive much lower wages and depress the overall wage level in the country. In many 
ways, migrant and local workers’ wages do not affect each other. These workers 
could lower productivity in the non-tradable sector relative to a non-OPEC country 
like Norway as well. This dynamic could effectively undermine the B-S assumption 
that workers can freely move between tradable and non-tradable sector. In such a 
case, wages in the non-tradable sector would not adjust, or adjust only partially, to 
wage fluctuations in the tradable sector and keep the overall price level low.  
 
 
Figure 4.18. Natural log of price level of consumption against per capita income in OPEC and non-
OPEC countries in 2008. 
 
This observation in conjunction with the shortcomings of the dataset and power 
limitations of individual cointegration tests meant that, in principle, it is difficult to 
reject the null of no cointegration for an individual country even when behaviour 
does follow the B-S hypothesis. When taken as a panel, cointegration could still be 
                                                 
 
States), International Labor Organization, Accessed 08/04/2017, 
http://www.ilo.org/beirut/areasofwork/labour-migration/lang--en/index.htm)). 
 191 
rejected when countries exhibit different behaviour, which appears to be the case for 
OPEC. 
4.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I attempted to identify whether changes in oil sector productivity can 
explain fluctuations of the real exchange rate in oil-exporting countries. This could, 
in turn, explain whether the countries in my dataset are affected by the Dutch disease 
and shed light on the wider resource curse theme. The analysis was based on a unique 
dataset that allowed me to calculate profits made in the oil sector in a large number 
of countries over a relatively long period. This enabled me to target increases in the 
productivity of the oil sector without having to use noisier traditional measures, such 
as GDP, as a proxy for productivity. Identifying such an impact carries importance 
for policy-making, especially in developed and developing countries as noted by 
Chen & Rogoff (2002).  
 
I found that the B-S mechanism holds in some oil-exporting countries but not all. For 
most countries, the relationship is non-negligible in size and statistically significant. 
Surprisingly, countries that are not OPEC members showed a particularly significant 
link between their real exchange rates and oil rents. Even so, the largest observed 
effect was for OPEC countries: nearly 12% appreciation in the real exchange rate in 
response to a 10% increase in oil sector productivity measured as oil rents per capita. 
Oil prices were identified as another covariate with coefficients of a similar size and 
sign.  
 
Two measures of oil rents were captured throughout the analysis and discussion as a 
robustness check and to discern whether oil rents are expected to have a greater 
impact on the real exchange rate in countries where the oil sector constitutes a larger 
share of GDP. There was some evidence towards this, especially since oil rents as a 
percentage of GDP were cointegrated with the real exchange rate in OPEC countries, 
whereas oil rents per capita were not. Both measures indicated an ambiguous 
relationship in OPEC countries with some coefficient estimates having an 
unexpected sign. In general, oil rents as a percentage of GDP is preferable to oil rents 
per capita, since the latter does not consider the size of the oil sector within the 
economy. By way of example, I would expect a one-dollar increase in oil rents to 
have a larger impact in Kuwait than in Australia. Further analysis on OPEC 
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countries revealed no link between oil rents and the nominal exchange rate or the 
price level. Sections 4.6.2 through 4.6.4 have discussed potential explanations for this 
unexpected result. I found some evidence, as in Korhonen & Juurikkala (2009), that 
the real oil price has an impact on the real exchange rate. In practice, at least one 
assumption of the B-S hypothesis appears to fail in some OPEC countries due to the 
lack of free movement of labour between tradable and non-tradable sectors.  
 
Overall, I find evidence for the B-S hypothesis in most oil-exporting countries. 
Further, the larger the share of GDP oil sector accounts for, the larger the impact of 
oil rents on the real exchange rate is expected to be. I also identified patterns that 
contradict this, which suggests other potential explanations of resource curse should 
be considered. In this sense, my results are consistent with Van der Ploeg (2011), who 
found that although the B-S mechanism is responsible for the resource curse to a 
certain extent, the main contributors are corruption, low quality of institutions, and 
underdeveloped financial systems that fail to mitigate the high volatility of 
commodity prices. Future work in this context would benefit from a larger dataset, 
especially in the time dimension.  
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4.8 Chapter Appendix 
ISO-
code 
0 lags 1 lags 2 lags 0 lags 1 lags 2 lags 
without trend with trend 
p-value n p-value n p-value n p-value n p-value n p-value n 
AGO 0.715 23 0.845 22 0.923 21 0.671 23 0.683 22 0.895 21 
ARE 0.263 23 0.245 22 0.402 21 0.509 23 0.415 22 0.722 21 
ARG 0.585 17 0.528 16 0.818 15 0.083 17 0.007 16 0.431 15 
AUS 0.000 36 0.175 35 0.325 34 0.000 36 0.252 35 0.402 34 
AZE 0.683 7 0.984 5 1.000 3 0.077 7 0.943 5 1.000 3 
BRA 0.484 16 0.384 15 0.463 14 0.335 16 0.012 15 0.310 14 
BRN 0.543 35 0.524 34 0.550 33 0.832 35 0.779 34 0.854 33 
CAN 0.179 20 0.991 16 0.842 12 0.304 20 0.996 16 0.980 12 
CHN 0.644 12 0.183 11 0.624 10 0.082 12 0.245 11 0.781 10 
COG 0.006 32 0.056 31 0.329 30 0.052 32 0.212 31 0.661 30 
COL 0.233 23 0.577 22 0.770 21 0.254 23 0.394 22 0.835 21 
DNK 0.406 30 0.009 29 0.491 28 0.017 30 0.000 29 0.125 28 
DZA 0.293 44 0.345 43 0.313 42 0.628 44 0.677 43 0.633 42 
ECU 0.416 12 0.026 11 0.863 10 0.001 12 0.003 11 0.599 10 
EGY 0.027 35 0.131 34 0.232 33 0.063 35 0.221 34 0.346 33 
GAB 0.148 35 0.137 34 0.254 33 0.337 35 0.271 34 0.484 33 
GBR 0.000 33 0.207 32 0.146 31 0.000 33 0.426 32 0.359 31 
GNQ 0.911 15 0.958 13 0.951 11 0.907 15 1.000 13 1.000 11 
IDN 0.207 41 0.189 40 0.235 39 0.451 41 0.368 40 0.363 39 
IND 0.163 10 0.676 9 0.642 8 0.729 10 0.980 9 0.987 8 
IRQ 0.276 39 0.339 38 0.284 37 0.528 39 0.596 38 0.447 37 
ITA 0.183 35 0.282 34 0.416 33 0.288 35 0.396 34 0.563 33 
KAZ 0.191 11 0.880 9 0.000 8 0.084 11 0.884 9 0.990 8 
LBY 0.572 23 0.521 22 0.792 21 0.634 23 0.522 22 0.892 21 
MEX 0.597 15 0.590 14 0.870 13 0.462 15 0.338 14 0.484 13 
MYS 0.000 36 0.077 35 0.037 34 0.011 36 0.306 35 0.193 34 
NGA 0.262 35 0.336 34 0.459 33 0.590 35 0.593 34 0.839 33 
NOR 0.117 31 0.302 30 0.785 29 0.067 31 0.058 30 0.324 29 
OMN 0.085 35 0.165 34 0.409 33 0.280 35 0.456 34 0.782 33 
PER 0.166 29 0.170 28 0.183 27 0.641 29 0.739 28 0.893 27 
QAT 0.659 23 0.752 22 0.941 21 0.553 23 0.616 22 0.934 21 
ROM 0.006 5 0.000 4 1.000 3 0.908 5 1.000 4 1.000 3 
RUS 0.737 19 0.650 18 0.884 17 0.548 19 0.537 18 0.689 17 
SAU 0.592 23 0.474 22 0.790 21 0.599 23 0.493 22 0.872 21 
SDN 0.797 9 0.314 8 0.684 7 0.733 9 0.959 8 0.978 7 
SYR 0.040 35 0.073 34 0.173 33 0.177 35 0.252 34 0.458 33 
THA 0.833 24 0.813 23 0.926 22 0.047 24 0.759 23 0.756 22 
TTO 0.418 34 0.447 33 0.656 32 0.758 34 0.801 33 0.970 32 
TUN 0.288 42 0.249 41 0.531 40 0.509 42 0.439 41 0.741 40 
VEN 0.472 20 0.467 19 0.852 18 0.468 20 0.194 19 0.740 18 
VNM 0.561 19 0.578 18 0.778 17 0.223 19 0.047 18 0.860 17 
YEM 0.488 20 0.540 19 0.643 18 0.319 20 0.034 19 0.034 18 
 
Table 4.22. Country-by-country ADF test results for loilrents_pc. 
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ISO-
code 
0 lags 1 lags 2 lags 0 lags 1 lags 2 lags 
without trend with trend 
p-value n p-value n p-value n p-value n p-value n p-value n 
AGO 0.096 23 0.246 22 0.398 21 0.027 23 0.026 22 0.094 21 
ARE 0.181 23 0.121 22 0.139 21 0.508 23 0.376 22 0.424 21 
ARG 0.674 17 0.708 16 0.564 15 0.893 17 0.954 16 0.933 15 
AUS 0.126 36 0.463 35 0.610 34 0.013 36 0.214 35 0.335 34 
AZE 0.448 7 0.890 5 1.000 3 0.213 7 0.912 5 1.000 3 
BRA 0.689 16 0.760 15 0.628 14 0.778 16 0.912 15 0.841 14 
BRN 0.434 35 0.599 34 0.509 33 0.804 35 0.924 34 0.888 33 
CAN 0.214 20 0.743 16 0.764 12 0.385 20 0.790 16 0.920 12 
CHN 0.290 12 0.088 11 0.273 10 0.582 12 0.661 11 0.829 10 
COG 0.174 32 0.099 31 0.241 30 0.493 32 0.321 31 0.521 30 
COL 0.164 23 0.463 22 0.508 21 0.345 23 0.592 22 0.741 21 
DNK 0.608 30 0.697 29 0.774 28 0.367 30 0.513 29 0.594 28 
DZA 0.241 44 0.211 43 0.224 42 0.546 44 0.503 43 0.526 42 
ECU 0.550 12 0.403 11 0.722 10 0.395 12 0.498 11 0.740 10 
EGY 0.359 35 0.067 34 0.353 33 0.388 35 0.043 34 0.261 33 
GAB 0.180 35 0.072 34 0.069 33 0.437 35 0.170 34 0.122 33 
GBR 0.486 33 0.447 32 0.333 31 0.317 33 0.342 32 0.149 31 
GNQ 0.700 15 0.644 13 0.697 11 0.749 15 0.878 13 0.930 11 
IDN 0.387 41 0.365 40 0.576 39 0.390 41 0.301 40 0.455 39 
IND 0.010 10 0.459 9 0.766 8 0.259 10 0.982 9 0.985 8 
IRQ 0.673 39 0.744 38 0.707 37 0.880 39 0.945 38 0.931 37 
ITA 0.179 35 0.254 34 0.261 33 0.481 35 0.582 34 0.587 33 
KAZ 0.513 11 0.850 9 0.622 8 0.536 11 0.625 9 0.888 8 
LBY 0.875 23 0.842 22 0.707 21 0.825 23 0.663 22 0.733 21 
MEX 0.478 15 0.507 14 0.750 13 0.692 15 0.414 14 0.455 13 
MYS 0.129 36 0.182 35 0.251 34 0.297 36 0.350 35 0.380 34 
NGA 0.069 35 0.007 34 0.035 33 0.231 35 0.050 34 0.151 33 
NOR 0.095 31 0.116 30 0.502 29 0.196 31 0.178 30 0.502 29 
OMN 0.251 35 0.282 34 0.386 33 0.411 35 0.427 34 0.602 33 
PER 0.005 29 0.067 28 0.108 27 0.167 29 0.536 28 0.685 27 
QAT 0.157 23 0.291 22 0.504 21 0.392 23 0.505 22 0.808 21 
ROM 0.044 5 0.908 4 1.000 3 0.392 5 1.000 4 1.000 3 
RUS 0.009 19 0.058 18 0.017 17 0.059 19 0.236 18 0.000 17 
SAU 0.563 23 0.842 22 0.820 21 0.535 23 0.834 22 0.862 21 
SDN 0.623 9 0.787 8 0.943 7 0.168 9 0.178 8 0.003 7 
SYR 0.114 35 0.263 34 0.469 33 0.266 35 0.416 34 0.633 33 
THA 0.790 24 0.951 23 0.909 22 0.354 24 0.858 23 0.864 22 
TTO 0.596 34 0.407 33 0.568 32 0.501 34 0.244 33 0.693 32 
TUN 0.522 42 0.322 41 0.443 40 0.641 42 0.387 41 0.524 40 
VEN 0.377 20 0.236 19 0.370 18 0.707 20 0.320 19 0.662 18 
VNM 0.616 19 0.535 18 0.735 17 0.798 19 0.561 18 0.661 17 
YEM 0.592 20 0.557 19 0.595 18 0.968 20 0.939 19 0.994 18 
 
Table 4.23. Country-by-country ADF test results for loilrents_rgdp. 
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ISO-
code 
0 lags 1 lags 2 lags 0 lags 1 lags 2 lags 
without trend with trend 
p-value n p-value n p-value n p-value n p-value n p-value n 
AGO 0.676 23 0.658 22 0.709 21 0.921 23 0.923 22 0.952 21 
ARE 0.902 23 0.826 22 0.873 21 0.595 23 0.314 22 0.417 21 
ARG 0.603 17 0.663 16 0.680 15 0.632 17 0.669 16 0.676 15 
AUS 0.415 36 0.076 35 0.152 34 0.674 36 0.287 35 0.321 34 
AZE 0.994 7 0.014 5 1.000 3 0.200 7 0.000 5 1.000 3 
BRA 0.655 16 0.347 15 0.032 14 0.911 16 0.755 15 0.276 14 
BRN 0.108 35 0.061 34 0.027 33 0.283 35 0.167 34 0.107 33 
CAN 0.509 20 0.167 16 0.005 12 0.891 20 0.543 16 0.105 12 
CHN 0.994 12 0.932 11 0.948 10 0.968 12 0.997 11 1.000 10 
COG 0.335 32 0.116 31 0.052 30 0.811 32 0.545 31 0.422 30 
COL 0.684 23 0.076 22 0.075 21 0.863 23 0.206 22 0.194 21 
DNK 0.455 30 0.096 29 0.311 28 0.352 30 0.054 29 0.365 28 
DZA 0.470 44 0.477 43 0.498 42 0.688 44 0.729 43 0.663 42 
ECU 0.635 12 0.350 11 0.773 10 0.375 12 0.000 11 0.057 10 
EGY 0.552 35 0.230 34 0.363 33 0.627 35 0.092 34 0.203 33 
GAB 0.228 35 0.324 34 0.420 33 0.575 35 0.787 34 0.892 33 
GBR 0.141 33 0.002 32 0.012 31 0.449 33 0.003 32 0.005 31 
GNQ 0.880 15 0.605 13 0.031 11 0.967 15 0.939 13 0.071 11 
IDN 0.425 41 0.463 40 0.567 39 0.566 41 0.624 40 0.692 39 
IND 0.851 10 0.706 9 0.844 8 0.517 10 0.299 9 0.633 8 
IRQ 0.727 39 0.715 38 0.612 37 0.827 39 0.797 38 0.604 37 
ITA 0.527 35 0.307 34 0.270 33 0.497 35 0.148 34 0.241 33 
KAZ 0.932 11 0.680 9 0.294 8 0.963 11 0.940 9 0.940 8 
LBY 0.763 23 0.687 22 0.579 21 0.566 23 0.396 22 0.093 21 
MEX 0.542 15 0.032 14 0.356 13 0.073 15 0.983 14 0.994 13 
MYS 0.715 36 0.624 35 0.743 34 0.522 36 0.089 35 0.356 34 
NGA 0.338 35 0.163 34 0.074 33 0.497 35 0.220 34 0.055 33 
NOR 0.608 31 0.152 30 0.236 29 0.589 31 0.122 30 0.113 29 
OMN 0.000 35 0.003 34 0.021 33 0.004 35 0.005 34 0.012 33 
PER 0.338 29 0.550 28 0.466 27 0.475 29 0.714 28 0.606 27 
QAT 0.792 23 0.956 22 0.292 21 0.734 23 0.977 22 0.794 21 
ROM 0.294 5 0.749 4 1.000 3 0.995 5 1.000 4 1.000 3 
RUS 0.051 19 0.030 18 0.140 17 0.028 19 0.000 18 0.366 17 
SAU 0.857 23 0.769 22 0.958 21 0.593 23 0.232 22 0.599 21 
SDN 0.467 9 0.576 8 0.703 7 0.978 9 0.133 8 0.833 7 
SYR 0.525 35 0.395 34 0.593 33 0.367 35 0.088 34 0.217 33 
THA 0.661 24 0.267 23 0.450 22 0.915 24 0.576 23 0.749 22 
TTO 0.410 34 0.186 33 0.225 32 0.675 34 0.486 33 0.507 32 
TUN 0.186 42 0.146 41 0.066 40 0.314 42 0.231 41 0.069 40 
VEN 0.948 20 0.906 19 0.879 18 0.882 20 0.813 19 0.569 18 
VNM 0.046 19 0.003 18 0.075 17 0.546 19 0.003 18 0.022 17 
YEM 0.659 20 0.288 19 0.330 18 0.942 20 0.506 19 0.787 18 
 
Table 4.24. Country-by-country ADF test results for lrer. 
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ISO-
code 
0 lags 1 lags 2 lags 0 lags 1 lags 2 lags 
without trend with trend 
p-value n p-value n p-value n p-value n p-value n p-value n 
AGO 0.990 23 0.994 22 0.990 21 0.935 23 0.960 22 0.896 21 
ARE 0.123 23 0.064 22 0.319 21 0.063 23 0.004 22 0.352 21 
ARG 0.958 17 0.808 16 0.868 15 0.959 17 0.622 16 0.642 15 
AUS 0.992 36 0.935 35 0.954 34 0.000 36 0.542 35 0.467 34 
AZE 0.990 7 0.888 5 1.000 3 0.622 7 0.975 5 1.000 3 
BRA 0.872 16 0.931 15 0.986 14 0.817 16 0.718 15 0.843 14 
BRN 0.818 35 0.643 34 0.661 33 0.603 35 0.331 34 0.752 33 
CAN 0.939 20 0.175 16 0.453 12 0.802 20 0.842 16 1.000 12 
CHN 0.999 12 0.964 11 0.998 10 0.791 12 0.458 11 0.983 10 
COG 0.016 32 0.004 31 0.008 30 0.096 32 0.012 31 0.012 30 
COL 0.967 23 0.928 22 0.905 21 0.942 23 0.705 22 0.421 21 
DNK 0.562 30 0.300 29 0.162 28 0.985 30 0.882 29 0.867 28 
DZA 0.549 44 0.224 43 0.346 42 0.488 44 0.378 43 0.513 42 
ECU 0.953 12 0.952 11 0.860 10 0.215 12 0.000 11 0.272 10 
EGY 0.690 35 0.255 34 0.004 33 0.926 35 0.848 34 0.801 33 
GAB 0.385 35 0.145 34 0.008 33 0.218 35 0.045 34 0.023 33 
GBR 0.718 33 0.412 32 0.735 31 0.977 33 0.505 32 0.750 31 
GNQ 0.965 15 0.924 13 0.135 11 1.000 15 1.000 13 0.997 11 
IDN 0.090 41 0.310 40 0.320 39 0.479 41 0.281 40 0.367 39 
IND 0.996 10 0.990 9 0.596 8 0.243 10 0.437 9 0.625 8 
IRQ 0.161 39 0.164 38 0.246 37 0.431 39 0.435 38 0.547 37 
ITA 0.222 35 0.007 34 0.345 33 0.997 35 0.994 34 1.000 33 
KAZ 0.912 11 0.082 9 0.268 8 0.329 11 0.997 9 0.997 8 
LBY 0.247 23 0.055 22 0.035 21 0.353 23 0.247 22 0.167 21 
MEX 0.706 15 0.027 14 0.304 13 0.372 15 0.785 14 0.853 13 
MYS 0.604 36 0.716 35 0.429 34 0.872 36 0.775 35 0.692 34 
NGA 0.589 35 0.454 34 0.406 33 0.948 35 0.894 34 0.976 33 
NOR 0.459 31 0.624 30 0.702 29 0.977 31 0.516 30 0.861 29 
OMN 0.019 35 0.515 34 0.422 33 0.000 35 0.071 34 0.069 33 
PER 0.947 29 0.575 28 0.825 27 0.938 29 0.515 28 0.791 27 
QAT 0.998 23 0.995 22 0.992 21 0.948 23 0.961 22 0.910 21 
ROM 0.546 5 0.694 4 1.000 3 0.953 5 1.000 4 1.000 3 
RUS 0.939 19 0.401 18 0.642 17 0.107 19 0.014 18 0.179 17 
SAU 0.695 23 0.298 22 0.404 21 0.488 23 0.447 22 0.231 21 
SDN 0.989 9 0.975 8 0.959 7 0.526 9 0.183 8 0.256 7 
SYR 0.369 35 0.739 34 0.862 33 0.273 35 0.573 34 0.673 33 
THA 0.126 24 0.129 23 0.141 22 0.848 24 0.346 23 0.219 22 
TTO 0.990 34 0.954 33 0.884 32 0.995 34 0.988 33 0.974 32 
TUN 0.275 42 0.251 41 0.241 40 0.264 42 0.368 41 0.176 40 
VEN 0.265 20 0.064 19 0.343 18 0.591 20 0.228 19 0.668 18 
VNM 0.944 19 0.894 18 0.971 17 0.677 19 0.081 18 0.469 17 
YEM 0.484 20 0.769 19 0.269 18 0.859 20 0.834 19 0.816 18 
 
Table 4.25. Country-by-country ADF test results for lrgdpch. 
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ISO-
code 
0 lags 1 lags 2 lags 0 lags 1 lags 2 lags 
without trend with trend 
p-value n p-value n p-value n p-value n p-value n p-value n 
AGO 0.180 23 0.264 22 0.233 21 0.752 23 0.919 22 0.840 21 
ARE 0.331 23 0.229 22 0.194 21 0.713 23 0.556 22 0.513 21 
ARG 0.524 17 0.597 16 0.635 15 0.708 17 0.839 16 0.584 15 
AUS 0.484 36 0.760 35 0.567 34 0.046 36 0.121 35 0.148 34 
AZE 0.108 7 0.907 5 1.000 3 0.981 7 0.136 5 1.000 3 
BRA 0.755 16 0.658 15 0.176 14 0.953 16 0.962 15 0.806 14 
BRN 0.041 35 0.029 34 0.200 33 0.173 35 0.135 34 0.510 33 
CAN 0.492 20 0.124 16 0.015 12 0.983 20 0.978 16 0.857 12 
CHN 0.638 12 0.238 11 0.450 10 1.000 12 0.997 11 1.000 10 
COG 0.561 32 0.474 31 0.651 30 0.527 32 0.521 31 0.681 30 
COL 0.681 23 0.638 22 0.518 21 0.244 23 0.679 22 0.820 21 
DNK 0.676 30 0.615 29 0.846 28 0.673 30 0.358 29 0.511 28 
DZA 0.429 44 0.081 43 0.337 42 0.703 44 0.213 43 0.654 42 
ECU 0.333 12 0.135 11 0.424 10 0.513 12 0.274 11 0.342 10 
EGY 0.018 35 0.128 34 0.150 33 0.093 35 0.375 34 0.418 33 
GAB 0.063 35 0.095 34 0.318 33 0.182 35 0.219 34 0.494 33 
GBR 0.246 33 0.160 32 0.226 31 0.271 33 0.092 32 0.138 31 
GNQ 0.196 15 0.004 13 0.267 11 0.538 15 0.020 13 0.638 11 
IDN 0.103 41 0.069 40 0.125 39 0.125 41 0.257 40 0.442 39 
IND 0.689 10 0.909 9 0.657 8 0.289 10 0.879 9 0.908 8 
IRQ 0.304 39 0.101 38 0.055 37 0.635 39 0.315 38 0.202 37 
ITA 0.512 35 0.413 34 0.603 33 0.592 35 0.638 34 0.684 33 
KAZ 0.220 11 0.986 9 0.992 8 0.818 11 0.765 9 0.701 8 
LBY 0.846 23 0.776 22 0.671 21 0.846 23 0.802 22 0.758 21 
MEX 0.000 15 0.324 14 0.420 13 0.000 15 0.600 14 0.748 13 
MYS 0.301 36 0.722 35 0.452 34 0.980 36 0.975 35 0.980 34 
NGA 0.249 35 0.531 34 0.320 33 0.200 35 0.541 34 0.232 33 
NOR 0.134 31 0.012 30 0.220 29 0.180 31 0.009 30 0.355 29 
OMN 0.244 35 0.078 34 0.850 33 0.425 35 0.029 34 0.766 33 
PER 0.352 29 0.386 28 0.396 27 0.528 29 0.607 28 0.574 27 
QAT 0.278 23 0.289 22 0.073 21 0.371 23 0.205 22 0.323 21 
ROM 0.893 5 0.949 4 1.000 3 0.000 5 1.000 4 1.000 3 
RUS 0.001 19 0.000 18 0.270 17 0.008 19 0.000 18 0.641 17 
SAU 0.871 23 0.792 22 0.885 21 0.915 23 0.816 22 0.945 21 
SDN 0.551 9 0.465 8 0.495 7 0.792 9 0.995 8 0.991 7 
SYR 0.481 35 0.699 34 0.573 33 0.404 35 0.674 34 0.570 33 
THA 0.224 24 0.061 23 0.200 22 0.790 24 0.526 23 0.675 22 
TTO 0.121 34 0.265 33 0.210 32 0.270 34 0.348 33 0.303 32 
TUN 0.145 42 0.006 41 0.008 40 0.370 42 0.013 41 0.025 40 
VEN 0.552 20 0.440 19 0.384 18 0.752 20 0.698 19 0.618 18 
VNM 0.578 19 0.721 18 0.891 17 0.009 19 0.027 18 0.048 17 
YEM 0.296 20 0.025 19 0.286 18 0.910 20 0.891 19 0.965 18 
 
Table 4.26. Country-by-country ADF test results for lopenc. 
 
  
 198 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Pt 
2.07** 1.84** 0.55 5.78*** 5.73*** 
(0.019) (0.033) (0.710) (0.000) (0.000) 
Pa 
0.39 0.15 1.22 5.12*** 4.66*** 
(0.348) (0.440) (0.888) (0.000) (0.000) 
            
Subsample World D10 OPEC 
World-
OPEC 
D10-OPEC 
n 40 25 10 30 15 
Lags & leads 1 1 1 1 1 
 
Table 4.27. Westerlund (2007) panel cointegration tests using oil price (lbrent). Dependent variable is 
real exchange rate, lrer. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
H0: No cointegration in any panel (𝜙𝑖 = 0 ∀𝑖; Ha: Cointegration in the panel as a whole (𝜙𝑖 < 0 ∀𝑖). 
Two countries, Romania and Sudan, were dropped for these tests due to their short time series. 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Pt 
3.11*** 2.54*** 0.45 6.33*** 5.93*** 
(0.001) (0.006) (0.327) (0.000) (0.000) 
Pa 
0.29 0.10 1.07 5.46*** 5.51*** 
(0.387) (0.462) (0.857) (0.000) (0.000) 
            
Subsample World D10 OPEC 
World-
OPEC 
D10-OPEC 
n 40 25 10 30 15 
Lags & leads 1 1 1 1 1 
 
Table 4.28. Westerlund (2007) panel cointegration tests using real GDP per capita (lrgdpch). 
Dependent variable is real exchange rate, lrer. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% level, respectively. H0: No cointegration in any panel (𝜙𝑖 = 0 ∀𝑖; Ha: Cointegration in the panel as 
a whole (𝜙𝑖 < 0 ∀𝑖). Two countries, Romania and Sudan, were dropped for these tests due to their 
short time series. 
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 Conclusion 
5.1 Summary and Implications of Findings 
This thesis has focussed on the energy elements of economies’ susceptibility to shocks 
and how, if at all, disturbances in the energy sector—oil prices or productivity of the 
oil sector, for example—may affect sustained economic growth. By following a 
review of existing literature and providing a theoretical framework for key 
transmission mechanisms, each chapter provided insights into the complex linkages 
in question through empirical modelling. Literature review sections identified gaps 
in the literature that each chapter attempted to fill. This involved revisiting 
previously-introduced approaches to compare against alternative techniques 
introduced here, including but not limited to alternative measures of key variables, 
modelling richer price dynamics, and conducting time-varying analyses.  
 
Chapter 2 investigated the oil price and macroeconomy relationship to determine 
whether oil price fluctuations Granger-cause changes in output growth rate in the US 
using VAR models. Although the chapter has an empirical focus, I describe a 
structural model that demonstrates the transmission mechanisms from oil price 
fluctuations to macroeconomic fundamentals. Findings showed that the chosen oil 
price measure, model specification, and sample period all have an effect on the nature 
of the relationship being tested. Although traditional approaches suggested a 
weakening relationship between oil price changes and GDP growth in the US, I 
found limited evidence for this observation using the approaches described. As a part 
of this, asymmetric modelling of oil prices as well as capturing oil price volatility 
proved important. Among possible oil price measures, RAC was the most robust 
mainly due to its smaller correlation with control variables. Control variables 
themselves were shown to play a key role in determining the effect of an oil price 
shock on macroeconomic fundamentals. Returning to the importance of modelling, 
Chapter 2 found evidence for asymmetry: oil price hikes affected US GDP growth to 
a larger extent than price falls. Further, oil price shocks normalised by preceding 
periods’ volatility were more highly correlated with output growth than their non-
normalised versions. This suggests that a shock of the same size could have different 
implications depending on when it occurs. To estimate the magnitude of the impact, 
IRFs were used with a 20-quarter horizon. A rolling-window IRF approach provided 
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evidence of changing characteristics of the relationship over time. VARs and IRFs 
estimated using post-1974 data indicated that GDP growth could be between -0.014 
and -0.034 less over a 5-year horizon due to a 10% increase in the price of oil. 
 
Chapter 3 shifted the attention to the UK. The primary objective was to determine 
how the oil price-macroeconomy relationship has evolved over time with an 
emphasis on the importance of oil price volatility modelling using methodology akin 
to that in the previous chapter. This primary objective extended to drawing 
comparisons between the US and the UK. At this stage, the analysis went beyond 
GDP growth and turned to other key variables identified in the analysis, such as 
inflation and unemployment rates in the two countries. In this chapter, I found some 
evidence of Granger-causality between oil price fluctuations and GDP growth, and 
concluded that this relationship is stronger with normalised oil price changes. As in 
the US, this suggests that oil price volatility leading up to a price shock contributes 
to its macroeconomic implications: unanticipated price shocks—those occurring 
after a period of stable prices—tend to have a larger impact on the economy. Inflation 
and unemployment rate, along with others, were also shown to have a strong link 
with oil price fluctuations. There was some, albeit muted, evidence for an asymmetric 
impact of oil price shocks on output growth rate. A rolling-window time-varying 
parameter approach concluded that after 1980, oil price implications have dwindled 
in terms of magnitude despite retaining statistical significance in VAR specifications. 
This time-dependency of parameters carried onto IRF estimates. Although not all 
points estimates were statistically significant, the responses pointed to a time-
dependent relationship. More specifically, 1974:2-2015:2 subsample suggested a 
0.24% decrease in GDP growth as a result of a 10% increase in normalised oil prices, 
whereas the same model estimated over 1986:1-2015:2 led to a 0.11% increase in 
GDP growth in response to the same shock. This observation was corroborated by 
rolling IRFs, which showed that the characteristics of the relationship have shifted as 
the UK’s domestic oil production increased. A key difference between the two 
countries was the role real exchange rates played in the UK as a small open economy. 
This dynamic was captured by import price inflation and domestic inflation, which 
were tested through nested model specifications. In spite of significant differences 
between the US and UK economies, results from Chapters 2 and 3 highlighted some 
fundamental similarities—particularly because, in some sample periods, the UK 
exhibited the behaviour of an oil importer and exporter. For instance, unemployment 
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rate is expected to follow a similar pattern following an oil price disturbance, since 
both countries have oil production activities and extensive direct and indirect 
employment within the sector. 
 
Chapter 4 took a more global approach and concentrated on the B-S hypothesis. 
Using a private dataset, I constructed a measure of profits in the oil sectors of a large 
number of countries to investigate the incidence of Dutch disease. My objective was 
to determine whether there is a long-run relationship between productivity in the oil 
sector and the real exchange rate as well as short-run adjustment towards the 
equilibrium. While working towards this goal, my variable allowed me to avoid the 
noisier traditional measures of productivity, such as GDP. I found that the B-S 
mechanism holds in some oil-exporting countries but not all. For most countries, the 
relationship is non-negligible in size and statistically significant. Surprisingly, 
countries outside of OPEC showed a particularly significant link between their real 
exchange rates and oil rents. However, the largest observed effect was for OPEC 
countries: nearly 12% appreciation in the real exchange rate in response to a 10% 
increase in oil sector productivity as measured by our oil rents per capita. Oil prices 
were identified as another covariate with coefficients of a similar size and sign. In 
addition to per capita oil rents, oil rents as a percentage of GDP was introduced as 
an alternative. The chapter presented some theoretical and empirical evidence that 
the latter variable is a better option, especially since oil rents as a percentage of GDP 
were cointegrated with the real exchange rate in OPEC countries and oil rents per 
capita were not. Furthermore, the oil rents per capita variable does not capture the 
size and significance of the oil sector relative to the rest of the economy. In this 
context, I would expect a one-dollar increase in oil rents to have a larger impact in 
Kuwait than in Australia. Nevertheless, both measures indicated an ambiguous 
relationship between oil rents and real exchange rate in OPEC countries. 
Investigating this further revealed an interesting dynamic about the two oil rents 
variables. Of note is the fact that oil rents measured as a percentage of GDP may 
appear to be shrinking if a country’s economy grows without a matching growth in 
the oil sector. Furthermore, no link was observed between oil rents and the nominal 
exchange rate or the price level in OPEC countries. In line with other researchers, I 
found some evidence that the real oil price has an impact on the real exchange rate. 
In practice, at least one assumption of the B-S hypothesis appears to fail in some 
OPEC countries due to the lack of free movement of labour between tradable and 
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non-tradable sectors. On a global scale, I found evidence for the B-S hypothesis in 
most oil-exporting countries. Moreover, the estimated impact was larger in countries 
whose oil sector accounts for a larger share of GDP. I also found some contradictory 
results which suggested that although B-S mechanism is responsible for resource 
curse to some extent, other factors, such as corruption and underdeveloped financial 
systems, also matter.  
Implications for policymakers and other stakeholders 
The findings in all three chapters have policy implications. Understanding the 
strengths and weaknesses of an economy as well as how a market economy would 
react to a shock are invaluable to policy-makers, especially since there is reason to 
believe that policy responses to energy shocks could mitigate or exacerbate the final 
impact. Chapters 2 and 3 identified a critical dynamic: the effect of an oil price shock 
is dependent on the volatility of oil prices in periods preceding its occurrence. This 
suggests, therefore, that optimal policy response may differ across shocks that are 
otherwise identical. More specifically, a 10% rise on oil price may require a different 
policy response for the same desired outcome depending on whether it occurs 
following a highly volatile period or a calm one. Furthermore, IRF analysis often 
showed an overshooting effect in the response of macroeconomic variables to an oil 
price innovation. Hence, policy tools that take time to take effect may worsen the 
original shock it attempted to counteract. By way of example, Chapter 2 
demonstrated that an oil price increase has a negative GDP growth effect in the 
second quarter followed by a positive effect in the third. Thus, without loss of 
generality, if an interest rate adjustment takes a quarter to take full effect, the initial 
impact of the shock may no longer be relevant. In this sense, it is not simply the size 
and sign of the shock’s effects we want to understand but rather the nature of the 
macroeconomic response as well as its timing. The fact that there is no consensus on 
how central banks should respond to exogenously and endogenously rising oil prices 
could be simply because it is not just the shock that matters but also when it occurs 
and how the economy reacts. Chapters 2 and 3 shed light on this notion providing 
evidence that oil price volatility preceding the shock plays a key role and should, 
therefore, be considered by policymakers. This comment applies to Chapters 3 and 4 
as well. Although the latter takes a global view of the oil rents and real exchange rate 
relationship, understanding what encourages and impedes economic growth has 
been a key objective for policymakers. In this context, Chapter 4 fits into the literature 
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that provides the groundwork for ameliorating the curse of natural resources as we 
look to improve our understanding of how these valuable subsurface assets can be 
transformed into wealth and development as well as the appropriate policy response 
when faced with volatile commodity prices. Beyond policymakers, findings 
presented in the thesis may interest other stakeholders. The link between oil rents, 
real exchange rates, and economic growth is relevant for national oil companies. 
Having observed and quantified a relationship in Chapter 4, ministries and oil 
companies can get a better understanding of the implications productivity in the oil 
sector has on the wider economy. This can, in turn, influence investment and policy 
decisions to counteract detrimental effects and capitalise on growth-inducing ones. 
5.2 Further Work and Concluding Remarks 
Economists have long observed fundamental shifts in the structure of economies over 
time. There is no denying that we are currently undergoing a significant 
transformation and that energy is at the heart of it all. Over the past few decades, we 
changed how we view energy sources (shifts from hydrocarbon-oriented growth 
towards renewable energy sources), what we use energy for (shifts from transport and 
heating to so much more), and how efficient we are at using it (notable improvements 
in energy efficiency across the board). Inevitably, these major shifts have had 
implications for the macroeconomic dynamics that interest us. As such, theoretical 
and empirical modelling should adjust accordingly to capture these effects. This 
thesis addresses this by offering alternative approaches both in variable choice and 
modelling techniques.  
 
There is still a lot of potential for further research. For example, non-linear VARs 
have received attention in the time-series literature but have not been fully adopted 
into the oil price context. Extending current models could provide insights into a new 
dimension of analysis such that we understand not only how volatility affects the 
implications of a shock but also its size. In addition, as more data become available, 
larger specifications become feasible. Large-dimensional VARs that were previously 
impossible to estimate are now within reach. Within this, the Bayesian framework 
and composite likelihood functions can offer an avenue for research. Since Chapters 
2 and 3 found that modelling oil price volatility is key, understanding which model 
specifications capture the underlying dynamics best can inform modelling decisions. 
For example, oil price series could be modelled using a different (G)ARCH 
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specification and using monthly instead of quarterly series could help identify the 
appropriate specification. If asymmetry is to be modelled differently, threshold 
autoregressive models are a good option. Under some regularity assumptions, these 
models are root-n consistent and asymptotically normally distributed. A related by 
distinct approach could be to focus more explicitly on agents’ expectations and 
behavioural implications of oil price dynamics. There is evidence in Chapters 2 and 
3 that oil price volatility plays a key role, so modelling behaviour formally could 
provide further insights. Lastly, Chapter 4 and econometric methods within it benefit 
from long time series. Unfortunately, the dataset imposed limitations on which 
methods I could use and what analysis I could conduct. In addition to allowing more 
detailed analysis, a larger dataset—especially in the time dimension—would enhance 
the asymptotic properties of estimates and may provide more accurate results. 
Building on the surprising results presented in this chapter, especially those pertaining 
to OPEC countries, a strand of research could focus on failure of B-S assumptions in 
these countries, the role the labour market plays in this, and how this could be 
modelled more explicitly. This has far-reaching economic development implications, 
as developing economies’ compositions evolve over time, and understanding what 
this means for economic growth and prosperity can help maximise welfare.  
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